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RENAISSANCE OR RETRENCHMENT: LEGAL 

EDUCATION AT A CROSSROADS 

LAUREN CARASIK' 
For the great enemy of truth is very often not the lie--<ieliberate, 
contrived, and dishonest-but the myth-persistent, persuasive, and 
unrealistic. Too often we hold fast to the cliches of our forebears. We 
subject all facts to a prefabricated set of interpretations. We enjoy the 
comfort of opinion without the discomfort of thought. 
John F. Kennedy" 
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INTRODUCTION 
This is a time of unprecedented opportunity to undertake a comprehensive 
and unflinching evaluation of the deeply entrenched and inflexible system of 
legal education, a system that has utterly failed to adapt its pedagogy, culture, and 
economics to the current and devastating reality facing law students. A 
confluence of factors has created the current state of affairs, including the 
publication of two monographs-the MacCrate Reportl and more recently, the 
Carnegie Reporf-decrying the limitations of the dominant pedagogy of legal 
education and urging educators to reshape its reigning design; a collaborative 
effort to delineate the best practices in legal education in the Best Practices 
Reporf that highlighted the shortcomings of legal education as currently 
structured; crushing student debt, rising tuition, and dismal employment prospects 
for law school graduates; vociferous student dissatisfaction with the value oftheir 
legal education; a continuing crisis in access to justice; the apparent end of "big 
law;" and alarming rates of student and lawyer distress. These factors contain 
1. AM. BAR AsS'N, LEGAL EDUCATION & PROFESSIONAL DEVEWPMENT-AN 
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REpORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: 
NARROWING THE GAP (1992) [hereinafter MACCRATE REpORT). 
2. WILUAM M. SUWVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW (2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REpORT]. 
3. Roy STUCKEy ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROAD 
MAP (2007) [hereinafter BEST PRACTICES], available at http://law.sc.edU/facuJty/stuckeylbest_ 
practiceslbest-practices-full.pdf. 
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thematic cross-currents and send the unmistakable message that it is time to ignite 
a conversation within the academy and the broader legal community to reassess 
our mission, vision, and efficacy as legal educators. We must engage in 
unsparing self-reflection, step back from our entrenched positions and the 
attendant privilege we have as members oflegal academia, and re-imagine a new 
vision for legal education that serves the interests of our students, the bench and 
bar, and society, with an overarching aspiration to bolster the bedrock principle 
of equal justice under law. 
This Article synthesizes some of the literature criticizing the current state of 
legal education with some of the scholarship proposing solutions and argues that 
whatever review is undertaken must be expansive, with a careful and critical look 
at how each piece supports the endeavor. None of the ideas discussed below, 
taken alone, are novel, as scholarship abounds on all of the topics. Considered 
together, they propound a comprehensive and holistic approach to reform. In 
essence, my goal is to catalyze a wholesale reconsideration ofthe very foundation 
of legal education. Many of the seemingly disparate themes comprise a Gordian 
Knot and cannot be rectified in isolation. Accordingly, the whole enterprise must 
be deconstructed, from how we recruit and admit law students to how we license 
them, because the process supports a self-reinforcing and self-perpetuating 
system and culture that fails to serve our students and the society in which they 
will operate as professionals. I hope this engenders a conversation that is 
unfreighted by and decoupled from history and compels us to step back and 
critically assess how we can restructure legal education by focusing our sights on 
the best interests of our students instead ofperpetuating the privilege and lUxury 
of legal academia. Given the well-documented emotional and fiscal price that 
legal education is exacting from our students, it is unconscionable to maintain the 
status quo. After lamenting the current conditions that law students confront, one 
commentator noted that "[a]t some point, law professors can no longer disclaim 
responsibility for the harmful consequences of this enterprise.,,4 
This Article is comprised of three parts. Part I provides the historical 
backdrop for legal education, briefly critiques the current system, and discusses 
the impact of those shortcomings on law students. Part II considers a few of the 
solutions crafted in response to the current crisis facing legal educators. Part III 
suggests a wide array of reforms aimed at remediating these deficiencies and 
argues that any real reform must consider and integrate the seemingly disparate 
but interdependent factors. Piecemeal and incremental reforms will ultimately 
fail to fully remedy the shortcomings of our current system, although they may 
provide marginal relief. This section also illuminates the significant impediments 
to meaningful reform in legal education. Each section contains a truncated 
discussion ofthe topics because space constraints preclude a thorough discussion. 
My intention is not to provide persuasive evidence on each component, but rather 
to encourage a cumulative discussion that underscores the importance of an 
4. Brian Tamanaha, Prospective Students Deserve StraightforwardLaw School Data, NAT'L 
JURIST (Sept. 28, 2010, 11 :02 AM), http://www.nationaljurist.comlcontentlprospective-students­
deserve-straightforward-law-school-data. 
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ecumenical commitment to holistic and comprehensive reform. In conclusion, 
the Article argues that while the forces supporting the status quo are powerful and 
the barriers to change are substantial, the costs of ignoring these problems for law 
students, practicing lawyers, our venerated legal system, and the greater society 
are wholly unacceptable. 
I. CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL EDUCATION 
A. Brief History 
The evolution of law school teaching methodology has been thoroughly 
discussed and dissected in other literature. 5 Although detailed coverage is not 
necessary here, a brief overview is warranted, precisely because legal education 
in the last century has been so tradition-bound and resistant to modernization. As 
initially structured, legal training relied on the apprentice model or classroom 
lectures.6 At the end ofthe nineteenth century, Christopher Columbus Langdell, 
the dean at Harvard Law School, radically altered the teaching methodology by 
introducing and promoting the case method.7 Designed to teach students "how 
to think like lawyers,,,g the case method was premised on the notion of "law as 
science," an assumption that fueled the notion that the primary skill students 
needed to master was the application of appellate decisions to the specific facts 
of individual cases.9 The dominance of the case method rendered the 
apprenticeship model obsolete, and as a result, law students had little opportunity 
to acquire practical skills.IO 
By the 1930s, critics condemned the limitations of the case method on a 
number of grounds, including its inability to recognize the vagaries of real law 
practice and the lack of training in practical skills. The "legal realists," among 
5. See, e.g., Ruta K. Stropus, Mend It, Bend It, and Extend It: The Fate ofTraditional Law 
School Methodology in the 21st Century, 27 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 449 (1996). 
6. Id. at 451-52. 
7. See Margaret Martin Barry et ai., Clinical Educationfor This Millennium: The Third 
Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. REv. 1,5 n.7 (2000). 
8. See Janeen Kerper, Creative Problem Solving vs. the Case Method: A Marvelous 
Adventure in Which Winnie-the-Pooh Meets Mrs. PalsgraJ, 34 CAL. W. L. REv. 351,358 (1998). 
9. Critics rejected the notion that legal analysis could be reduced to "the collection, 
synthesis, and analytical comparison of common law cases ... that could be consistently applied 
in predicting results and deciding future cases." Bernard K. Freamon, Action Research for Justice 
in Newark, New Jersey, in EOUCATING FOR JUSTICE: SOCIAL VALUES AND LEGAL EOUCA nON 167, 
169-70 (Jeremy Cooper & Louise G. Trubek eds., 1997). 
10. See Douglas A. Blaze, Deji.l Vu All Over Again: Reflections on Fifty Years ofClinical 
Education, 64 TENN. L. REv. 939, 943-44 (1997). 
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them Jerome Frankll and Karl Llewellyn,12 believed that the case method's 
reliance on the dry application of purportedly neutral legal principles, as if 
scientifically predictable, left students inadequately prepared to practice law in 
the messy "real world situations" in which actual lawyering unfolded. To remedy 
this deficiency, Frank was one of the first vocal proponents of clinical 
instruction. 13 Although others echoed his call for training in practical skills, there 
was initially little recognition of the value of this methodology in law schools.14 
During the 1960s and 1970s, some changes on the periphery of legal 
education mirrored the zeitgeist in the wider culture. IS Legal clinics, with a focus 
on justice and skills, began to solidify their place in the legal academy, albeit still 
on the edges oflaw school pedagogy. The 1980s ushered in an era in which some 
clinical faculty experienced heightened dissatisfaction with their marginal role 
within law school culture and the lack oflegitimacy for skills training and argued 
for fuller integration into the legal academy.16 Some friction ensued between 
those agitating for legitimacy and those who worried that the goal of integration 
subverted the central and compelling role of a justice mission in clinical 
education, tensions which remain unresolved today.17 Whether skills should 
assume primacy over justice is an ongoing debate. 18 The late 1990s witnessed the 
11. See Jerome Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303, 1315 (1947) 
[hereinafter Frank, A Plea] (proposing that law school be modified to more closely resemble the 
medical school model); Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 907 
(1933). 
12. Legal realists believed that "legal education should expose students to the dynamic 
relationship between theory and practice-that good theory is practical, and that good practice is 
informed by theory." Stephen Wizner, The Law School Clinic: Legal Education in the Interests 
ofJustice, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 1929, 1932 (2002). 
13. See generally Frank, A Plea, supra note II ;see also Blaze,supra note 10, at 939-42,952 
(discussing the goal of clinics to provide comprehensive lawyering skills). 
14. Barry and her colleagues ascribe four main reasons to the legal academy's resistance to 
a full embrace of clinical education. Barry et aI., supra note 7, at 8-9. Specifically, law schools 
bristled at any similarity to a trade school and, as such, rejected the value ofapprenticeships; clinics 
are resource-intensive and do not warrant a large share ofhotly contested resources; no consensus 
supported the notion that any training aside from doctrinal analysis had any educational merit; and 
the American Bar Association initially did little to encourage the use ofclinics. ld. These reasons 
continued to impede the integration of clinics until the late 1950s. See id. at 9-10. 
15. See Wizner, supra note 12, at 1933. 
16. Barry et aI, supra note 7, at 16-17. 
17. See generally id. (discussing the resistance to augmenting clinical training as part of the 
law school curriculum). 
18. See, e.g., Praveen Kosuri, Clinical Legal Education at a Generational Crossroads: X 
Marks the Spot, 17 CUNICALL. REv. 205, 218 (2010) (noting that millennials may not share the 
commitment to social justice that the founders of clinical education espoused and that clinical 
faculty must adapt their pedagogy to the needs and preferences of current students: "Today, all 
students are looking to the clinics to provide them with real-life, practical, and professional skills. 
There will inherently be more students in our presence who simply do not care about any 
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chorus of voices calling for meaningful refonn growing more insistent and 
pervasive. 19 Among the arguments advanced was the argument that the 
responsibility for skills training should not be relegated to the clinics alone.20 
Contemporary critiques oflegal education are no less polemical and continue 
to condemn its anachronistic leanings. As one commentator noted, "[t]here is so 
much wrong with legal education today that it is hard to know where to begin. ,,21 
Other critics have concurred, noting that "the reality is that few law students 
graduate from law school ready to practice law.',zz Any conversation and serious 
self-inventory must address the argument that "there is no way to refonn legal 
education in any meaningful way without giving law students far more 
experience in the practice of law.,,23 Responses to the demands for greater 
practical training came in various fonns, and three reports in particular carried 
enough gravitas to engender dialogue and scholarship--both in agreement and 
dissent-about the recurring critiques ofthe dominant and unyielding law school 
teaching orthodoxies: the MacCrate Report,24 the Carnegie Report,zs and the Best 
Practices Report.26 Although some legal educators are committed to seriously 
evaluating the arguments and principles identified in these reports, many of the 
recurring themes still face stiff resistance. In essence, careful review and 
constructive critiques have engendered incremental advances, but legal education 
has not changed fundamentally in the last quarter century. 
B. Monographs 
1. The Macerate Report.-Responding to widespread reproach about the 
state of legal education, the ABA assembled a task force charged with 
investigating how to "narrow the gap" between law school and the practicing bar. 
The results, entitled the MacCrate Report and issued in 1992, endeavored to 
identify a taxonomy of the requisite skills and values necessary for the practice 
of law.27 The report implored law schools to "narrow the gap" between law 
graduates and the practicing bar.28 While emboldening beleaguered advocates of 
underlying social mission which the clinics employ. They want someone to show them what it 
means to be a lawyer, not just a public interest lawyer."). 
19. See Russell Engler, The Macerate Report Turns IO: Assessing Its Impact andIdentifying 
Gaps We Should Seek to Narrow, 8 CLINICALL. REv. 109, 116 (2001). 
20. See id. at 169 (concluding that the "teaching of fundamental lawyering skills and values 
to help prepare law graduates for practice" should be embraced throughout the law school 
curriculum, not isolated in clinics). 
21. Morrison Torrey, You Call That Education?, 19 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 93,93 (2004). 
22. Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking Legal Education, 43 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 595, 595 
(2008). 
23. Id. at 597. 
24. MACCRATE REpORT, supra note I. 
25. CARNEGIE REpORT, supra note 2. 
26. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 3. 
27. See MACCRATE REpORT, supra note 1, at 3-8. 
28. See id. at l38-40 (identifYing ten fundamental lawyering skills: problem solving, legal 
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skills training, the report triggered an avalanche of commentary, some laudatory 
and some dismissive.29 The MacCrate Report inspired some incremental reforms 
and animated conversations that continued for the next fifteen years. Prominent 
critiques in the commentary included the short shrift paid to problem solving in 
context and the notable absence of inculcation about values in the curriculum.30 
The criticisms contained in the report were not new, and they emanated from 
diverse constituencies: the bench, the bar, accrediting bodies, students, and the 
public. Owing at least in part to institutional resistance to comprehensive reform, 
prior curricular changes were ad hoc in nature and continued to generate 
considerable resistance. 
2. The Carnegie Report.-Fifteen years later, in 2007, dissatisfied with the 
legal academy's intransigence, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of 
Teaching (the "Carnegie Foundation") undertook its own critique, prompted by 
similar concerns. The Carnegie Foundation embarked on a comprehensive 
evaluation of the professional education offered to lawyers, compared this 
training to that provided in other professional training programs, and issued a 
analysis and reasoning, legal research, factual investigation, communication, counseling, 
negotiation, litigation and alternative dispute resolution procedures, organization and management 
oflegal work, and recognizing and resolving ethical dilemmas). 
29. See, e.g., Engler, supra note 19; see also Brook K. Baker, Beyond MacCrate: The Role 
of Context, Experience, Theory, and Reflection in Ecological Learning, 36 ARIZ. L. REv. 287 
(1994). Criticisms include the report's failure to emphasize issues such as the human elements of 
lawyering and creative problem solving. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap by 
Narrowing the Field: What's Missing from the MacCrate Report-OfSkills, Legal Science and 
Being a Human Being, 69 WASH. L. REv. 593, 595-96 (1994); see also Janet Weinstein, Coming 
ofAge: Recognizing the Importance ofInterdisciplinary Education in Law Practice, 74 WASH. L. 
REv. 319, 346-47 (1999) (noting that the MacCrate Report paid scant attention to "the more 
humanistic roles of values, interests, problem prevention, interdisciplinary analysis, creative 
thinking and self-reflection"). For the report's failure to account for the substantial resources 
necessary to alter the curriculum as suggested, see John J. Costonis, The MacCrate Report: Of 
Loaves, Fishes, and the Future ofAmerican Legal Education, 43 J. LEGAL Enuc. 157 (1993), and 
for its failure to address the values underlying diversity, see Beverly Balos, Conferring on the 
MacCrate Report: A Clinical Gaze, 1 CLIN. L. REv. 349 (1994). For the Report's lack ofemphasis 
on research and writing skills, see Lucia Ann Silecchia, Legal Skills Training in the First Year of 
Law School: Research? Writing? Analysis? Or More?, 100 DICKL. REv. 245, 261 (1996), and 
for the Report's failure to incorporate professional values, see Russell G. Pearce, MacCrate's 
Missed Opportunity: The MacCrate Report's Failure to Advance Professional Values, 23 PACE 
L. REv. 575 (2003). 
30. See, e.g., Myron Moskovitz, Beyond the Case Method: It's Time to Teach with Problems, 
42 J. LEGAL Enuc. 241, 245 (1992)("Ifour job is to train students to 'think like lawyers,' then we 
should train them to solve such a problem, because that is the kind of thinking that lawyers must 
actually do. But-you reply-law schools cannot spend their scarce academic resources teaching 
students every single skill they will need in law practice--how to bill clients, how to manage an 
office, how to find the courthouse. True, but problem-solving is not like any of those activities. 
Problem-solving is the single intellectual skill on which all law practice is based."). 
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fairly critical report.31 The Carnegie Report characterized law schools as hybrid 
institutions of which one progenitor is "the historic community of practitioners, 
deeply immersed in the common law and carrying on traditions of craft, 
judgment, and public responsibility.'m Providing a countervailing influence is 
the culture of university research institutions that values scholarly productivity 
over skills often deemed insufficiently intellectual to warrant serious attention or 
the allocation of resources.33 From the inception of modem law schools in the 
1870s, legal education has tilted progressively toward its academic identity, 
relying on the notion that law and legal analysis are scientific undertakings, 
decipherable through formal knowledge.34 Distancing themselves from a model 
pejoratively dismissed as a mere trade school, legal academics have focused 
increasingly on scholarship and research.35 A byproduct of this orientation has 
been considerable contested discourse as to the legal academy's role in preparing 
students for the practice of law.36 Noting this tension, the Carnegie Report 
endeavored to advance a model that integrates formal knowledge and applied 
practice by suggesting curricular and pedagogical realignment.37 Not satisfied 
with reforms aimed solely at inculcation in doctrine and skills, the report also 
directed much of its discussion to the development of professional identity as 
integral to the enterprise of legal education.38 
While the Carnegie Report identified a number of areas in which legal 
education is lacking, it acknowledged the significant challenges attendant to the 
effort to reevaluate and revitalize legal education, making it more relevant to the 
preparation ofpracticing lawyers.39 Past progress toward reform has been spotty 
and occasionally regressive.40 For example, coinciding with greater integration 
31. CARNEGIE REpORT, supra note 2. 
32. Id. at 4. 
33. See id. at 4-5. 
34. See id. at 5. 
35. See id. at 7. 
36. See id. at 8; see also Gary L. Biasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, 
Cognitive Science, and the Functions ofTheory, 45 J. LEGAL Eouc. 313, 316 n.5 (1995) ("Law 
schools seem to be the only professional schools with faculties who see their central function as 
detached from the preparation of professionals for practice. Nor do professors in those other 
schools-medicine, engineering, business, architecture--generally view their scholarly work as 
both more important than, and essentially detached from, the work being performed by 
practitioners. "). 
37. CARNEGIE REpORT, supra note 2, at 8-9. 
38. See id. at 14. The authors explained that 
[p]rofessional identity is, in essence, the individual's answer to questions such as, Who 
am I as a member of this profession? What am I like, and what do I want to be like in 
my professional role? and What place do ethical-social values have in my core sense 
of professional identity? 
Id. at 135. 
39. See generally id. at 162-84. 
40. See, e.g., Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Law School Matrix: Reforming Legal 
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for clinical faculty and the broad range of skills and experiences they provide to 
students was a movement toward hiring doctrinal faculty with less practice 
experience and more impressive academic credentials, further polarizing the 
debate over the allocation of resources between skills training and scholarly 
productivity.41 
3. The Best Practices Report.--Contemporaneous with the publication ofthe 
Carnegie Report, members of the clinical community completed the Best 
Practices Project and issued a Best Practices Report, which endeavored to apply 
the best practices analysis applied widely in other disciplines to legal education.42 
The Best Practices Project methodically deconstructed the skills and professional 
ideals necessary for the competent practice oflaw.43 This monumental effort set 
out guiding principles for the best practices in legal education, arguing that law 
schools must evolve to adapt to the changing legal landscape.44 The Best 
Practices Report exhorted law schools to broaden their perspective of the skills 
necessary for the effective practice oflaw and lamented that this wide conception 
of skills is given scant attention in the law school curriculum.45 The report 
echoed the recurring refrain that law schools fail to instill in their students a sense 
ofprofessional commitment to ensure access to justice, both to the nation's poor 
and to its middle class.46 
The Best Practices Report also decried a lack of professionalism that has 
fueled an erosion of public trust and an accompanying loss of lawyers' standing 
as moralleaders.47 Not satisfied with limiting its purview to skills and values, the 
Education in a Culture of Competition and Conformity, 60 V AND. L. REv. 515, 519 (2007) 
("[H)istory is littered with failed refonn efforts ofthis type. Many brilliant refonns do not take root 
because they overlook the crucial role of law school culture in determining their meaning and 
impact."). 
41. See Brent E. Newton, Preaching What They Don't Practice: Why Law Faculties' 
Preoccupation with Impractical Scholarship and Devaluation ofPractical Competencies Obstrnct 
Reform in the Legal Academy, 62 S.C. L. REv. 105, 127-28 (2010) (noting that the recent decades 
have seen an influx oflaw professors with insufficient practical skills). 
42. See BEST PRACTICES, supra note 3, at 1-3. 
43. See id. at 2-4. 
44. See id. at 13-14. 
45. See id. at 15. According to the Best Practices Report, 
[t]he lawyer ofthe next century will need to be able to diagnose and analyze problems, 
to talk to and listen to people, to facilitate conversations, to negotiate effectively, to 
resolve disputes, to understand and present complex material, to use ever-changing 
technologies, to plan, to evaluate both economic and emotional components and 
consequences of human decision-making, and to be creative---to use tried and true 
methods when they are appropriate, but not to fear new and category-smashing ideas 
or solutions. 
Id. (quoting Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking Problem-Solving Pedagogy Seriously: A Response 
to the Attorney General, 49 J. LEGAL EoUC. 14, 14 (1999)). 
46. Id. at 18-19. 
47. Id. at 20. 
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report exhorted legal educators to attend to the emotional impact oflaw school,48 
noting that "too many law school classrooms, especially during the first year, are 
places where students feel isolated, embarrassed, and humiliated, and their values, 
opinions, and questions are not valued and may even be ridiculed. ,>49 The Best 
Practices Report resolved that "[i]n order to improve the preparation of law 
students for practice, law schools should expand their educational goals, improve 
the competence and professionalism of their graduates, and attend to the well­
being of their students.,,5o These debates are not merely academic-some 
analysts predict that the current recession will prompt prospective employers to 
place an even higher premium on competencies in skills related to the readiness 
to practice law upon graduation.51 Citing increased pressure from law students 
and other constituencies, the Best Practices Report noted that change is inevitable 
and argued that effective reform is better enacted from within the academy than 
imposed externally. 52 
Although these three reports may differ in presentation, several common 
themes are evident. The reports support longstanding efforts of clinical faculty 
to "engage[] in a concerted shift to integrate legal practice with doctrinal learning 
in curricula of engaged clinical legal education. ,,53 The reports are further 
consonant in their position that discussions about pedagogy and competing 
visions about the nature and structure of legal education must not obscure one 
critical element oflaw school mission and purpose-the obligation oflawyers to 
advance justice, particularly for the poor and dispossessed. 54 This theme is 
48. See id. at 21-26. 
49. Id. at 22. 
50. Id. at 13. 
51. E.g., Daniel Thies, RethinkingLegalEducation in Hard Times: The Recession, Practical 
Legal Education, and the New Job Market, 59 J. LEGAL Eouc. 598,599 (2010) (concluding "that 
graduates with practical training will be best situated to succeed in the emerging job market"). 
52. See BEST PRACTICES, supra note 3, at 26-27. 
53. See Letter from Robert R. Kuehn, President, Clinical Legal Education Association, to 
Hulett H. Askew, Consultant on Legal Education & Admissions to the Bar, American Bar 
Association 3 (Oct. 15, 2010), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/legalediaccreditation/ 
Comments%200n%20Foreign%20Program%20Accreditation/CLEA.pdf (regarding the 
accreditation offoreign law schools). 
54. MACCRATE REpORT, supra note 1, at 213. Regarding the second normative goal, 
"striving to promote justice, fairness, and morality," the MacCrate Report states that 
lawyer[s] should be committed to the values of: 
2.1 Promoting Justice, Fairness, and Morality in One's Own Daily Practice, including: 
(a) To the extent required or permitted by the ethical rules of the profession, 
acting in conformance with considerations ofjustice, fairness, and morality when 
making decisions or acting on behalfof a client; 
(b) To the extent required or permitted by the ethical rules of the profession, 
counseling clients to take considerations of justice, fairness, and morality into 
account when the client makes decisions or engages in conduct that may have an 
adverse effect on other individuals or on society; 
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widely echoed by other writers as well.55 
C. Student Vitriol 
Students have responded to increasing tuition, staggering debt, and 
deteriorating job prospects with a fire storm of fury, becoming vocal and more 
sophisticated in disseminating their discontent. 56 This is facilitated in part by the 
students' unprecedented ability to communicate with each other in real time. The 
Internet is a popular forum for student jeremiads declaring that something is 
rotten in the state of legal education, evincing widespread student 
dissatisfaction.57 Student blogs are replete with scathing entries expressing 
outrage at the law schools they accuse ofengaging in unethical behavior through 
the recruitment and matriculation oflaw students without full disclosure as to the 
realistic prospects those students face. 58 While at times the language is so salty 
(c) Treating other people (including clients, other attorneys, and support 
personnel) with dignity and respect; 
2.2 	 Contributing to the Profession's Fulfillment of Its Responsibility to Ensure That 
Adequate Legal Services Are Provided to Those Who Cannot Afford to Pay for 
Them; 
2.3 	 Contributing to the Profession's Fulfillment of its Responsibility to Enhance the 
Capacity of Law and Legal Institutions to Do Justice. 
Id. (citations omitted). The MacCrate Report further argued that "[I]aw school deans, professors, 
administrators and staff must not only promote these values [ofjustice, fairness and morality] by 
words, but must so conduct themselves as to convey to students that these values are essential 
ingredients of our profession." Id. at 236. 
55. E.g., Deborah L. Rhode,Access to Justice: Again, Still, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 10 13, 1021 
(2004) ("[M]ost legal academics have done little to educate themselves, the profession, or the 
public about access to justice and the strategies necessary to increase it. ... [W]e are not shouting 
from rooftops about unmet needs; we are not, for the most part, even murmuring in classrooms or 
muttering in law reviews."); see also John O. Calmore, Social Justice Advocacy in the Third 
Dimension: Addressing the Problem of"Preservation-Through-Transformation, " 16 FLA. J. INT'L 
L. 615, 632 (2004) (noting that "law school fails to produce public spirited and socially responsible 
lawyers") (quoting GEOFFREY C. HAzARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND Enncs OF LAWYERING 971 
(3d ed. 1999)). 
56. See Leslie Kwoh, Irate Law School Grads Say They Were Misled About Job Prospects, 
STAR-LEDGER, Aug. 15, 2010, available at http://www.nj.comlbusiness/indexlssfl20 1 0/08/irate_ 
law_school~ds_saLthe.htrnl; see also Debra Cassens Weiss, AngryLaw Grads Beef, Blog and 
Move On; Tuition Makes $15K Total in 80s Seem Paltry, ABA J., Aug. 16, 2010, available at 
http://www.abajournal.com/weekly/article/angry_law~ads_beeCblog_and_move_on_big_tuit 
ionyales_next_to_15k_totalj 
57. Because student complaints are sometimes perceived by law school faculty and 
administrators as constant and unfounded, the sentiments expressed in melodramatic terms can 
make legitimate concerns easier to dismiss, thereby foreclosing serious attention to the underlying 
issues. 
58. See, e.g., BUT I DID EVERYTHING RIGHT!, http://butidideverythingrightorsoithought. 
blogspot.com (last visited June 9, 20 II); FLUSTER CUCKED, http://flustercucked.blogspot.com(last 
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and accusatory as to be off-putting, the underlying sentiment reflects their 
desperation-they have endured three years of grueling academic demands, 
foregone income, and mounting debt, all undertaken with the belief that at the 
light at the end of the tunnel was a respectable profession and a reasonable salary. 
Instead, they face temporary employment, underemployment in areas such as 
low-wage contract work or even worse, complete unemployment. Whether these 
blogs and efforts exert any real pressure on law schools remains to be seen, but 
current and prospective students make up an important constituency that has 
seemed to be historically out of the mix of any national conversation about legal 
education. 
Aside from vocalizing generalized lament, students are channeling their 
despair into other avenues. Several students in Tennessee have organized a non­
profit group to demand concrete reforms, including more transparency in how law 
schools report and disseminate employment data. 59 Another student expressed his 
despondency about his job prospects by writing to his dean and offering to leave 
law school in his third year if the law school would refund his poorly invested 
tuition.60 A third disgruntled student named his alma mater in his bankruptcy 
case and issued requests for admissions asking his law school to "[a]dmit that 
your business knew or should have known that [the p]laintiff would be in no 
position to repay those loans. ,,61 Modem technology includes not just blogs, but 
other multimedia outlets such as Y ouTube videos, often evincing humorous but 
poignant discontent.62 While the public expressions of outrage may only 
represent a minority view of the most disaffected students and are not always 
written diplomatically, legal educators would do well to heed the opinions 
visited June 9, 20II ); LAWYERS AGAINST THE LAW SCHOOL SCAM, http://lawschooiscam.blogspot. 
com (last visited June 9, 2011); SCAMMED HARD!, http://scammedhard.blogspot.com (last visited 
June 9, 2011); TALES OF THE FOURTH-TIER NOTHING, http://poetryforpants.blogspot.com (last 
visited June 9, 2011); THIRD TIER REALITY, http://thirdtierreality.blogspot.com (last visited July 
3,2011). 
59. See LAW SCHOOL TRANSPARENCY, http://www.lawschooltransparency.com(last visited 
June 9, 2011). Law School Transparency (LST) describes itself as "a Tennessee non-profit 
dedicated to encouraging and facilitating the transparent flow of law school employment 
information." Id. Founded by two Vanderbilt University Law School students in 2009, LST and 
its administrators operate independently of any legal institutions, legal employers, or academic 
reports related to the legal market. Id. 
60. Open Letter to Interim Dean Brown, EAGLEIONLINE (Oct. 15,20I 0), http://eagleionline. 
coml20 IOil 01l5/0pen-Ietter-to-interim-dean-brown. 
61. Elie Mystal, Student v. School: Charlotte School of Law Sued by Student Seeking 
Admissions for Bankruptcy Proceeding, ABOVE THE LAW (July 22, 2010, 10:09 AM), 
http://abovethelaw.coml2010/07/student-v-school-charlotte-school-of-law-sued-by-student-seeking­
admissions-for-bankruptcy-proceeding. 
62. See, e.g., Not Sure If This Is Funny or Sad: "So You Want to Go to Law School," 
IOEALAWG (Oct. 18,2010,8:36 PM), http://westallen.typepad.comlidealawgl2010/10/not-sure-if­
this-is-funny-or-sad.htrnl. 
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expressed. After all, many of these students paid upwards of $120,000,63 in 
addition to fees, books, living expenses, and foregone income, and they are 
understandably dismayed. 
D. Evidence ofLaw Student Distress and Professional Dissatisfaction 
Compounding complaints about the value ofthe skills imparted in law school 
and the dismal economic outlook for students is the evidence documenting the 
toll law school exacts from its students. The literature is rife with articles 
deploring the prevalence and severity of law student distress,64 which manifests 
in a variety of maladaptive responses. Studies document elevated rates of 
depression, anxiety, alcoholism, suicide, and professional dissatisfaction among 
law school students. 65 These alarming statistics are compared to the indicia of 
well-being prior to starting law school, indexed against other graduate school 
students, and followed over the course oflaw school.66 The reported distress does 
63. I note that this figure does not account for merit aid offered to some students, nor to the 
lower tuition typically associated with public law schools. 
64. See, e.g., Lawrence S. Krieger, The Inseparability of Professionalism and Personal 
Satisfaction: Perspectives on Values, Integrity and Happiness, 11 CUNICAL L. REv. 425 (2005) 
[hereinafter Krieger, Inseparability]; Lawrence S. Krieger,!nstitutional Denial About the Dark Side 
ofLaw School, and Fresh Empirical Guidancefor Constructively Breaking the Silence, 52 J. LEGAL 
Eouc. 112 (2002); Ruth Ann McKinney, Depression and Anxiety in Law Students: Are We Part 
of the Problem and Can We Be Part of the Solution?, 8 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 229 (2002); 
Kennon M. Sheldon & Lawrence S. Krieger, Understanding the Negative Effects of Legal 
Education on Law Students: A Longitudinal Test ofSelf-Determination Theory, 33 PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 883 (2007); see also Gerald F. Hess, Heads and Hearts: The Teaching 
and Learning Environment in Law School, 52 J. LEGAL Eouc. 75, 79 (2002) ("Unfortunately 
psychological distress, dissatisfaction, and substance abuse that begin in law school follow many 
graduates into practice."); Ann L. Iijima, Lessons Learned: Legal Education and Law Student 
Dysfonction, 48 J. LEGAL Eouc. 524, 538 (1998) (arguing that law students do not fare well when 
they are required to sacrifice personal values on the "altar of rationalism"); Deborah L. Rhode, 
Legal Education: Professional Interests and Public Values, 34 IND. L. REv. 23, 36 (2000) 
("Although the psychological profile of entering law school students matches that of the general 
public, an estimated twenty to forty percent leave with some psychological dysfunction including 
depression, substance abuse, and various stress related disorders."); Kennon M. Sheldon & 
Lawrence S. Krieger, Does Legal Education Have Undermining Effects on Law Students? 
Evaluating Changes in Motivation, Values, and Well-Being, 22 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 261,283 (2004) 
("[V]arious problems reported in the legal profession, such as depression, excessive commercialism 
and image-consciousness, and lack ofethical and moral behavior, may have significant roots in the 
law-school experience."). 
65. See Todd David Peterson & Elizabeth Waters Peterson, Stemming the Tide of Law 
Student Depression: What Law Schools Need to Learn from the Science ofPositive Psychology, 
9 YALE J. HEALTH POL'y L. & ETHICS 357, 358 (2009) ("In a country where the depression rate is 
ten times higher today than it was in 1960, lawyers sit at the unenviable zenith of depressed 
professionals." (internal citation omitted)). 
66. Id. at 366-67. 
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not drop off after the fIrst year, when one might reasonably write off the statistics 
as reflecting the process ofadjusting to law school. 67 In response to this troubling 
trend, law schools have taken limited steps to address the problem, primarily by 
referring students to on-campus counseling services.68 However, most of these 
measures are aimed at students experiencing clinically signifIcant, self-reported 
distress, and these programs are often not adequately resourced to provide 
sustained assistance to the majority of students. Perhaps most disturbing, these 
programs serve only to relieve distress ex post facto instead of identifying and 
ameliorating the underlying factors before they take their toll on students. 
Student distress is attributed to a variety of factors ranging from the 
unrelenting workload and the constant academic pressure fostered by grading 
curves to the manner in which law school arrests students' moral development.69 
These explanations need not be mutually exclusive, and a synergy among the 
factors impacts each student differently.70 The most frequently suspected 
contributors to student distress are outlined below.7! 
E. Why All This Discontent? 
1. The Socratic Method.--One recurring theme proffered to explain law 
student distress is that disaffection is endemic to the nature of the fIrst year 
curriculum. Socratic teaching, law school's "signature pedagogy," has been 
widely deconstructed. Some argue that it is by its very nature damaging,72 while 
67. [d. at 367. 
68. [d. at 361. Many, if not most, law student insurance programs have limited coverage 
outside of the institution, and if they do provide coverage, it likely requires a contribution from 
already overtaxed student financial resources. It is conceivable that some faculty do not take the 
data about law student distress seriously, as they survived law school without undue harm. 
69. Steven Hartwell, Moral Growth or Moral Angst? A Clinical Approach, II CLINICALL. 
REv. 115,118-19 (2004). 
70. Ofparticular concern is that the negative impact oflaw school seems to be exacerbated 
for students of color and women. See LANI GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, 
LAW SCHOOL, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 76 (1997) ("If law school is 'boot camp' to train 
recruits for equally ruthless law firms, then the success ofthis institution is brilliant. Silence makes 
sense, difference has no place, and domination and alienation are the point. Alternatively, iflaw 
school is an attempt to engage and educate diverse students democratically and critically about the 
practices and possibilities oflaw for all people, then the failure of the institution is alarming. In 
the meantime, the price borne by women across colors is far too high and their critique far too 
powerful to dismiss."). See generally infra Part III.C. 
71. One analyst attributes distress to "the overwhelming workload, intimidating classroom 
dynamics, excessive competition, astronomical debt, personal isolation, lack of feedback, and the 
nearly exclusive emphasis on linear, logical, doctrinal analysis." Lynn C. Herndon, Help You, Help 
Me: Why Law Students Need Peer Teaching, 78 UMKC L. REv. 809, 810 (2010) (quoting Hess, 
supra note 64, at 76). 
72. Some commentators are particularly concerned about the impact ofthe Socratic method 
on women and students of color. E.g., Benjamin V. Madison, III, The Elephant in Law School 
Classrooms: Overuse o/the Socratic Method as an Obstacle to Teaching Modem Law Students, 
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others posit that its utility and potential to inflict harm is dictated by the skill and 
temperament of the professor employing the method.73 As noted earlier, the 
Carnegie Report opined that law schools are reasonably effective in this "first 
apprenticeship.,,74 Suggestions as to how to modify the methodology vary as 
widely as assessments of its efficacy. One school of thought favors keeping 
Socratic teaching intact as the best way to prepare law students for the rigors of 
practice.75 Others suggest that this methodology should be modified after the first 
year, when repetition ofthe style in each subsequent doctrinal class can be mind­
numbing and begins to generate diminishing retums.76 Still others contend that 
irrespective of its suitability, allowing this one-dimensional methodology to 
dominate the entire first year eclipses other learning opportunities, as it is well­
suited to only a narrow range of learning styles.77 Proponents of a modified 
approach suggest that the first year is the prime time to integrate other 
competencies such as training in ethics, professionalism, and practical skills 
beyond the traditional first year writing curriculum.78 Waiting until later may 
present a missed opportunity and even do irreversible damage. Despite the 
diversity of opinions regarding the Socratic method, it seems unlikely to be 
jettisoned in the foreseeable future. Within this framework, however, there is 
ample room to integrate strategies to minimize its negative impacC9 and 
85 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 293, 301 (2008) ("If women and minorities do not benefit from the 
pure-Socratic approach, we ought to ask ourselves whether professors are ironically perpetuating 
a subtle form of discrimination by their insistence upon a purely Socratic classroom."). 
73. Ruth V. McGregor, Response to Bang Goes the Theory-Debunking Traditional Legal 
Education, 3 PHOENIX L. REv. 343, 344-45 (2010) ("There is no question in my mind that the 
effectiveness ofthe Socratic method does depend to a very considerable extent upon a particular 
teacher's ability to help students make the necessary connections between what they are learning, 
the cases they read, and what they need to know to analyze actual problems in the real world."). 
74. CARNEGIE REpORT, supra note 2, at 21-24. This sentiment is echoed by some law 
students~ven those who report dissatisfaction with or distress caused by the law school 
experience-who believe that the method effectively trains students to "think like a lawyer." 
75. Robert M. Lloyd, Hard Law Firms and Soft Law Schools, 83 N.C. L. REv. 667, 677 
(2005) ("Unfortunately, today's [s]oft law schools do not prepare their graduates for ... reality. 
In most law schools, performance is optional. While the practice oflaw has been getting [h]arder, 
law schools have been getting [s]ofter."). 
76. See id. at 677-78. 
77 . Kristin B. Gerdy, Making the Connection: Learning Style Theory and the Legal Research 
Curriculum, 19 LEGAL REFERENCE SERVS. Q. 71, 78 (2001) ("The majority oflegal instruction is 
oriented toward verbal learners."). 
78. See generally Madison, supra note 72. 
79. See, e.g., Marcia Canavan, Using Literature to Teach Legal Writing, 23 QU1NNIPIAC L. 
REv. I, 15-21 (2004) (discussing the use ofstorytelling techniques to teach legal writing); Deleso 
Alford Washington, Critical Race Feminist Bioethics: Telling Stories in Law School and Medical 
School in Pursuit of"Cultural Competency, "72 ALB. L. REv. 961,966 (2009) (advocating for "the 
use of storytelling and narrative analysis in legal and medical educational settings as a viable 
approach to enhance learning as well as benefit ultimate professional interactions"); see generally 
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complement the skills imparted. Given the intensity ofopinion about the Socratic 
method and its centrality to law school pedagogy, a more detailed discussion of 
the varied schools of thought is warranted. 
Arguably, the Socratic method exerts too much pressure on students, who are 
on the hook to answer a series of questions posed by an infinitely more skilled 
professor who is adept at "hiding the ball" and continues to press for answers 
when the student has long since exhausted his ability to argue. Closely related 
to the unrelenting pressure is the perceived humiliation of "getting it wrong" in 
front of a large classroom brimming with one's peers.80 This method is utilized 
even early on in the first year, when students cannot reasonably be expected to 
have mastered the cognitive dexterity necessary to engage in the rigors of 
Socratic banter.81 Admittedly, lawyering may require thinking on one's feet, 
under high-pressure situations, but it is not likely to demand the mastery of large 
quantities ofnew material each day, day after day, in class after class. Moreover, 
real life cases are animated by the authentic clients that provide sufficient details 
to impassion advocates (or at least their motivation for a paycheck), and the hours 
ofpreparation necessary for an appearance on behalfofa client are not analogous 
to the voluminous nightly reading assignments law students slog through, often 
exacting a considerable toll on family, friends, and a sense ofhealthy balance in 
their lives. I am not suggesting that law schools should infantilize or coddle 
students, that hard work is inherently bad, or that the workload should be reduced 
in a way that prevents rigorous preparation. Instead, educators ought to be 
selective and intentional about how they teach and what they assign and assure 
themselves through critical review that the methods employed are reasonably 
calculated to serve those ends. 
The Socratic method is also impugned because as employed by some 
professors, it requires students to separate their morals from their professional 
identity as a lawyer.82 Analysis of the cases requires students to focus on a 
sanitized and dispassionate presentation of facts (disembodied from the people 
who lived those conflicts and devoid ofthe social, historical and political context 
in which the issue arose) and apply purportedly neutral legal concepts to those 
facts. As a result of the forced impartiality and decontextualized facts, students 
must disassociate themselves from their moral reactions to answer with 
Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073 (1989) (arguing in favor 
of storytelling in law). 
80. See Jeffrey D. Jackson, Socrates andLangdell in Legal Writing: Is the Socratic Method 
a Proper Toolfor Legal Writing Courses?, 43 CAL. W. L. REv. 267,285 (2007) (noting that "there 
is ample evidence that a large number of students have found the Socratic method, at least in the 
way it was conducted in their classes, to be both humiliating and terrorizing"). 
81. Presumably, it takes much repetition to impart these skills; thus, the same methodology 
is repeated in different substantive areas throughout three years of law school. 
82. Jane Aiken & Stephen Wizner, Law as Social Work, 11 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'y 63, 73 
(2003) (observing that law school embraces a "curriculum [that] is designed to neutralize ... 
passion by imposing a rigor of thought that divorces law students from their feelings and 
morality. "). 
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imperturbable composure.83 This antiseptic recitation of the facts, repeated ad 
nauseum in each case across substantive areas, can train the mind to disregard the 
rich tapestry ofcircumstances that makes each case compelling and unique. For 
some students, the divorce of their moral identity from the positions they must 
argue is profoundly alienating.84 Related to the personal morality issue, the 
casebook method is also targeted for criticism because its decontextualized facts 
ignore the broader societal implications of individual cases.85 Moreover, many 
law students entered law school with idealistic notions about advancing social 
and economic justice, yet our system of ethics instructs lawyers that the broader 
social implications of legal work are subverted by the goals of individual 
representation. The repeated focus on just one client rather than the lofty ideals 
of systemic change can be disappointing---especially when the outcome in a 
particular case is adverse to a larger group of disenfranchised people-since our 
system privileges the absolute right of clients to dictate the goals of 
representation, absent ethical conflicts. Despite the very real cost of this system, 
students are not often invited to participate in a broader social critique about 
society's preference for the glorification of individual autonomy over a 
collectivist ethos, or even taught that the system reflects those priorities.86 
83. CARNEGIE REpORT, supra note 2, at 139 ("[T]he curricular emphasis on analysis and 
technical competence at the expense ofhuman connection, social context, and social consequences 
is reinforced by the broader culture in most law schools."). 
84. A brief discussion of the issue of morality may illuminate why the Socratic method 
alienates some students more than others. A gender-based critique ofmorality was articulated by 
Carol Gilligan, whose pioneering work on gender difference is both seminal and oft-criticized. See 
generally Erika Rackley, From Arachne to Charlotte: An Imaginative Revisiting ofGilligan's in 
a Different Voice, 13 WM. & MARy J. WOMEN & L. 751 (2007). Gilligan argued that women 
operate on a different moral paradigm than men. After her initial reception as a groundbreaking 
feminist, Gilligan came under attack. Critics chastised her for essentializing women's voices and 
argued that her approach privileged those who conform to the stereotype while marginalizing those 
outside it. Similarly, they argued that her analysis implicitly elevated the female voice as morally 
superior to the male voice and that her theory reduced morality to an overly simplistic, 
decontextualized duality. See id. at 752-53. Although Gilligan's work has been repudiated by 
some subsequent feminists as ultimately having a retrograde impact, certain threads of her 
analysis-namely, that people approach morality differently, between and within cultures-are 
compelling. See id. at 753-56. Removing the inflammatory gender labels, Gilligan has provided 
useful insights-that the amoral, analytical thinking required oflaw students is palatable to some 
and distressing to others. Critiques of Gilligan's gender theories aside, her identification of 
different moral compasses, and the inherent tension they create, can be instructive in looking at the 
law school paradigm. See generally id. 
85. Karen H. Rothenberg, Recalibrating the Moral Compass: Expanding "Thinking Like a 
Lawyer" into "Thinking Like a Leader, " 40 U. ToL. L. REv. 411,412 (2009) ("[L law schools focus 
too heavily on teaching skills for legal analysis while neglecting students' training regarding the 
'social consequences or ethical aspects' of that legal analysis." (citing CARNEGIE REpORT, supra 
note 2, at 187». 
86. Edward Rubin, What's Wrong with Langdell's Method, and What to Do About It, 60 
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Finally, presenting cases with predigested facts, devoid of the emotion that 
typically swirls around legal disputes, forces students to divert their attention 
from the emotional aspects of lawyering. While attorneys must be trained to 
analyze cases dispassionately, avoiding the emotional features of cases can be 
detrimental to students', lawyers', and clients' well-being.87 
Not all educators agree that the casebook method has limitations, and some 
argue that the Socratic method has been unfairly maligned.88 It is true that as 
applied currently, Socratic teaching bears little resemblance to the corrosive and 
imperious manner employed by Professor Kingsfield.89 Proponents posit that 
further deviation from the already eviscerated application of this method leaves 
students woefully unprepared for the rigors of practice90 and that the more 
humanistic application ofthe Socratic method has served only to increase the gap 
between legal education and the practice of law.91 These concerns are 
VAND. L. REv. 609, 612-15 (2007). 
87. See Rhonda V. Magee, Legal Education and the Formation ofProfessional Identity: A 
Critical Spirituo-Humanistic- "Humanity Consciousness "-Perspective, 31 N.Y. U. REv. L. & Soc. 
CHANGE 467, 476 (2007) ("We should talk about the spiritual and emotional implications ofwhat 
we study, what we do, and how we interact with one another, so as to encourage and to model an 
approach to legal education and practice that brings the whole person into the room."); Terry A. 
Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy ofan Emerging Field, 30 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 119, 120 (2006) ("A core presumption underlying modern legality is that reason and 
emotion are different beasts entirely: they belong to separate spheres of human existence; the 
sphere of law admits only of reason; and vigilant policing is required to keep emotion from 
creeping in where it does not belong."); Grant H. Morris, Teaching with Emotion: Enriching the 
Educational Experience of First-Year Law Students, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 465, 474 (2010) 
("[E]motional issues confronting lawyers in 'real' practice should not be deferred until students' 
second or third year of law school. Those issues are an essential part of practical skills and 
professional identity development."). 
88. See, e.g., Michael Vitiello, Professor Kingsjield: The Most Misunderstood Character in 
Literature, 33 HOFSTRAL. REv. 955, 955-56 (2005); see also Lloyd, supra note 75, at 667 (arguing 
that "softening" of the law school curriculum and weakening academic rigor has resulted in law 
schools "doing a poor job" oftraining future lawyers). These arguments reinforce the assumption 
that lawyering is a zero-sum game and that zealous advocacy must somehow be premised on 
combative interactions. This group further argues that other reforms have "softened" law school, 
such as the "increasing reliance on student evaluations as part ofthe tenure process," which offers 
professors an incentive for easy grading and "spoon-feeding" information to increase student 
evaluations. See Christine Pedigo Bartholomew & Johanna Oreskovic, Normalizing Trepidation 
and Anxiety, 48 DUQ. L. REv. 349, 355-56 (2010). 
89. Michael Vitiello, Teaching Effective Oral Argument Skills: Forget About the Drama 
Coach, 75 MISS. L.J. 869, 895 (2006) ("So anathema is the Socratic method that many law schools 
now distance themselves from the historical image of law school and advertise themselves as 
'kinder and gentler,' than the traditional law school where Professor Kingsfield, the archetypal law 
professor in The Paper Chase, roams the halls."). 
90. See Lloyd, supra note 75, at 677. 
91. See Bartholomew & Oreskovic, supra note 88, at 355 ("The slow decline ofthe Socratic 
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undoubtedly genuine and well-intentioned, but as the Best Practices Report points 
out, '" [l]aw professors not only have no incentive to change their teaching 
methods, they have no incentive to change' at all.,,92 
2. CompetitionIGrades.-The grading system employed by the vast majority 
of law schools, and the inherent competition it engenders, is another frequently 
cited source of distress for students.93 The first year's reliance on high-stakes, 
end of semester exams typically provides only summative assessment, a system 
that is often in stark contrast to students' experience in their undergraduate 
institutions. This grading system endures despite criticism from current students 
and practitioners.94 Although some professors have implemented measures 
intended to address this pressure and provide some interim feedback, the fact 
remains that in most cases, the grade is premised almost entirely on one exam that 
typically requires and rewards a discrete skill set that comprises only a minute 
part of what lawyering requires. 
Compounding the pressure exerted by high-stakes exams is the fact that they 
are neither designed nor intended to provide formative feedback. As Erwin 
Chemerinsky states with unapologetic candor, "[t]his is impossible to justify from 
a pedagogical perspective.,,95 If law schools truly exalt the skill of"thinking like 
a lawyer," they cannot subscribe to the belief that this skill is fully imparted 
though classroom exercises and observations in the absence of corrective 
feedback that enables students to gauge their mastery of the material; individual 
feedback ought to be a high priority. A mere numerical grade and its placement 
within a mandatory curve provides little more guidance than allowing a student 
to see how she compares to her competitors, not whether she has mastered the 
material. Nor does it impart assistance in identifying areas of weakness (other 
than test-taking ability) and providing concrete, constructive suggestions as to 
strategies to improve performance.96 Self-reflection and motivation are not 
method contributes to the gap between legal education and practice."). But see generally Eric E. 
Johnson, A Populist Manifesto for Learning the Law, 60 J. LEGAL Eouc. 41 (2010) (arguing that 
law professors should endeavor to make the law easier to learn rather than engage in obfuscation; 
for example, by encouraging and adopting revamped case books that more closely resemble classic 
textbOoks, intent on explaining the law, instead of rendering portraits of sometimes impenetrable 
concepts and presenting judicial opinions that were not written for an audience ofnovices). 
92. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 3, at 211 (quoting Michael Hunter Schwartz, Teaching Law 
by Design: How Learning Theory andInstructional Design Can Inform andReform Law Teaching, 
38 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 347, 362 (2001)). 
93. Peggy Cooper Davis, Slay the Three-Headed Demon!, 43 HARv. c.R.-C.L. L. REv. 619, 
622 (2008) ("The fixed curve interferes with learning. It motivates students to work for grades 
rather than for comprehension or skill development."); see Barbara Glesner Fines, Competition and 
the Curve, 65 UMKC L. REv. 879, 915 (1997) (acknowledging that law schools will continue to 
utilize mandatory grading curves despite compelling reasons not to). 
94. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 3, at 176 ("The single exam tradition remains with us today, 
despite long-standing criticisms from academics, practitioners, and students."). 
95. Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 597. 
96. See Note, Making Docile Lawyers: An Essay on the Pacification ofLaw Students, III 
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encouraged by digits. Mandatory grading curves only exacerbate this pressure.97 
Moreover, mandatory curves can chill collaboration, as peers are perceived as 
competitors in a zero-sum game, deterring students from approaching learning as 
a mutually supportive and beneficial enterprise. The high stakes and isolation can 
cause profound stress and self-doubt.98 Since this is often the only feedback 
students receive, other than the first year legal research and writing curriculum 
(LRW), which is often ungraded or not calculated in GPA,99 summative 
assessment becomes the only indicia of success by which the students feel they 
can measure themselves. Students can come to believe that they are nothing more 
than the sum of their grades lOo and class rank,IOI disregarding a constellation of 
other skills they possess, including many that are integral to good lawyering but 
are neither formally recognized nor universally valued at the law school. I02 
HARV. L. REv, 2027,2036 (1998) (stating that "[t]he significance ofgrades thus becomes inflated 
because without more personalized feedback, grades provide students with the only indication of 
their performance"), 
97, Lawrence S, Krieger, Human Nature as a New Guiding Philosophy for Legal Education 
and the Profession, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 247,263-64 (2008) (criticizing curved grading). 
98. See Grant H. Morris, Preparing Law Students for Disappointing Exam Results: Lessons 
from Casey at the Bat, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REv, 441, 452 (2008) (noting the negative impact oflaw 
school grading systems on student self-esteem). 
99. Motivations may vary for schools that decline to grade LRW courses or to exclude those 
grades from a student's GPA. The decision could be premised on a desire to decrease stress and 
foster learning, although that rationale is arguably applicable to all grades in the first year. 
Alternatively, excluding LRW work from grading or inclusion in GPA could be related to status 
and hierarchy concerns. Because legal writing is often taught by professors without full integration 
into the academy, some may believe that the grades in legal writing do not reflect sufficient 
academic rigor to compete with grades in doctrinal classes, or that the faculty is insufficiently 
qualified to assess student achievement. 
100. Camille Lamar Campbell, How to Use a Tube Top and a Dress Code to Demystify the 
Predictive Writing Process and Build a Framework ofHope During the First Weeks ofClass, 48 
DUQ. L. REv. 273, 291 (2010) (arguing that students often perceive opportunities within the law 
school and future employment prospects as directly correlated with grades, which can cause distress 
that "typically manifests itself in isolation, detachment from the academic process, and a 
corresponding loss of self-confidence and motivation"). 
101. Hess, supra note 64, at 78 (noting that concern with grades and class rank causes 
significant stress for law students and that "[t]he significance ofgrades becomes inflated because 
students get so little feedback during the semester that grades are the only indicator of their 
perfonnance"), 
102. Empathy, interpersonal skills, professionalism, creative problem solving, and a host of 
others skills are necessary to the competent representation of clients. See generally Stacy L. 
Brustin & David F, Chavkin, Testing the Grades: Evaluating Grading Models in Clinical Legal 
Education, 3 CLINICALL. REv, 299 (1997), On a peripheral but relevant note, considerable debate 
has circulated among clinical faculty about the relative merits ofgrading, although no monolithic 
position has resulted. One position holds that ifdoctrinal classes are graded, clinics should follow 
suit to avoid sending a tacit message about the comparative worth of the endeavors and the skills 
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The emphasis on grades and the narrow skills they assess under the current 
regime does serve a purpose by sorting students for prospective employers, 
thereby streamlining the student selection process. Moreover, class rank dictates 
more than just job opportunities, as it is often the benchmark by which other 
learning opportunities in the law school are meted out. 103 The emphasis on grades 
as predictive of the quality ofa student's future legal work is misplaced, as there 
is no definitive study correlating class rank with being an effective and 
professional attorney.104 Presumably, this is in part because lawyers are rarely 
called upon to produce a three-hour written, issue-spotting, closed-book test, and 
the outcome of legal disputes is not determined by a high-stakes exam. Instead, 
effective advocacy requires interpersonal communication and problem-solving 
skills and adherence to ethical and professional norms, qualities that are rarely 
factored into a student's class rank. 105 Other criticisms impugn the accuracy and 
consistency of grading, arguing that the process is ultimately infused with an 
the clinics impart. See id. at 327-28. They further contend that for students who work incredibly 
hard, a grade of "pass" does not reflect the enormous efforts the students have expended and 
equates them with students who barely clear the hurdle of a passing grade, an outcome which is 
fundamentally unfair. In contrast, other clinicians suggest that dispensing with grading fosters a 
more collaborative leaming environment; that sometimes grading clinics as other courses is like 
comparing apples to oranges depending on the vagaries of individual cases and the inherent 
difficulty ofmaking quantitative and qualitative comparisons ofintangible skills; and that students 
should rely on some intrinsic motivation to excel at the enterprise, not the external reward of a 
grade. See id. at 321 n.58. This debate among clinicians fleshes out additional concerns about 
grading. See generally id. 
103. Glesner Fines, supra note 93, at 879 (arguing "that law schools rely too much on grading 
systems (as opposed to evaluation systems); that requiring norm-referenced grading undermines 
an effective learning environment; and that ranking is wholly counterproductive in a program 
designed to prepare individuals to serve justice"}. Glesner Fines suggests that law schools 
delay ranking [students] until the second semester [ofthe first year], or even the second 
year oflaw school, could base first-year grades on a pass/fail system, or could weight 
the cumulative GPA to give greater emphasis to upper-level grades. Where grades are 
used to restrict access to law school programs, such as [I]aw [r]eview, seminars, or 
competitions, law schools should be especially wary that our academic reward systems 
do not aggravate inequality by providing richer, more effective leaming opportunities 
for some students than others. 
Id. at 910. 
104. See James E. Coleman, Jr. & Mitu Gulati, A Response to Professor Sander: Is It Really 
All About the Grades?, 84 N.C. L. REv. 1823, 1828 (2006); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing 
Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34,58,63-64 
(1992); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The Dissonance 
Between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1231,1245-46, 1252 (1991); Daniel 
Keating, Ten Myths About Law School Grading, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 171, 172 (l998). 
105. See generally John O. Sonsteng et aI., A Legal Education Renaissance: A Practical 
Approach for the Twenty-First Century, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 303 (2007) (proposing legal 
education reform and presenting various tables quantitying legal skills). 
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element ofrandomness, creating an outcome which is wholly unacceptable given 
the importance of class rank. 106 
The exclusive reliance on high-stakes testing has cemented its place in legal 
academia for several reasons. Among those is that it is far more labor-intensive 
to provide frequent and detailed feedback to students than summative 
assessments, and law school faculty seem reluctant to hire teaching assistants. 107 
For many law school classes, large enrollment is the norm since "[i]t is also very 
cost-effective to have one teacher in front of a large number of students.,,108 To 
further justify end ofsemester, high-stakes summative feedback, some argue that 
students should be subjected to the type of testing they will need to excel at in 
order to pass the bar. l09 The focus on grades and the power they wield over a 
student's sense of self and optimism for the future offer a compelling reason to 
encourage schools to invest heavily in their academic support programs. I 10 The 
singular focus of the grading system creates intense pressure, and the high stakes 
associated with student performance can lead to depressed, disaffected students. III 
106. See generally Jeffrey Evans Stake, Making the Grade: Some Principles o/Comparative 
Grading, 52 1. LEGAL EDUC. 583 (2002) (analyzing the technical intricacies of the law school 
grading system). 
107. See Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 597. 
108. ld. at 595. 
109. For further discussion of the bar exam, see infra Part III.E; see also AM. BAR ASS'N, 
20 I 0-20 II STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVALOF LAW SCHOOLS 21, available 
at http://www.americanbar.org/contentldam/aba/migrated/legaled/standards/20 I 0­
20 II_standardS/20 I 0-20 II abastandards-pdCfiles/chapter3.authcheckdam.pdf("A law school shall 
not continue the enrollment of a student whose inability to do satisfactory work is sufficiently 
manifest so that the student's continuation in school would inculcate false hopes, constitute 
economic exploitation, or detrimentally affect the education of other students."). The 
corresponding obligation to weed out students who are statistically unlikely to pass the bar can 
cause some shortsighted and ultimately counterproductive results. For example, some students who 
pursue legal education as a powerful social and political tool and have no intention ofpracticing 
law could be edged out despite the irrelevance of bar passage potential. Also, the pressure to 
identify underperforming students could lead schools to ratchet up academic dismissal rates or ask 
students to aver that they will not take the bar exam, lest the results negatively impact the school's 
reputation. Academic dismissal after "only" the first year may minimize the financial and 
emotional cost, but it can be devastating. This is not to suggest that schools should never 
academically dismiss students, but instead that schools should undertake this task judiciously and 
humanely and not be solely driven by statistics. The overarching goal should be first to support 
underperforming students. 
110. Academic support programs should be carefully designed and structured to avoid singling 
out students and sending the message that they are destined to struggle, as such messages may 
create a self-fulfilling prophesy, undermine rather than bolster the acquisition of skills and 
confidence, and reinforce insidious stereotypes. See generally Louis N. Schulze, Jr., Alternative 
Justifications/or LawSchool Academic Support Programs: Self-Determination Theory, Autonomy 
Support, and Humanizing the Law School, 5 CHARLESTON L. REv. 269 (2011). 
III. Morris, supra note 98, at 442-43. 
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Most law students presumably excelled at their undergraduate institutions, and 
the adjustment to struggling with the academic rigors of law school can be 
difficult and disorienting. 112 Further intensifying the stress is that in some 
instances, the pressure to perform well can have an immediate and devastating 
financial impact. 113 
A final criticism is that the intensely competitive atmosphere fostered by 
jockeying for class rank may serve to reinforce the zero-sum game adversarial 
model that pervades lawyering, I 14 causes discontent and distress, and generates 
negative public perceptions along with a host of other drawbacks. Recognizing 
the costs of a system that valorizes the combative nature of some lawyering is 
becoming more widespread, and alternative approaches to lawyering in 
general-specifically, conflict resolution-are gaining a foothold. liS Despite 
evidence of the failings of the grading system employed almost universally by 
law schools, entrenched reasons cement their hold, some related to academic 
integrity and others related to less noble objectives. I16 
112. Id. at4S0-SI (noting that students internalize grades, and those who are "condemned with 
a grade of C' believe they "are marginal at best"). 
113. For some schools that award merit aid as a part of their financial aid package, the grant 
is accompanied by a requirement that the student must remain above a certain percentile/class rank, 
which is statistically impossible to achieve for all students receiving merit aid packages. See, e.g., 
David Segal, Law Students Lose the Grant Game as Schools Win, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 30, 2011, 
available at http://www.nytimes.coml20II /OS/O Ilbusinessnaw-school-grants.html?pagewanted= 
I&J= I &sq=laWOIo20school&st=cse&scp=2; see also Glesner Fines, supra note 93, at 886. This 
increases the pressure and stakes exponentially. Schools presumably disclose to students that they 
must maintain a certain class rank or standing in a certain percentile and that as a result of the 
amount of aid given out, some students will, as a statistical certainty, lose their aid. However, 
many students, unaccustomed to mandatory grading curves, may be unable to realistically assess 
their chances oflosing their merit aid or to fully comprehend the pressure such a requirement will 
add to an already stressful transition. This system, intended to lure students to a less expensive 
option that inures primarily to the benefit of law school revenue and enrollment statistics, is 
unconscionable. 
114. CARNEGIE REpORT, supra note 2, at 149 (quoting a student as saying, "The whole 
adversarial system is set up to produce winners and losers,just as the grading curve creates winners 
and losers."). 
liS. See infra Part III.N. I do not mean to suggest that litigation or aggressive lawyering never 
has its place. Adversarial lawyering is clearly warranted in some circumstances, but in certain 
situations, adversarial lawyering can ultimately yields results that inflict enduring harm on all 
involved, even the parties who prevailed under conventional standards. This is particularly true in 
cases such as divorce and special education, when the parties are likely to have a vested interest in 
maintaining the ability to work cooperatively in the future. In such instances, a "scorched earth" 
approach can extinguish any residual goodwill. Even in less obvious scenarios, cooperative 
problem solving may lead to more buy-in from the parties. Less contested outcomes in cases 
involving a more cooperative approach may help illuminate the broader and long-term implications 
of adversarial dispute resolution processes. 
116. Peterson & Peterson, supra note 6S, at 381 n.1S4 ("In a discussion before a recent moot 
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3. Professional IdealsIProfessionalism.-The system oflegal education was 
initially premised on the exalted concept of citizen lawyers. 1I7 Over time, 
however, these ideals were sometimes eclipsed by the lure of high-salary, high­
prestige jobs. As a result, the connection between lawyering and the greater 
social good became increasingly attenuated. lIB For students who embark on their 
legal education with lofty goals, the recalibrated focus dislocates the ideals that 
brought them to school, as they find little resemblance to the noble profession 
they aspired to join.ll9 
Legal educators seem to shrink from discussions about their role in shaping 
professional ideals. Professors seem comfortable issuing definitive answers about 
doctrine but less so in advancing their beliefs about justice and professionalism. 
Ifthere is no room to convey normative judgments, professors leave students with 
little guidance about how to develop their own professional values, other than 
what they surmise or absorb by osmosis. In hiding behind tenets ofneutrality to 
cover the reluctance to weigh in on these matters, legal educators may tacitly and 
inadvertently send the message that matters of professionalism are wholly 
relegated to the realm ofpersonal choice. Given the stakes, legal educators need 
to provide guidance and leadership on these issues by articulating aspirations for 
professional behavior. 120 Indeed, "instead of sending the positive message they 
are capable of, law faculty may inadvertently send a message of indifference and 
unimportance regarding the most important aspect of being a lawyer-being 
human.,,121 The absence ofattention leaves students to develop their professional 
ideals in a vacuum. 
4. The Economics: Grim Job Prospects, Rising Tuition, 122 and Crushing 
court final argument at George Washington University Law School, Justice Scalia and two 
distinguished circuit judges agreed that the abandonment of grades was not a realistic possibility 
for the vast majority oflaw schools." (citation omitted». 
117. The visibility and importance oflawyers in our society started long before the big fmn 
model made them very wealthy. 
118. See CARNEGIE REpORT, supra note 2, at 150 (noting that law school can disconnect law 
practice from any social significance). 
119. See Krieger, Inseparability, supra note 64, at 433-34. 
120. Various bar committees have developed and distributed aspirational standards for 
professionalism. See BARBARA GLESNER FINES, RESEARCHING PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, 
CH. 3, http://law2.umkc.eduffaculty/profilesiglesnerfineslbgf-13.htm (last visited June 9, 2011) 
("Today, most states have adopted a version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which 
provides regulatory standards for the most part. However, additional aspirational ... [ tenets] have 
been promulgated by specialized professional associations or state and local bar groups."). 
121. Amy Timmer & John Berry, The ABA's Excellent and Inevitable Journey to 
Incorporating Professionalism in Law School Accreditation Standards, 20 PROF. LAW. I, 15 (20 I 0). 
122. Bill Henderson, Law School 4.0: Are Law Schools Relevant to the Future ofLaw?, 
LEGAL PROF. BLOG (July 2, 2009), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legal....Professionl2009/07/law­
school-40-are-Iaw-schools-relevant-to-the-future-of-Iaw.html ("Over the last 30 years, the cost of 
a legal education has increased approximately three times faster than the average household 
incomes. Yet, it is difficult to identify a corresponding innovation within legal education that 
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Debt.-As a result of astronomical tuition increases, law students are saddled 
with withering debt that they have no guarantees of servicing, given the 
constricted job market. 123 The rapid escalation of tuition bills is justified neither 
by transformative reforms in legal education that would warrant the escalation of 
costs nor by being pegged to inflation. Nevertheless, ascending costs translate to 
crushing student debt. 124 The outgoing dean ofNorthwestern University opined 
that the break-even salary for law graduates is $65,000.125 Another study suggests 
that the figure is even higher than that. 126 
Despite the obvious importance of providing students with information 
necessary to gauge their job and salary prospects post-graduation, those interested 
in reviewing alumni employment and salary data face lamentable impediments 
to uncovering unvarnished statistics about individual institutions. Reported 
income and employment statistics for law schools can be inaccessible and 
ultimately misleading for a variety of reasons: a few high-paying jobs raise the 
average, skewing the real median income; 127 law schools dissemble behind fudged 
figures; unemployed or underemployed graduates are less likely to respond to 
inquiries; and some law schools have recently experimented with providing short­
term research jobs to recent graduates to elevate employment rates that do not 
reflect jobs obtained in the real legal marketplace. Optimism expressed by law 
schools is belied by the real numbers. According to the National Association of 
Law Placement (NALP) website, the rate of student employment is at its lowest 
rate since the early 1990s.128 The employment rate fell almost 4% over the prior 
justifies the higher cost."); Elie Mystal, Even U.S. News Suggests Law School Tuition Is Getting 
Ridiculous, ABOVETHE LAW (July 15, 2010,10:58 AM), http://abovethelaw.coml2010/07/even-u-s­
news-suggests-Iaw-school-tuition-is-getting-ridiculous/#more-26942. 
123. The ABA has recently released a memo entitled "The Value Proposition of Attending 
Law School," which advises prospective students to carefully consider the consequences of 
undertaking debt. AM. BAR ASS'N, THE VALUE PROPOSmON OF ATIENDING LAW SCHOOL (2009), 
available at http://www.abanet.org/lsd/legaledlvalue.pdf. 
124. Debt can dampen the goals and ideals that inspired them to attend law school in the first 
place. See EQUAL JUSTICE WORKS, FROM PAPER CHASE TO MONEY CHASE: LAW SCHOOL DEBT 
DNERTS ROAD TO PUBUC SERVICE 6 (2002), available at http://www.americanbar.org/contentl 
darnlabaimigratedimarketresearchIPublicDocumentsllrapsurvey.authcheckdam.pdf ("Faced with 
staggering law school debt, many law school graduates must forgo the call to public service despite 
their interest and commitment to such a career."). 
125. David Lat, Changes in Legal Education: Some Thoughtsfrom Dean David Van Zandt, 
ABOVE THE LAW (Feb. 3, 2010, 8:23 PM), http://abovethelaw.coml2010/02/changes-in-Iegal­
education-some-thoughts-from-dean-david-van-zandtl. 
126. Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, Big but Brittle: Economic Perspectives on the 
Future of the Law Firm in the New Economy, COLUM. Bus. L. REv. (forthcoming 2011) 
(manuscript at 73), available at http://papers.ssrn.comlso13/papers.cfrn?abstractjd=1680624. 
127. See Annie Lowrey, A Case ofSupply v. Demand, SLATE (Oct. 27, 2010, 4:14 PM ESn, 
http://www.slate.comlidl2272621/pagenumlaI1l#p2. 
128. Press Release, Nat' IAss'n ofLegal Placement, Class of2009 Faced New Challenges with 
Recession: Overall Employment Rate Masks Job Market Weakness (May 20,2010), available at 
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two years; nearly 25% of jobs were classified as temporary, including judicial 
clerkships; 10% ofjobs were part-time; and 70.8% were employed in positions 
that required a J.D., representing a decrease from previous years. 129 These figures 
include graduates employed by their alma maters. I3O 
For students unable to command a salary sufficient to service their debt (or 
find employment at all, for that matter), the consequences can be financially 
catastrophic. 131 Yet it can be difficult for law students to grasp the harsh 
reality-that for many of them, law school is not a wise investment-until they 
have already matriculated. 132 Forbes Magazine characterized student debt as "an 
unfolding education hoax on the middle class that's just as insidious, and nearly 
as sweeping, as the housing debacle.,,133 For those idealistic students fighting 
valiantly to dig out of a mountain of debt, the viability of working in public 
interest work will be even more remote. 134 One lawyer argued that the glut oflaw 




131. Burk & McGowan, supra note 126, at 74 ("[M]any graduates ofless prestigious law 
schools, and many graduates with less distinguished academic records and similar credentials, are 
having a very hard time findingjobs remunerative enough to support the levels ofstudent-loan debt 
common among recent graduates, let alone recoup the investment of time and money law school 
represents for them."). 
132. ABA Standard 509 requires law schools to provide "basic consumer information," which 
could be expanded to more fully illuminate the economics for prospective students. AM. BAR 
ASS'N, supra note 109, at 38-39. Whether further information would be useful is questionable, 
however, if students do not fully comprehend that many law schools utilize mandatory grading 
curves and distinct pedagogical underpinnings that differ significantly from typical undergraduate 
teaching and assessment philosophies, a difference that may impede their ability to parallel 
undergraduate performance. If students unrealistically expect that they will be the exceptions to 
salary and employment statistics, additional information may be insufficient to spark a more 
realistic assessment. 
133. Kathy Kristof, The Great Col/ege Hoax, FORBES, Feb. 2, 2009, available at 
http://www.forbes.comlforbes/200910202/060.html. 
134. In my personal conversations with students who came to law school committed to public 
interest work, the stress about finding employment is often raw and palpable. My inability to offer 
reassurances leaves me feeling like I am complicit in their distress. The federal government has 
instituted a loan forgiveness program that includes lawyers working in public interest jobs (broadly 
defined), but this is only available for public loans. See Public Service Loan Forgiveness, FINAID, 
http://www.finaid.org/loans/publicservice.phtml (last visited June 9, 2011). Given the cost of 
education, many students are saddled with substantial private loans for which there is no relief By 
limiting eligibility for loan forgiveness to those working for non-profits, the program excludes 
lawyers who may make low wages working to respond to underserved communities. This may 
serve to discourage people further from experimenting with innovative service delivery 
models-such as the private public interest law firm-because they are technically for-profit 
enterprises, rendering employees ineligible for loan forgiveness. 
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responsible for suppressed wagesI35--43,588 students received a J.D. degree in 
2008, an increase of 11.5% since 2000. 136 Placing blame on the ABA for weak 
regulatory oversight, he invited the federal government to limit the accreditation 
of new law schools as a measure designed to stanch the flow of students lured to 
law school with unrealistic hopes of seeing a fair return on their investment. 137 
F. Conclusion 
Theories abound as to why students are experiencing distress, and a 
combination offactors likely affects each student differently. Dangers attend any 
effort to generalize, and it is important to avoid essentializing students, as they 
do not present a monolithic group. Student resilience may differ based on race, 
gender, socioeconomic status, the presence and consistency of outside support 
networks, the level of financial stress, and whatever constellation of personal 
attributes and pressures accompany them to law school. Irrespective of the 
causes, the statistics documenting severe and pervasive distress paint a startling 
and foreboding picture. Indicators suggest that the stress ofpracticing law is not 
dissimilar from the pressure law students experience. 138 Law schools must 
explore these issues, develop palliative measures, and foster long-term resilience. 
II. RESPONSES 
Suggestions for change come from diverse constituencies with disparate 
perspectives, motivations, and agendas. In some areas, allies for reform have 
made strange bedfellows. The level of responsiveness to the current conditions 
confronting law students varies widely within and among institutions. Some 
visionary, innovative, and intrepid schools have heeded the call to make real 
changes rather than superficial and piecemeal reforms. Others have been 
markedly intractable in their refusal to consider and enact meaningful reforms. 
The following is a sample, admittedly quite limited, of some relatively recent 
efforts to craft meaningful reforms. 
A. HumanizinglBalance in Legal Education 
Because law school and law practice are inordinately stressful for many 
participants, a small but passionate group of educators has been striving to make 
law school and lawyering more humane. Their mission is defined as "seeking to 
maximize the overall health, well being and career satisfaction of law students 
135. Mark Greenbaum, No More Room at the Bench, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2010, available at 
http://articles.latimes.coml20 I 0/jan/08/opinionlla-oe-greenbaum8-20 I Ojan08. 
136. Lowrey, supra note 127. 
137. See Greenbaum, supra note 135. 
138. William E. Livingston, De-Stressing the Profession, 81 MICH. B.J. 25, 26 (2002) ("Work 
overload, competition, dealing with difficult people, and time pressures are stressors found in many 
professions. Unique to law, however, are legal role conflicts, an adversarial system ofjustice, and 
certain areas ofpractice with a more pronounced level ofconflict."). 
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and lawyers."139 In an earlier incarnation, the movement self-identified under the 
umbrella of "humanizing legal education," and more recently, the group was 
accepted as an Association of American Law Schools (AALS) section entitled 
"Balance in Legal Education.,,14o This movement has spawned a number of 
articles theorizing about the problems and proposing solutions. Despite the 
severity and ubiquity of reported distress, neither the harsh statistics nor the 
heroic efforts of these educators appear to have ignited a national conversation 
aimed at getting to the root of the problem.141 According to those committed to 
humanizing legal education, the goal ofhumanizing legal education will only be 
realized by wholesale reevaluation of the process by which we educate lawyers, 
as well as the culture of practice. 142 Despite the enonnity of this task, it should 
be undertaken with a sense of urgency. The discussion must be inclusive and 
expansive, and "[t]o truly humanize legal education we must step out of the 
classroom and hallways and advocate on behalf of our students. We must step 
into the admissions and financial aid offices and take into account the values of 
investing in our students.,,143 
Refonn must be holistic and comprehensive, and it cannot limit its focus to 
just curriculum or job prospects. As Barbara Glesner Fines observes, schools 
cannot just "[a]dd humanizing and stir."I44 Glesner Fines defines three core 
principles of humanizing legal education.145 The first, to "do no harm,"146 
requires professors to attend to the environment they create and to recognize and 
mitigate the stressors that make law school such a devastating experience for 
many students.147 Second, professors are exhorted to understand their students 
139. Humanizing Law School, FLA. STATE UNIV. COLL. OF LAW, http://www.law.fsu.edul 
academic-programslhumanizingJawschool/humanizingJawschool.html (last visited June 9,2011). 
140. Bruce 1. Winick, Greetingsfrom the Chair, EQUIPOISE, Dec. 2009, at 1, available at 
http://www .aals.orgidocuments/sectionslbalancelBalanceInLegaIEdDec _09.pdf The Florida State 
University College ofLaw was recognized by the new section as making a significant contribution 
to the group's mission by hosting a listserv devoted to the topic of balance in the legal education 
field and facilitating discussion therein. Id.; see also Humanizing Ideas, FLA. STATE UNN. COLL. 
OF LAW, http://humanizingideas.law.fsu.eduldefault.asp (last visited June 9,2011). 
141. Barbara Glesner Fines, Fundamental Principles and Challenges ofHumanizing Legal 
Education, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 313,321 (2008). 
142. Id. at 317-18. 
143. Id. at 325. 
144. Id. at 318. 
145. Id. at 313. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 315-18; see also Herndon, supra note 70, at 815-17 (observing that the best attribute 
ofthe class rank system is that it helps employers with selectingjob candidates, but noting that this 
system is unreliable, primarily because it offers a limited assessment of a student's full ability); 
Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education: How Law Schools Reproduce Social 
Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56 BUFF. L. REv. 1155,1186 (2008) ("The class rank system 
has not changed substantively from its origins at Harvard in 1887. Class rank, based on grades 
received on law school examinations, continues to serve as the competitive selection process for 
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and interact with the same compassion that they expect students to cultivate 
toward their clients. 148 Finally, Glesner Fines provides a poignant reminder ofthe 
core values ofhumanism, which embraces working toward peace and justice and 
encourages professors to nurture these ideals in their students.149 The critique of 
law and legal institutions is not enough-lawyering itself must also be 
scrutinized. Self-awareness is empowering, and "[s ]tudents at least need to be 
made aware, not only of the various sorts of lawyer they might become but also 
of the various kinds of approaches they can take toward lawyering itself.,,150 
Larry Krieger, a pioneering voice in the humanizing movement, excerpted several 
parts of his article for distribution to students, exhorting them to identify their 
core values, maintain perspective about what really matters, and strive for a 
healthy balance in their lives. 151 
Deviation in law school from the established norm of uniformity can be 
perceived as heretical, and the traditional curriculum and structure of interactions 
between professor and student is viewed by some as sacrosanct. Moreover, the 
assumptions that law schools should toughen students up, not attend to their inner 
lives, can be veiled behind objections about academic rigor. Given the 
entrenched ethos, institutional will is required to shake the traditional law school 
curriculum from its firmly planted roots. 
B. Outcome Measures 
Another area that spawns acrimonious and suspicious debate is the topic of 
"outcome measures,,,152 which are widely employed by other accrediting 
membership on law review, law school honors, and as a gate-keeping mechanism for legal 
employers. Legal employers use a student's class rank to determine who they will interview for 
positions, refusing to consider students who do not make the strict cut-off point. Moreover, even 
if a law firm elects to interview students from lower-tiered schools (and many will not), the class 
rank cut-off point for graduates at lower-tiered schools is significantly lower than where it is for 
graduates at more prestigious schools. Thus, similar to what occurs with the overall ranking oflaw 
schools, the economic value of a law degree wiII depend on the class rank of the student." 
(footnotes omitted»; Judith WeIch Wegner, Reframing Legal Education's "WickedProblems, .. 61 
RUTGERS L. REv. 867, 1006 (2009) (noting that employers may also benefit from access to a 
comprehensive portfolio outlining a law student's accomplishments, "encouraging attention to more 
than class rank and grades," thereby providing a better evaluation of a student's overall legal 
capacity). I can state from experience that some ofmy most academically successful students were 
not necessarily those whom I expected would be the most effective advocates. 
148. G1esner Fines, supra note 141, at 319. 
149. ld. at 322-23. 
150. CARNEGIE REpORT, supra note 2, at 132. 
151. Lawrence S. Krieger, What We're Not Telling Law Students-and Lawyers-That They 
Really Need to Know: Some Thoughts-in-Action Toward Revitalizing the Professionfrom Its Roots, 
13 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 18 (1999) (exhorting students to maintain balance between career and family 
and to stay loyal to their ideals.). 
152. In discussions regarding whether schools satisfy their learning objectives, the ABA is 
considering various changes to the current standards, including the implementation of outcome 
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agencies. IS3 The movement to implement outcome measures emanates from 
dissatisfaction with the current system ofreporting "input measures," such as the 
number of volumes in a library, faculty-student ratios,IS4 per pupil expenditures, 
and bar passage rates. Critics argue that the typical comparative input measures 
do little to truly illuminate the value of the educational experience for students 
and do not empower them to make meaningful comparisons to other law 
schools. ISS To remedy this problem, those advocating for the imposition and 
institutionalization of outcome measures argue that law students deserve 
transparency and the ability to make informed decisions about how they will be 
edified and enriched by the selection of a particular law school program. 
Skeptics of outcome measures enumerate a number of objections. In a letter 
outlining concerns, the Society ofAmerican Law Teachers (SALT) reiterated the 
most frequently stated objections to the prospective change in standards: that the 
proposed "accreditation [s]tandards are overly prescriptive, will be a costly 
administrative endeavor, and will force law schools to reduce everything to a 
quantifiable measure and thus [spur] ... a 'race to the bottom.",IS6 Building 
assessments. According to the most recent draft: 
The following methods, when properly applied and given proper weight, are among the 
acceptable methods to measure the degree to which students have attained competency 
in the school's student learning outcomes: review of the records the law ... [school] 
maintains to measure individual student achievement pursuant to Standard 304, 
evaluation of student learning portfolios, student evaluation of the sufficiency of their 
education, student performance in capstone courses or other courses that appropriately 
assess a variety of skills and knowledge, bar exam passage rates, placement rates, 
surveys of attorneys, judges, and alumni, and assessment of student performance by 
judges, attorneys or law professors from other schools. The methods to measure the 
degree of student achievement of learning outcomes are likely to be different from 
school to school and law schools are not required by this standard to use any particular 
methods. 
AM. BARAss 'N, REpORT OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON STUDENT LEARNING OUTCOMES 5 (2011), available 
at http://apps.americanbar.org/legaledicommittees/cornstandards.html(scroll down to "Meeting 
Date: January 8-9,2011" and click "Report of Subcommittee on Student Learning Outcomes"). 
153. These include business, architecture, pharmacy, and dental schools. Karen Sloan, 
Holding Schools Accountable, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 22, 2010, available at http://www.law.coml 
jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ .jsp?id= 1202443 899383. 
154. Faculty-student ratios do not provide enough information for students to make 
knowledgeable assumptions about the accessibility offacuity, whether ratios translates to class size, 
and, if so, whether this is present across the board or solely in introductory lecture classes or 
seminars. 
155. See Mary Crossley & Lu-in Wang, Learning by Doing: An Experience with Outcomes 
Assessment, 41 U. TOL. L. REv. 269, 269 (2010) ("An emphasis on assessment and outcomes 
measures is a drum beat that is growing louder in American legal education."). 
156. Letter from Raquel Aldana & Steven Bender, Co-Presidents of the Soc'y of Am. Law 
Teachers (SAL n, to Donald Polden, Dean ofSanta Clara Law Sch., and Steven C. Bahls, President 
of Augustana Coil. 1 (Mar. 8, 2010), available at http://www.saltlaw.org/userfiles/filel3-5­
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consensus on defining the requisite skills and the more thorny and elusive 
problem of measuring them are daunting tasks. Critics are concerned that a new 
standard would be too magisterial, requiring an inflexible, designated curriculum 
with little room for faculty to develop and pilot innovative programs tailored to 
their institutional mission. 157 They further worry about the potential cost of 
implementing such a system,158 pointing out that because law schools lack the 
expertise to design and administer outcome assessments, they may be forced to 
seek outside consultants, driving up costs and intruding on law school 
autonomy.159 Finally, commentators worry that schools could develop disparate 
standards and even allow schools to thwart even the most minimal alternations. 160 
SALT proposed a middle ground by suggesting the mandate to provide 
instruction on a set of core lawyering skills that every law student should master 
irrespective of the area of practice, while allowing latitude to individual 
institutions to develop programs consistent with their specific programmatic 
goals. 161 Resistance also emanates from concern about the economics of 
implementing assessment measures, which coincide with calls to enhance and 
expand the labor intensive enterprise of skill bUilding. 
Further criticism ofoutput measures is premised on the concern that they are 
part of a larger insidious effort to deregulate the legal academy, thereby 
devolving to law school administrators the "full discretion to determine their own 
mission and to inaugurate a curriculum to fulfill that mission."162 If the ABA 
adopts standards related to outcome measures, careful design will be critical to 
ensure that the priorities and values embedded in the current methodology do not 
inadvertently reinforce the outdated norms educators are hoping to revise. 
Another risk is the difficulty of assessing the mastery of intangibles, such as 
internalized habits of self-reflection. Perhaps most alarming is the fear that 
outcome measures will be purely focused on bar passage without examining the 
inherent problems and shortcomings of the bar exam as the ultimate gatekeeper 
of the profession. Moreover, a focus on the relatively easy-to-measure bar 
passage results could compel schools to "teach to the test" to the exclusion of 
other worthy and important competencies. At a minimum, it would be useful to 
incorporate an expansive conception of the outcomes schools implicitly value by 
implementing measurements of success, writ large. 
The significant risks of new standards have to be weighed against the right 
IOSALTSuggested%20Modifications%20to%20Standard%20302.pdf 
157. See id. at 2,4. 
158. Katherine Mangan, LawSchools Resist Proposal to Assess Them Basedon What Students 
Learn, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 10, 2010, available at http://chronicle.com!articlelLaw­
Schools-Resist-Proposal-to/634941 ("Given the fragility ofthe legal profession and the fragility of 
law-school finances, it's a tough time to think about taking on a major process of assessment." 
(quoting Lauren K. Robel, Dean, Ind. Univ. Maurer Sch. of Law)). 
159. Aldana & Bender, supra note 156, at 5-6. 
160. [d. at 2, 4. 
161. [d. at 2. 
162. Kuehn, supra note 53, at 2. 
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of students to rely on the stated educational mission of a law school and the 
institution's ability to satisfy that mission by providing effective instruction in 
those areas. Despite the risks and challenges, the imposition of outcome 
measures is likely to prompt a vigorous debate about what should be measured 
and, presumably, why those skills are important, generating the possibility for a 
constructive dialogue. 
C. 	 Procedural and Structural Changes to Accreditation Standards/Structural 
Changes to the Academy 
A variety ofproposed changes to the current accreditation standards threaten 
to uproot the underlying structure of law school. The process and substance of 
the debate are provoking much consternation within the academy. For example, 
objecting to procedural changes, the Clinical Legal Educators Association 
(CLEA) recently expressed dismay that in the process of altering longstanding 
accreditation standards, the standards review committee failed to solicit opinions 
and invite the participation ofvarious stakeholders impacted by reform efforts. 163 
In particular, CLEA objected to procedural changes that signaled the 
unwillingness of the committee to seriously consider comments during the 
formative stage of developing reform. l64 CLEA expressed concern that the 
availability ofsubsequent opportunities to comment would be essentially illusory 
since proposed changes would already be cemented and therefore 
unchangeable. 165 Of particular concern is that the committee appeared to rely 
almost exclusively on the agenda advanced by the American Law Deans 
Association (ALDA), an organization proposing radical deregulation ofthe legal 
academy.166 As outlined in the concerns expressed by CLEA, the flawed process 
creates the distinct possibility that legal education could be fundamentally altered 
while excluding many dissenting voices and eclipsing any meaningful effort at 
consensus-building. 
The concerted effort to deregulate the law school accreditation process is 
inflamed by what can be reasonably perceived as the veiled goal ofmoving to an 
entrepreneurial model of legal education, with deans emboldened to function as 
autocratic business leaders. The obvious price of deregulation if taken to its 
extreme would be the end of "job security, academic freedom, and meaningful 
participation in law school governance.,,167 Under an extreme version of this 
model, law schools would have little or no full-time faculty, allowing them to 
contain costs and be nimble to effectuate changes, untethered to the demands of 
163. Letter from Robert Kuehn, President, CLEA, to Hon. Christine Durham, Chair, Council 
on Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar and member, Utah Supreme Court; Hulett H. Askew, 
Consultant on Legal Educ.; and Donald J. Polden, Dean, Santa Clara Law Sch. 2 (Nov. 4, 2010), 




166. Id. at 2-3. 
167. See Kuehn, supra note 53, at 2. 
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faculty governance that can be notoriously contentious and obstructionist. One 
argument to justify a reduction in full-time faculty members is based on criticisms 
of the utility of increasingly esoteric faculty scholarship that is produced on the 
backs oflaw students, with no real attendant benefit to the students. 168 According 
to this argument, the money spent supporting law professors to produce 
scholarship could be better spent providing direct benefits to the students who 
finance those salaries. In a move that is less of a threat to the traditional law 
school faculty, ALDA is strongly pushing to eliminate security of position for 
clinical faculty. 169 Motivated, at least in part, to respond to the increasing cost of 
legal education, the member deans are demanding more freedom and power to 
tinker with faculty security, status, and salary.170 
Although the underlying motivation of easing the financial burden of legal 
education is commendable and long overdue, the downsides of the ALDA 
proposal are considerable. Once launched, these modifications could lead down 
a slippery slope, ultimately signaling the reincarnation of the legal academy into 
mere technocratic enterprises. One school of thought touts the benefits of 
replacing at least some of the immovable and expensive full-time faculty with a 
more flexible, less demanding group of adjuncts, 171 a group without any vested 
stake in democratic law school governance. Under such a model, law students 
could be taught by less expensive, less organized, and transient adjuncts who 
work at the pleasure of the dean.172 Undoubtedly, if the ABA authorizes the 
168. Thies, supra note 51, at 599 ("No longer can schools continue to subsidize academic 
research at the expense of teaching practical skills to their graduates."); see also Newton, supra 
note 41, at 135-36 ("[M]any tenured professors continue to publish impractical law review articles 
in highly ranked reviews because such publications yield benefits even after tenure. Despite the 
extensive post-secondary education possessed by many law professors hired during the last decade, 
the quality ofteaching by such faculty members (as a class) is deficient, particularly in preparing 
students to actually practice law (which should be the primary mission ofa professional school for 
future attorneys)." (internal citations omitted»; Edward Rubin, Should Law Schools Support 
Faculty Research?, 17 J. CONTEMP.LEGALISSUES 139, 161-62 (2008)("[S]cholarship and teaching 
have increasingly diverged .... The scholarship that receives most attention these days, and that 
brings its authors most renown, is largely disconnected from the required first year curriculum and 
increasingly remote from all but the most specialized and sophisticated upper class courses."). 
169. Peter A. Joy & Robert R. Kuehn, The Evolution ofABA Standardsfor Clinical Faculty, 
75 TENN. L. REv. 183,214 (2008). 
170. See Scott Jaschik, Law School Professors' Tenure in Danger?, USA TODAY, July 26, 
2010, available at http://www.usatoday.comlnews/educationl2010-07-26-ihe-law-tenure_N.htm 
(stating that the push for ABA's removal offacuity tenureship language from the ABA standards 
was initiated by the dean ofNorthwestern University, David Van Zandt). 
171. See Sonsteng et aI., supra note 105, at 339-41. 
172. See John Sonsteng & David Camarotto, Minnesota Lawyers Evaluate Law Schools, 
Training and Job Satisfaction©, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 327, 330 (2000) ("The use of non­
tenured teachers, closely supervised adjuncts, non-lawyer professionals· and the best distance­
learning techniques will improve training and reduce costs."); Judith Welch Wegner, Response: 
More Complicated Than We Think, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 623,633 (2010) (noting that employing 
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increased use of adjuncts, such as judges and practitioners, they can provide 
practical skills training at decreased COSt.1 73 On the positive side, adjuncts would 
typically be drawn from the ranks of the practicing bar and would infuse the 
classroom with realHfe experience. However, in the absence offull-time faculty, 
or in the presence of one whose power has been essentially usurped, the dean 
would possess absolute authority to ahiculate and implement a law school's 
mission without any democratic checks and balances. Important issues that are 
already receiving short shrift, such as a school's commitment to justice and the 
inculcation of values, could become even more tangential in such a system. 
Although some professors rail against the contested discourse and infinite 
regressions that plague some faculty meetings and stifle reform efforts, there is 
value in the process ofdiscussion and democratic voting, even in the face ofvery 
real power imbalances. 
Despite the need to dislodge the faculty from their current comfort and 
complacency, I strenuously object to many of the assumptions embedded in 
ALDA's proposed reforms. In effect, some of the proposals could eviscerate 
academic freedom.174 It is disheartening that hard-fought gains are facing 
renewed threats l75 such as security of position for clinicians, who at times can 
seem singularly vulnerable to political interference. 176 Retrograde as they are, 
adjunct faculty will be beneficial in two areas: teaching students practical skills and serving as a 
cost reduction measure). This is essentially outsourcing, as non full-time faculty, who presumably 
have a practice and are excluded from participation in law school governance, are unlikely to read 
articles about law school pedagogy in their unremunerated spare time. Although discussions at 
faculty meetings can at times border on the absurd, the discourse can provide cross-pollination of 
ideas. Law schools should not minimize the administrative burden ofclosely overseeing adjuncts. 
Moreover, the concentration of power in the hands of one omnipotent administrator certainly 
presents significant risks. 
173. Thies, supra note 51, at 619-21 (proposing safeguards such as the publication of an 
adjunct handbook, smaller class sizes for adjuncts, attention to hiring and training, the development 
of a more rigorous interview process that includes the teaching presentation typically required of 
full-time faculty candidates, and careful evaluation and critique by full-time faculty members). 
Thies further notes that the current ABA accreditation process provides disincentives to the greater 
use ofadjuncts, including their deflated percentage for purposes offacuity-student ratios and active 
discouragement for the integration of adjuncts in the first year curriculum. See id. at 621. 
174. This loss ofacademic freedom would conceivably pose greater threats to clinical faculty 
than their doctrinal counterparts because of the former's tendency to use their voices in live 
controversies with real and often powerful adversaries rather than engage in disagreements in the 
relatively safe venue of scholarly publications. 
175. See infra Part m.M. 
176. See Sussex Commons Assoc. v. Rutgers, 6 A.3d 983, 990 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2010) (holding that clinic was a public agency and, as such, subject to open access); Robert R. 
Kuehn, Denying Access to Legal Representation: The Attack on the Tulane Environmental Law 
Clinic, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'y 33, 37 (2000); Maryland Legislature Blunts Threat to Law Clinic 
Funding, ABANow (Apr. 7,20I 0), http://www.abanow.orgl2010/04/maryland-legislature-blunts­
threat-to-law-clinic-fundingl; see also Robert R. Kuehn & Peter A. Joy, An Ethics Critique of 
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however, the proposals deserve credit for sparking a national conversation-ifnot 
exactly soul-searching inquiry-about what we do in legal academia and why we 
do it. It is difficult to completely dismiss the notion that the current system may 
serve the interests oflaw professors, but it is not serving students. However, the 
academy should not categorically reject deregulation and experimentation out of 
fear of the ALDA agenda because the proposed changes may hold the key to 
some much needed reforms. Instead, despite the very valid concerns, educators 
should focus on establishing and safeguarding the floor of good educational 
practices and build in mechanisms to assuage fears about the end of a uniform 
program of legal education. In truth, even under the current system that strives 
to impose unified standards, legal education is not uniform. Adaptability is 
key-not in the regressive manner promoted by the ALDA, but in a manner that 
incorporates progressive values. 
III. SUGGESTIONS 
As outlined above, the current state of legal education demands serious and 
sustained attention. Legal educators can hand-wring and cling desperately to the 
old traditions, or they can re-imagine legal education in ways that address its 
multiple shortcomings. The latter can be achieved by making the instructional 
process more humane and humanizing, providing better and more relevant 
training, reducing costs and their concomitant impact on student debt, turning the 
lasers on ourselves to examine our resistance, and constructing this enterprise as 
student-centered. A wide range of possibilities exist if faculty push themselves 
to think outside the box, and here I outline only a few. Professors need to 
consider options without retreating to the corners of their historically designated 
roles in the wrestling ring, and without underestimating the forces ofresistance. 177 
A. Allow Flexibility for Schools to Reevaluate Institutional Mission 178 
Law schools could benefit from the latitude to individualize their programs 
instead of hewing to a uniform model that might be neither appropriate nor 
achievable for a particular institution. Some deans bristle at the "one size fits all" 
approach mandated by the current ABA accreditation standards. 179 Admittedly, 
there are risks associated with looser, more adaptive regulation oflegal education, 
and some critics fear the unintended and potentially regressive consequences of 
Interference in Law School Clinics, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 1971, 1975 (2003). 
177. Sturm & Guinier, supra note 40, at 520 (warning that law school "culture is remarkably 
static, non-adaptive, and resistant to change, even in the face of strong pressure from significant 
constituents oflegal education and evidence that law schools are not fulfilling core aspects oftheir 
mission"). 
178. Sturm and Guinier note that this is "a time for systemic reflection and for reconstituting 
the framework and relationships shaping law schools." Id. at 517. 
179. Sherwood Ross, 7 Law School Deans Rip Accreditor American Bar Assn., OpEDNEWS 
(Dec. 3, 2008), http://www.opednews.com/populum/print_friendly.php?p=7 -Law-School-Deans­
Rip-Acc-by-Sherwood-Ross-081203-512.html&c=a. 
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experimentation. Deborah Rhode, hardly a voice associated with the reactionary 
ALDA, has argued in favor of specialized law schools that reflect the reality, 
needs, and mission oflaw schools and the communities served by their graduates, 
noting that different skills are necessary depending on the location and type of 
practice. ISO This represents another area where faculty should restrain the impulse 
to reflexively reject innovation simply because it parallels the ALDA position. 
Clearly, permitting experimentation and deviation from a standardized curriculum 
could further stratify law schools and legal practice. But if schools are not 
adequately preparing students to practice law in the venues in which they are 
most likely to practice, legal institutions are facing increasingly compressed 
resources, and students are facing increased debt, it is incumbent upon all oflegal 
academia to direct energy and thought into figuring out how to educate students 
in a way that enables them to service their debt, support their families, and serve 
their communities, not fund faculty paychecks and research stipends. 
Some undeniable logic attends the argument that law schools focused on nuts 
and bolts practice could reallocate resources to ensure that students obtain the 
type of skills necessary to flourish in the professional areas commonly 
represented in the demographics oftheir graduates. If one concedes the validity 
ofthe argument that some scholarship provides little practical benefit to students 
despite its cost, individual schools could repurpose salary and stipends to those 
who provide instruction in skills rather than research. Stratification is risky, but 
perhaps such a model would make law school more broadly accessible, and 
consequently make lawyers available to a wider swath of the population. This is 
a worthy goal in light of the prevalence of people dispossessed from the legal 
system. Although it is easy to see why a bifurcated system is objectionable, the 
concept deserves discussion, as there may be ways to mitigate those very valid 
concerns. 
Law schools must engage in the careful and perhaps painful process of self­
reflection about institutional mission and vision. Not every school can possess 
a coveted spot in the top tier, and educational programs at lower-tiered 
institutions should not reflexively try to mimic the programs at those schools and 
aspire to a standard many schools will never achieve. A reasonable query is why 
the academy should not allow law schools to recognize and respond to the 
distinctions that already exist-notably, graduates ofprestigious law schools are 
more likely to work at big firms and enter legal academia; local law schools will 
more likely produce lawyers who represent individuals within their communities. 
Law schools should be able to individualize the training to provide the skills 
180. DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE 190 (2000) ("It makes little sense to 
require the same training for the Wall Street securities specialist and the small town matrimonial 
lawyer. While some students may want a generalist degree, others could benefit from a more 
specialized advanced curriculum or from shorter, more affordable programs that would prepare 
graduates for limited practice areas."). But see Michael A. Olivas, "Majors" in Law?: A 
Dissenting View, 43 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 625, 627 (2008) (arguing that Rhode's proposal 
would result in further stratification among law schools). 
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necessary to succeed in a small firm or solo practice. 181 Perhaps some schools 
should set their sights on serving their communities rather than covet a higher 
ranking. 182 Schools could be encouraged to follow the example cited by the 
Carnegie Report, detailing the distinct programs at CUNY and NYU.183 The 
Carnegie Report lauds the schools for their ability to "form communities of 
learning in which the form of curriculum and pedagogy follows, or anticipates, 
their students' future professional functions."I84 
B. Increase Diversity ofFacuity, Students, and the Profession 
Exhortations to increase diversity within law schools and the legal profession 
elicit little conceptual opposition. 185 However, merely acknowledging the 
importance of diversity within law schools is insufficient to combat the existing 
disparities with the intention, determination, and rigor necessary to overcome the 
barriers to fuller participation. Legal education and the legal profession have 
witnessed significant progress in eliminating homogeneity, and they are far more 
representative ofthe general population than before.186 Despite very real progress 
in enhancing the diversity oflaw schools however, significant obstacles endure. 187 
Current minority enrollment in law school is at approximately 20%;188 African­
181. Redirecting resources away from scholarly pursuits may ultimately reinforce further 
stratification because faculty interested in research and writing might migrate to schools that value 
scholarly output. 
182. See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Two Hemispheres ofLegal Education and the Rise and 
Fall ofLocal Law Schools, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 863, 887 (2006-07) ("Local law schools, 
however, must do more than this to justify their continued existence. The schools need to focus 
more on training their students to practice and compete better in the small-firm, personal-client 
sphere where the majority of their graduates will practice."). 
183. CARNEGIE REpORT, supra note 2, at 34-45. 
184. See id. at 43. 
185. But see Rachel F. Moran, Diversity and Its Discontents: The End ofAffirmative Action 
at Boalt Hall, 88 CAL. L. REv. 2241, 2258-59 (2000) (citing studies suggesting that increasing racial 
diversity within law schools comes with risks, including the increasing balkanization of students 
of color, which must be weighed against the risks of minority "tokenism"). 
186. Whites comprise 90.3% oflawyers, and 69% oflawyers are men. AM. BARAss'N, GoAL 
IX REpORT 2006-2007: THE STATUS OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN THE AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION 5 (2007) [hereinafter GoAL IX REpORT], available at http://www.americanbar. 
orglcontentldamlabalmigratedl2011_buildlracial_ethnic_diversityIcredp~oal9_ 2007 _2011.auth 
checkdam.pdf; COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, A CURRENT GLANCE AT WOMEN IN THE 
LAW 2009, at 1 (2009), available at http://www.americanbar.orglcontentldarnlabalmigratedl 
womenireportsiCurrentGlanceStatistics2009.authcheckdam.pdf. 
187. Ryan D. King et aI., Demography ofthe Legal Profession and Racial Disparities in 
Sentencing, 44 LAW & Soc'yREv. I, I (2010) (observing that "the legal profession [is] now more 
racially and ethnically diverse than at any point in U.S. history"). 
188. See LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL & AM. BAR ASS'N, OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA­
APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS 2009 EDITION 858-62 (2008). The composition of law school student 
bodies is not expected to be reflective of the general population any time soon. See ABA 
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Americans constitute 4.2% ofthe legal profession (but 12.9% ofthe population), 
and Latinos comprise 3.7% of the legal profession (but 12.5% of the 
population).189 Women are now well-represented among law students, but they 
are still underrepresented in the academy and the profession, most notably at the 
highest levels of practice. 190 Inattention to remediating the factors that obstruct 
realization ofegalitarian and diversity ideals serves to perpetuate the present state 
of affairs. 
This section recognizes an expansive definition of diversity, including not 
just race and gender, but a host "of social, political, and cultural variations in 
individuals/groups, including those related to class, national origin, sexual 
orientation, geographic region, political affiliation, religion, ability/disability and 
age.,,191 Heterogeneity in law school classes and the profession contributes 
immeasurably to enriched understanding of the myriad experiences and 
perspectives that combine and overlap to form the human condition. Because of 
the historical foundation of race and gender disparities, and because much of the 
scholarship focuses on these two areas,192 they will be the primary focus of this 
section. This decision should not be taken to suggest that these two are the only 
categories worthy ofattention, but instead should be taken as symbolic ofa much 
more inclusive and expansive conception of diversity. 
Given the changing demographics of this countryl93 and of the legal 
profession, the cultural changes engendered by globalization require law schools 
Leadership: Office ofDiversity Initiatives, AM. BAR ASS'N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
leadership/diversity.html (last visited June 9, 2011). 
189. GoAL IX REpORT, supra note 186, at 5. 
190. Deborah Jones Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, New Directions for Women in the Legal 
Academy, 53 J. LEGALEDUC. 489, 490-91 (2003) (reporting that a study ofhired tenure track and 
non-tenure track faculty from 1986 to 1991 revealed that "[a]ggressive action ... was needed just 
to assure that faculties identified and hired women who were equal to the white men they so readily 
hired"); Eli Wald, Glass Ceilings and Dead Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender Stereotypes, 
and the Future of Women Lawyers at Large Law Firms, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 2245, 2245-46 
(2010); see generally Deborah Jones Merritt, Are Women Stuck on the Academic Ladder? An 
Empirical Perspective, 10 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 249,251 (2000)( demonstrating through empirical 
research that women in general, and particularly those of color, were disadvantaged in the job 
market in legal academia). 
191. Meera E. Deo et aI., Paint by Number? How the Race and Gender ofLawSchool Faculty 
Affect the First-Year Cu"iculum, 29 CHICANA/o-LATINA/o L. REv. 1, 3 (2010) (citation omitted). 
Given the current financial conditions, attention to issues ofsocioeconomic diversity and its impact 
on the accessibility of legal education class seems a worthy topic. 
192. See id. at 4. 
193. Barry et aI., supra note 7, at 62 (citing projections by the U.S. Census Bureau that by 
2050 in the United States, the percentages ofCaucasians and persons ofcolor will be equal); David 
Hal1, Giving Birth to a Racially Just Society in the 21st Century, 21 U. ARK. LiTfLERocKL. REv. 
927,935 (1999) (suggesting that "by the year 2030, the number ofpeople ofcolor will exceed the 
number ofwhites in this country"). 
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to provide instruction on multicultural competencies. 194 Even the Supreme Court 
has recognized the importance of diversity in legal education,195 noting that a 
diverse class contributes to cross-cultural understanding, preparing students to 
function in a diverse workforce, and deconstructing stereotypes. 196 
The significance of these issues extends far beyond the confines of legal 
education to the practice of law as members of an increasingly globalized 
community. Lawyers will have no choice but to develop multicultural 
competencies, even if they expect to practice in a narrowly local field or 
homogenous community.197 Aside from the intrinsic value of a more diverse 
bench and bar, diversity within the profession appears to support a more impartial 
administration ofjustice,198 greater perceived legitimacy ofour democracy, 199 and 
194. Sue Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8 
CUNICAL L. REv. 33, 34-35 (2001); see also BEST PRACTICES, supra note 3, at 66 (identifying 
"[s]ensitivity and effectiveness with diverse clients and colleagues" as one offive professional 
values). 
195. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) ("Our conclusion that the [I]aw [s]chool 
has a compelling interest in a diverse student body is informed by our view that attaining a diverse 
student body is atthe heart ofthe [I]aw [s ]chool's properinstitutional mission, and that'good faith' 
on the part of a university is 'presumed' absent 'a showing to the contrary.'" (citation omitted)). 
196. Id. at 330-31. 
197. Deo et aI., supra note 191, at 7 ("[A] meaningful presence offaculty of color, female 
faculty, and students of color in the classroom is critical not only for students who find diversity 
discussions personally significant, but also for every student who wishes to understand how the law 
develops in a society that is becoming progressively multicultural."); see also Charles R. Calleros, 
Training a Diverse Student Body for a Multicultural Society, 8 LA RAzA L.J. 140, 142 (1995) 
("[S]ome law students may expect to practice law in a field in which race, gender, sexual 
orientation, age, religion, physical and mental ability, economic class, and other significant 
personal characteristics simply do not matter. Thus, a graduate may try to define a narrow legal 
niche in which he or she can maintain at least the illusion that sensitivity to diverse perspectives 
is unnecessary for a successful practice oflaw. However, even those who do not seek to challenge 
the legal system's claims ofobjectivity will find it difficult to deny or escape the cultural pluralism 
of our national identity ...." (internal citation omitted)). 
198. See King et aI., supra note 187, at 26 (noting that after studying the impact of a more 
diverse bar to the sentencing practices of non-white convicts, the authors concluded "that more 
racial diversity in the bar results in less racial disparity in criminal sentencing"); see generally 
Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality andRepresentation on State 
Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REv. 95 (1997) (lamenting the dearth ofminority judges and positing that 
a diverse bench and varied perspectives enhance impartiality and public perceptions of fairness); 
Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence, 57 
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 405 (2000) (arguing that homogeneity undermines the perceived and real 
legitimacy of the judiciary). 
199. Carla D. Pratt, Taking Diversity Seriously: Affirmative Action and the Democratic Role 
ofLaw Schools: A Response to Professor Brown, 43 Hous. L. REv. 55, 77 (2006) ("The visual 
presence of lawyers of color serving in leadership positions in our democracy assures people of 
color that they belong to the political community and that their group interests are being represented 
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the training of lawyers more likely to provide services to underserved 
communities.200 The intersection between a heterogeneous student body and 
advancing justice is critically important. As Anderson notes, if legal education 
reform directs its attention only to "the curriculum but fail[s] to address who law 
schools teach and who our graduates serve, we will have missed an opportunity 
to diversify the profession and renew its commitment to making justice a reality 
for all. ,,201 
Realizing the goal ofassembling a diverse student body requires law schools 
to increase the heterogeneity ofthe applicant pool. Instead ofmerely articulating 
disappointment about the lack of qualified candidates and relying on minimal 
efforts such as sending out ever-increasing quantities of glossy admissions 
literature, schools need to dig deeper into the roots of the problem. Some critics 
argue that one of the most intractable impediments to a diverse student body is 
a failure to invest in the pipeline process, and law schools are well-situated to 
make a meaningful contribution to these initiatives.202 Providing meaningful and 
sustained support for the pipeline process is a substantial commitment, but most 
profound problems are not solved without holistic and sustained efforts. Other 
studies have suggested that initiatives are necessary to enhance diversity within 
law school and the profession. For example, one report on the disproportionately 
low representation of Latinas outlined several suggestions, including the 
implementation of a mentoring program, increasing the visibility of Latina role 
models, conducting outreach to various community members to fortify the 
pipeline process, and developing support networks. 203 Additional initiatives 
included eliminating glass ceilings that penalize women for endeavoring to strike 
a balance between family and career, as well as drawing attention to the 
underrepresentation of Latinas in law school and the profession.204 Little 
empirical evidence has been gathered to elucidate all the barriers to a diverse 
academy and profession, heightening the importance of engaging in a systematic 
study. In the interim, law schools can begin to act on common sense suggestions, 
gather, share, and analyze data, and expand beyond the nominal efforts that have 
failed to achieve the objectives ofdiversifying law school and the legal practice. 
in governmental debates and decisionmaking."). 
200. Michelle 1. Anderson, Legal Education Reform. Diversity. and Access to Justice, 61 
RUTGERS L. REv. 1011, 1025 (2009) ("For justice and legitimacy, however, broad access to the 
profession must be a central concern. The overwhelming whiteness of the profession contributes 
to a disparity injustice for the poor and disempowered."). 
201. [d. 
202. Sarah E. Redfield, The Educational Pipeline to Law Schoo/-Too Broken and Too 
Narrow to Provide Diversity, 8 PIERCE L. REv. 347, 381 (2010) ("Law schools and the law 
cornmunity, with their institutional infrastructure and systemic connections, have the capacity to 
craft, support, and sustain successful pipeline interventions before the law school gates, should they 
have and commit the will."). 
203. HISPANIcNAT'LBARAss'N,FEWANDFARBETWEEN: THE REALTY OF LATINA LAWYERS 
(2009). 
204. See id. at 7. 
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Once assembled in school, commentators have suggested various methods of 
making the entire process of legal education more inclusive and relevant to a 
diverse student body.205 Ensuring a diverse faculty is indisputably important-an 
ideal that is far from the current reality, despite the ABA's objectives of 
"[p]romot[ing] full and equal participation in the association, our profession, and 
the justice system by all persons" and "[e ]liminat[ing] bias in the legal profession 
and the justice system. ,,206 The notion that diversity is important merely because 
it provides role models has drawn fire207 as critics point out the myriad benefits 
of a diversified faculty. Despite the value of a heterogeneous faculty, statistics 
about the presence ofwomen208 and people ofcolor09 in the academy are telling. 
Increasing faculty diversity must be a priority, not merely paying lip service to 
it. This requires a wide array of initiatives such as paying close attention to how 
teaching loads are assigned.2\o Further examples include expanding conceptions 
ofvalued scholarship to include critical and interdisciplinary theories, analyzing 
whether women and minority faculty fare worse in teaching evaluations than their 
205. One professor suggests the following methods: "[m]ake classrooms welcoming"; 
"[a]ssign minority and white women faculty to teach in the fIrst year"; "[r]equire a pedagogy that 
does not have a demonstrated bias"; "[e ]liminate letter grades, relying upon a pass/fail system"; and 
"[ e ]ncourage faculty to utilize take-home exams." Morrison Torrey, Actually Begin to Satisfy ABA 
Standards 211 (a) and 212(a): Eliminate Race and Sex Bias in Legal Education, 43 HARv. C.R.­
C.L. L. REv. 615, 616-17 (2008). 
206. Diversity, AM. BAR ASS'N, http://www.americanbar.org/portals/diversity.htrnl (last 
visited June 10,2011). 
207. Lani Guinier, Of Gentlemen and Role Models, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 93,98-99 
(1990). 
208. One report found that 36.9% of all law faculty are women. 2007-2008 Association of 
American Law Schools Statistical Report on Law Faculty, ASS'N OF AM. LAW SCH., 
http://www.aals.org/statistics/2008dltlgender.htrnl (click "Gender and Age" hyperlink) (last visited 
June 10,2011). That number drops when calculating the percent oftenure track or tenured women, 
which falls to 30.4% women. Id. (click "Job Security" hyperlink); see also Ass'NOF AM. L. SCH., 
ON LAW SCHOOL FACULTY AND CANDIDATES FOR LAW FACULTY POSITIONS 4-5 (2005-06), 
available at http://www.aals.org/documents/statisticsl20052006statistics onlawfaculty.pdf(showing 
that 81.2% ofdeans, 63.6% ofassociate deans with professor title, 74.1 % ofprofessors, 55.2% of 
associate professors, and 54.9% of assistant professors are male). 
209. Only 15.2% offacultywere identifIed as non-white. 2007-2008Association ofAmerican 
Law Schools Statistical Report on Law School Faculty, supra note 209 (click "Race and Ethnicity" 
hyperlink). 
210. Faculty candidates and those under review who are not ofthe dominant culture may face 
challenges. For example, evidence suggests that women and faculty ofcolor fare worse in teaching 
evaluations than their white male counterparts, and progressive and critical scholarship agendas 
may not be as well-received. Moreover, women may be assigned to teach classes considered 
"soft." See, e.g., Matjorie E. Kornhauser, Rooms of Their Own: An Empirical Study of 
Occupational Segregation by Gender Among Law Professors, 73 UMKC L. REv. 293,305,314 
(2004) (arguing that "[g]enerally, female law professors disproportionately teach courses that can 
be described as more 'feminine,' softer, less hard core, and often perceived as less prestigious"). 
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white male counterparts, and exploring and dismantling other impediments to a 
full representation in the academy. In addition to a representative faculty, other 
suggestions exhort professors to attend to the classroom dynamics that alienate 
students hailing from diverse backgrounds.2I1 
Despite the discomfort associated with raising issues of race, gender, and 
diversity more generally, professors should be encouraged to confront and 
address these issues, as they are often central to a complete discussion of the 
context of cases.212 One critic concluded that "white males tend to exclude and 
avoid discussions regarding race and gender, while female faculty and faculty of 
color tended to engage in diversity discussions. As a whole, students prefer 
classroom discussions that include race and gender issues as means of 
illuminating how the law affects people differently.,,213 Compounding the 
211. See Sari Bashi & Maryana Iskander, Why Legal Education Is Failing Women, 18 YALE 
lL. & FEMINISM 389, 389 (2006); Adam Neufeld, Costs ofan Outdated Pedagogy? Study on 
Gender at Harvard Law School, 13 AM. UJ. GENDER SOC. POL'y & L. 511, 572 (2005) (arguing 
that eliminating "the Socratic method or hiring more female faculty will not alone end gender 
differences or address likely underlying causes. Rather, the problems with the current legal 
education that cause gender differences are likely far more nuanced-part curricular, part 
pedagogical, part cultural, and part social-and their effect on gender is only one ofmany harmful 
manifestations.... This search for underlying causes will require that the law school community 
discuss and grapple with the missions and methods of legal education more generally."); see also 
Felice Batlan et ai., Not Our Mother's Law School?: A Third-Wave Feminist Study of Women's 
Experiences in Law School, 39 U. BALT. L.F. 124, 128, 147 (2009) (noting that a review of the 
literature over the last twenty-five years generally "conclude[s] that women are much less satisfied 
with their law school experience than men and often experience deep feelings of alienation while 
in law school" and recommending that law schools "provide more female mentors for the student 
body"). The authors do, however, laud the end ofthe discrepancy in achievement between men and 
women, noting that in some instances, women have begun to outperform men. Id. at 128-29. But 
see Claire G. Schwab, A Shifting Gender Divide: The Impact ofGender on Education at Columbia 
Law School in the New Millennium, 36 COLUM. lL. & SOC. PROBS. 299, 301, 327 (2003) (arguing 
that gender is not dispositive in dictating student experience, but rather that the problem is 
attributable to "the persistence of an underlyingly male approach to legal education," and 
concluding that there has been "a shift from a law school experience that is entirely gendered to one 
characterized by a combination of both a gendered and a 'standard'-that is to say, traditionally 
male--law school experience"). 
212. See generally Johanna K.P. Dennis, Ensuring a Multicultural Educational Experience 
in Legal Education: Start with the Legal Writing Classroom, 16 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REv. 613 
(2010) (exhorting legal educators to integrate multicultural educational experiences throughout the 
curriculum). 
213. Deo et ai., supra note 191, at 37; see also Deirdre M. Bowen, Brilliant Disguise: An 
Empirical Analysis ofa Social Experiment Banning Affirmative Action, 85 IND. L.J. 1197, 1234 
(2010) (stating that contrary to what anti-affirmative action advocates argue, students of 
"underrepresented minority students in 'meritocracy' states must endure silencing, imposition, and 
performing in white spaces at a far greater rate than their counterparts in race-based admissions 
states"). 
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tendency of some faculty to skirt difficult topics is that specific language choices 
can be alienating for those not in the cultural majority. For example, one theory 
suggests that the neutral language of law affects students differently based on 
their race and gender?14 Failure to interrogate these issues risks the continued 
alienation of women and those in the cultural minority and misses an important 
opportunity to broaden the students' understanding of the real and perceived 
biases embedded in the law and legal institutions.215 Attention to these issues 
benefits not only those who are alienated by a more circumscribed and 
decontextualized conversation, but the entire law school population.216 The above 
suggestions can be expanded to apply to issues of race, class, and diversity more 
generally.217 The best intentions of diversifying law school and the legal 
214. ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO "THINK LIKE A 
LAWYER" 6 (2007) ("[L]earning the apparently neutral language of the law appears to have 
different effects on students of different races, genders, and class backgrounds. "). 
215. Discord exists among feministthinkers about gender-based reforms to legal education. 
Caitlin Howell outlines the arguments aimed at combating the marginalization of women in law 
school and has enumerated various feminist proposals to counteract the inherent bias. See Caitlin 
Howell, Combating Gender Inequities in Law School: Time for a New Feminist Rhetoric That 
Encourages Practical Change, 4 MOD. AM. 36 (2008). These include "inserting gender and 
feminist perspectives into first year classes, such as torts and contract law," employing feminized. 
teaching methodologies, "[h]umanizing law school ... [by] fostering an ethic of care in the 
classroom," and examining "the concept ofgender as the consequence ofthe power structure oflaw 
school." Id. at 36-37. Howell argues that this focus on gender is misplaced and encourages legal 
reform that does not rely on gender stereotypes. See id. Others have outlined the risk of focusing 
on the impact of law school on women. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Rosato, The Socratic Method and 
Women Law Students: Humanize, Don't Feminize, 7 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 37, 39 
(1997) (cautioning against a "women-friendly" approach, concerned that the implicit message is 
that woman are unsuited to the demands of the law school experience). Other critics note that 
female professors are assigned less respected course loads. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 210, 
at 314. 
216. See Morrison Torrey, Yet Another Gender Study? A Critique ofthe Harvard Study and 
a Proposalfor Change, 13 WM. & MARy 1. WOMEN & L. 795, 797 (2007) ("After writing several 
articles addressing gender and legal education, I have come to the realization that even though 
female students were subjected to a greater quantity (and sometimes different quality) ofnegative 
law school experiences, substantial numbers of men are also being deprived of a quality legal 
education. Apparently law school is a positive learning experience for hardly anyone!" (internal 
citation omitted)). 
217. For a discussion ofhow the current admissions practices, while facially neutral, impede 
the diversification oflaw schools, see Leonard M. Baynes, Introduction: The LSAT, U.S. News & 
World Report, and Minority Admissions, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1 (2006) (providing an overview 
ofthe articles outlining the adverse impact ofLSAT scores on admissions); Pamela Edwards, The 
Shell Game: Who Is Responsiblefor the Overuse ofthe LSAT in Law School Admissions?, 80 ST. 
JOHN'S L. REv. 153 (2006); Phoebe A. Haddon & Deborah W. Post, Misuse andAbuse ofthe LSAT: 
Making the Case for Alternative Evaluative Efforts and a Redefinition ofMerit, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. 
REv. 41 (2006). There is a documented racial disparity in LSAT performance. See LAW SCH. 
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profession will be circumvented unless the existing structural impediments to full 
participation are identified and eliminated. This cannot be a passive endeavor; 
it demands attention, energy, and resources. 
C. Encourage Student Well-Being Through Self-Awareness 
and Self-Reflection 
Law students are expected to assimilate seamlessly into a culture that 
privileges and rewards a discrete set of skills and a particular temperament that 
tolerates conflict and stress. The attributes valued and validated in law school 
tend to focus on the analytical and linear while subverting creativity and 
communitarian ideals.218 Law schools make little effort to cultivate awareness of 
each student's strengths and preferences. Instead, law school tends to value and 
reinforce the set of skills that allowed law professors to rise to the top of their 
fields. Rather than force students to conform their constellation of strengths and 
values to those reflected in the dominant paradigm, law schools should structure 
opportunities for students to explore self-knowledge and instill habits of self­
reflection. This habit should begin when students first arrive during orientation219 
and then be revisited repeatedly throughout law school.220 Many clinics enhance 
discussions and self-awareness by utilizing testing such as Myers-Briggs221 to 
help students identify personality types, motivated by the assumption that 
students will experience more professional satisfaction if they make informed 
ADMIsSION COUNCIL, MINORITY DATABOOK 14 tbl.IV-l (2002) (noting that the average LSAT 
score for African-American students over a seven-year period was 141 to 142; for Native 
Americans, 147 to 148; for Asian-Americans, 150 to 151; for Caucasians, 151 to 152; for 
Hispanics, 146 to 147; for Mexican-Americans, 146 to 147; and for Puerto Ricans, 137 to 138). 
For a discussion ofthe staggering cost oflegal education, which necessarily reduces opportunities 
based on class, see infra Part III.K. See, e.g., Osamudia R. James, Dog Wags Tail: The Continuing 
Viability 0/Minority-Targeted Aid in Higher Education, 85 IND. L.J. 851, 853 (20 lO)(arguing that 
schools may constitutionally employ race-conscious and race-exclusive aid as methods of 
diversifying student body). 
218. David R. Culp, Law School: A Mortuary/or Poets and Moral Reason, 16 CAMPBELL L. 
REv. 61, 98 (1994) ("Legal instruction teaches students to exercise rational, critical judgment and 
exalt logic over other values, such as emotional sensitivity."). 
219. See generally Paula Lustbader, You AreNot in Kansas Anymore: Orientation Programs 
Can Help Students Fly over the Rainbow, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 327 (2008). 
220. See Allison D. Martin & Kevin L. Rand, The Future's So Bright. I Gatta Wear Shades: 
Law School Through the Lens a/Hope, 48 DUQ. L. REv. 203, 218 (2010) ("[L]egal educators can 
play an important role in maintaining and creating hope in law students by enhancing the 
components ofhope: goals, pathways thinking, and agentic thinking. Based on these components, 
we have created five principles ofengendering hope in law students: (A) help them formulate or 
reframe goals; (B) increase their autonomy; (C) model the learning process; (D) help them 
understand grading as feedback rather than as pure evaluation; and (E) model and encourage 
agentic thinking."). 
221. METl Basics, MYERS & BRIGGS FOUND., http://www.myersbriggs.orglmy-mbti­
personality-typelmbti-basicsl (last visited June 10,2011). 
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choices about practice based on self-awareness. Recognizing different areas of 
strength and personality types, even if they are not those rewarded in the 
traditional classroom teaching methodologies, may serve to anchor students to 
their value and sense of self-worth even in the face of less than stellar 
performance in other areas. 
To ameliorate student distress, law schools should integrate sound 
psychological principles into their pedagogical practices. As with most 
disciplines, the study of psychology has evolved, providing new insights. A 
development that holds particular promise in palliating law school distress is the 
field ofpositive psychology, based on the notion that "to understand the human 
condition, we should study not only mental illness and distress but also the 
conditions that lead to optimal functioning.,,222 Recent proponents of positive 
psychology include Todd and Elizabeth Peterson, who argue that past proposals 
for curricular reform aimed at addressing student distress are likely to generate 
controversy within the academy, as they are perceived by some faculty as 
requiring deviation from the traditional law school educational mission.223 
Instead, they suggest strategies derived from the precepts ofpositive psychology 
and note that these might be more palatable than some proposals for radical 
reform, as they would "not require a complete overhaul of the law school 
curriculum.,,224 
Another example of engendering positive health is one professor's efforts to 
integrate hope theory, a subset of positive psychology, in the first year writing 
curriculum.225 Hope theory holds that students fare better when they are: focused 
on learning objectives rather than fixated on specific performance goals, the latter 
ofwhich are imposed externally; urged to formulate concrete rather than abstract 
goals; and encouraged to work towards rather than avoiding a particular
226outcome.
Even if legal education refuses to budge, sound psychological practices can 
be incorporated into the existing structure to counteract the disempowering 
dynamics of law school. Schools should make a commitment to consciously 
focus on empowering and enlightening students and promoting self-awareness to 
inoculate students against stress, depression, and alienation. 
222. Peterson & Peterson, supra note 65, at 362. 
223. See id. at 361. 
224. [d. 
225. See generally Jamie R. Abrams, A Synergistic Pedagogical Approach to First-Year 
Teaching, 48 DUQ. L. REv. 423 (2010). 
226. See Martin & Rand, supra note 220, at 218. 
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D. Rethink Summative Assessment, Mandatory Grading Curves, 
and Class RanJil27 
Given the stakes for students, law schools should eschew the reliance on 
summative assessments, mandatory grading curves, and class rank. Employers 
would surely object to a system that required them to expend more energy to sort 
students, but if all law schools adopted a system that presented a more holistic 
review of student competencies, employers might come to believe that this 
system ultimately enabled them to make better hiring decisions.228 Law school 
seems to foster a belief by some students that good jobs229 are only available to 
those in the top 10% ofthe class, yet hard reality dictates that 90% ofthe students 
will not realize that goal, and the ensuing pressure can be demoralizing.230 
Mandatory grading curves foster an inherently competitive environment. 
Arguably, the competition imposed by mandatory grading curves mirrors 
pressures in the "real" world. Perhaps that is precisely the reason to modify or 
jettison the reliance on competition. Students could instead be encouraged and 
rewarded for collaborating, allowing them all to achieve good grades rather than 
doling out grades based on a comparison to their cohort, premised on the theory 
that objective rather than comparative mastery of the material is paramount.231 
Promoting the acquisition of collaboration skills as a byproduct would also be a 
welcome development that reflects the realities ofpractice. Perhaps if the ethos 
of collaboration were nurtured instead of extinguished in law school, it would be 
more prevalent and visible in practice. Law school lags far behind the practice 
of law in cultivating an awareness of the importance of collaboration and 
instruction in that and other skills necessary to solve problems. 
A few schools have eliminated numerical grading and class rank, although 
227. This type of reform will require lower-tier law schools to become less risk-averse, but 
with that risk comes opportunity. Instead of genuflecting to the U.S. News and World Report 
rankings, schools can set their sights on a better system of assessment. Law schools themselves 
could model introspection and an honest assessment of their strengths and gear their educational 
program to the needs oftheir student body. This could include producing lawyers who primarily 
practice in small or solo practices and acknowledging that they are not training future law 
professors if that is not the likely career trajectory of their graduates. 
228. Some schools have eliminated numerical grading and class rank, although some ofthese 
tend to be the types of schools in which employment is not ever really in question. See infra note 
232. 
229. This is another instance wherein the groupthink mentality for some students can distort 
their own priorities and lead them to believe that the "good jobs" are those defined by high status 
and salaries, rather than a determination of the best fit for each student based on circumstances, 
preferences, values, and skills. 
230. Daisy Hurst Floyd, We Can Do More, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 129, 130 (2010) 
("Unfortunately, legal education defines the prizes as goals that cannot be achieved by most ofour 
students. If winning is defined by being in the top 10 percent of the class, then 90 percent of our 
students are set up for failure from the beginning."). 
231. See Robert P. Schuwerk, The Law Professor as Fiduciary: What Duties Do We Owe to 
Our Students, 45 S. TEx. L. REv. 753, 781 (2004). 
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many of these tend to be the types of schools in which employment is not ever 
really in question.232 The use of narrative evaluations rather than numerical 
grades answers many concerns: they provide formative feedback (even in end of 
semester, high-stakes tests, students are given the tools to understand 
retrospectively what they did well and what they did not); eliminate the need for, 
and mechanism supporting, mandatory curves and class rank; and provide 
employers with a far more comprehensive and holistic view of a student's 
abilities.233 Alternative schemes are already in place in select institutions. With 
the explicit goal of encouraging cooperative learning, for example, Northeastern 
University School of Law utilizes written evaluations that provide meaningful 
feedback about test performance but do not pit students against each other with 
mandatory curves.234 This system necessarily dispenses with class rank because 
it is impractical to make comparisons of narrative assessments.235 
Short of radical reform, professors can implement adjustments that blunt the 
deleterious impact ofhigh-stakes testing. One suggestion is to require professors 
to give midterm exams in the first year courses and provide students with 
individualized narrative feedback, even if the interim results are not included in 
the final grade.236 Similarly, practice multiple choice quizzes may help prepare 
students for the bar, even if they are not calculated into the students' GPAs. 
Professors have created ways to overcome the deterrents to providing corrective 
feedback in large classes,237 including assigning students to at least one small 
232. See Degree Requirements, NE. UNN. SCH. OF LAW, http://www.northeastern.edul 
law/academics/curriculum/degree-requirements.html (last visited June 10, 20 II) (using narrative 
evaluations instead of numerical grades); Grades, YALE LAW SCH., http://www.law. 
yale.edulacademics/jdgrades.htm (last visited June 10, 2011) (using modified pass/fail grading 
system); Grading Policy, BERKELEY LAW, http://www.law.berkeley.edulstudents/career_ 
services/foremployers/grading.html (last visited June 10,2011) (same); Policies, U. OF CHI. LAW 
SCH., http://www.law.uchicago.edulemployers/policies (last visited June 10,2011) (using a scaled 
grading system instead ofGPA system and not ranking students); Requirementsfor Graduation and 
Good Academic Standing for the J.D. Program, U. OF NOTRE DAME LAW SCH., 
http://law.nd.edulcurrent-studentslbulletin-of-informationlrequirements-for-graduation-and-good­
academic-standing-for-the-j-d-prograrnl (last visited June 10, 2011) (using the regular grading 
system, but not ranking students); Requirements for the J.D. Degree, HARVARD LAW SCH., 
http://www.law.harvard.edulacademicslhandbooklrules-relating-to-law-school-studies/20 I 0-20 11­
requirements-for-the-j.d.-degree-.html#1.Gradesfor1.D.Students (last visited June 10,20 II) (using 
a pass/fail system); Stanford Law School Grading System, STANFORD LAW SCH., http://www.law. 
stanford.edulexperience/careers/ocs/students/resources/pdf/Grading_ System_Explanation. pdf(last 
visited June 10,2011) (same). 
233. Implementing such a system would require a reallocation of faculty resources and a 
reorientation of priorities, as well as rethinking the curriculum to make it more amenable to 
narrative and frequent assessments. 
234. Degree Requirements, supra note 232. 
235. Id. 
236. Schuwerk, supra note 231, at 782. 
237. See Schwartz, supra note 84, at 370 (suggesting that law schools adopt "computer 
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section and eliminating grades in the first semester.238 Finally, schools could 
develop systems of recognizing excellence in areas outside of grade point 
average, such as intramural competitions, seminars, and pro bono activities. This 
would serve to emphasize and reinforce other important measures ofparticipation 
in law school culture and the value ofalternative methods ofpreparing to practice 
law. Further, schools could work to limit the primacy ofgrades in the distribution 
of other resources within the school, such as law review and interscholastic 
competitions.239 
E. Restructure the Bar Exam 
A frequently cited argument in favor of high-stakes exams is that they are 
similar to the conditions presented by the bar exam. This argument is an instance 
of the tail wagging the dog, since the bar exam has been excoriated by critics for 
its near complete irrelevance to the actual practice oflaw,240 and few believe that 
this test adequately measures the competencies necessary to practice.241 Instead 
programs [to] allow faculty to administer short answer and multiple-choice assessments to their 
students on-line" and encouraging professors to "use self-, peer-, and small group-grading"). Even 
if these measures are not implemented across the board, schools could assign students to at least 
one small course in the first year, which would be conducive to more individualized feedback. See, 
e.g., Bruce R. Jacob, Developing Lawyering Skills and the Nurturing of Inherent Traits and 
Abilities, 29 STETSON L. REv. 1057, 1071 (2000) ("In some law schools, each first-year student is 
placed in at least one small enrollment section of a basic course, e.g., Contracts, Torts, or Real 
Property. In a section with twenty-five or fewer students, writing assignments periodically can be 
given."). 
238. See Emily Zimmerman, An Interdisciplinary Framework for Understanding and 
CultivatingLawStudent Enthusiasm, 58 DEPAULL. REv. 851, 897-99 (2009) (arguing that grading 
curves and summative assessments dampen enthusiasm for law school, which negatively impacts 
the quality and effectiveness oflegal education, and suggesting alternatives such as dispensing with 
grading for the first semester oflaw school). 
239. Schuwerk, supra note 231, at 789-90. 
240. See, e.g., Andrea A. Curcio, A Better Bar: Why and How the Existing Bar Should 
Change, 81 NEB. L. REv. 363, 364 (2002) ("[T]he entire process used to select lawyers-from the 
Law School Admission Test (LSAT), through law school, and up to the bar exam­
overemphasizes some skills and completely disregards others. "); Kristin Booth Glen, Thinking Out 
ofthe Bar Exam Box: A Proposal to "MacCrate" Entry to the Profession, 23 PACE L. REv. 343, 
433 (2003); Daniel R. Hansen, Note, Do We Need the Bar Examination? A Critical Evaluation 
ofthe Justificationsfor the Bar Examination and Proposed Alternatives, 45 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 
1191,1193 (1995). 
241. Keating, supra note 104, at 172 ("While law school tests attempt to measure issue­
spotting and legal analysis-two skills that are certainly important to the practice oflaw-reallaw 
practice generally allows a lawyer the luxury to ruminate on a client's problem for more than just 
three hours."); Adam G. Todd, Exam Writing as Legal Writing: Teaching and Critiquing Law 
School Examination Discourse, 76 TEMP. L. REv. 69,72 (2003) (''There is a multiplicity of skills 
not assessed on a blue book exam that can be found in outstanding lawyers in practice. Key skills 
such as the ability to counsel troubled clients, negotiate favorable settlements, and be persuasive 
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of working backwards from a flawed licensing system, those in the profession 
should instead advocate for a reformation of the bar exam under a methodology 
that reflects and assesses the skills commonly employed by competent and ethical 
attorneys. The current system parallels concerns articulated about "teaching the 
test" that some educators feel has eviscerated creativity in public school 
curricula.242 As a result ofthis pressure, the focus ofthe curriculum and teaching 
methodologies is often directed to passage rates rather than critical legal 
education and instruction in a broad array of skills and competencies. I am not 
suggesting that schools or their accrediting agencies should unleash all students 
who have earned a J.D. to practice law without demonstrating proficiency in an 
enumerated list of competencies, but instead that the existing paradigm of legal 
education and licensing assessment does not serve those ends.243 
Law schools do have an affIrmative duty to prepare students to pass the bar 
examination, and concerns about bar passage rates are legitimate. However, 
allowing bar passage concerns to drive the curriculum, grading methodologies, 
and academic standards is shortsighted and counterproductive to the goal of 
producing competent practitioners. This is particularly true when some of the 
conventional wisdom about bar passage is belied by the facts. For example, an 
empirical study demonstrated that taking substantive bar courses in the upper­
level curriculum did not correlate with a higher bar passage rate for the lowest 
quartile of the class, those considered at highest risk for failing the bar.244 This 
conclusion does not support the frequent admonitions that lower-performing 
students should be channeled into substantive bar courses.245 For schools in lower 
tiers with serious concerns about bar passage rates, a low passage rate can prompt 
faculties to enact reactionary (and potentially punitive) measures instead of 
engaging in comprehensive self-assessment and reform. Harsher grading systems 
aimed at identifying underperforming students and directing them to supportive 
services is justifiable if the remedy is to actually guide students to adequately 
resourced and easily accessible academic success programs with a proven record 
of success. However, if the unspoken but real goal is to weed out students who 
may lower a school's already problematic bar passage rate, perhaps the schools 
should be encouraged to develop a better mechanism for identifying students who 
are likely to succeed-instead of accepting students whose future success they 
may question-to fill seat with tuition-paying students.246 Instead of 
to a jury are not assessed."). 
242. Janice Gross Stein, Law andEducation: The Practice ofAccountability, 14 Eouc. &L.J. 
1,4(2004). 
243. See Lorenzo A. Trujillo, The Relationship Between Law School and the Bar Exam: A 
Look at Assessment and Student Success, 78 U. COLO. L. REv. 69, 69-70 (2007). 
244. See Douglas K. Rush & Hisako Matsuo, Does Law School Curriculum Affect Bar 
Examination Passage? An Empirical Analysis ofFactors Affecting Bar Examination Passage 
During the Years 2001 Through 2006 at a Midwestern Law School, 57 J. LEGAL Eouc. 224, 225 
(2007). 
245. 1d. at 225-26. 
246. Sober lessons are presented by an ominous trend at high schools concerned about their 
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externalizing blame by bemoaning student performance, work ethic, and study 
habits, schools should closely analyze their teaching methodologies. Fairly mild 
adjustments may usher in measurable improvements such as incorporating 
frequent practice essays with prompt and detailed feedback and providing free bar 
preparation courses as a short-term fix. Unfortunately, in the absence of other 
reforms, imposing more rigidly enforced academic standards is likely to 
negatively impact diversity within the student body and, ultimately, the 
profession. 
Various proposals set forth alternatives to the bar exam that are more closely 
calculated to assess skills that are necessary in lawyering.247 One widely 
discussed option is a post-graduate apprenticeship, or at least a "mandatory period 
of supervised practice before full admission to the legal profession. ,,248 The 
demands of requiring a structured apprenticeship could present seemingly 
insurmountable logistical and quality control concerns, and the costs associated 
with such a model would only serve to exacerbate student debt if they are not 
offset in some way. However, the idea should not be dismissed without a careful 
consideration of creative ways to construct such a program in a cost-effective 
manner. 
Another proposal envisions a tripartite evaluation process: the first step 
involves an evaluation of common law knowledge; the second phase requires 
application of this knowledge to more complicated problems; and the third 
component consists ofan assessment of the integration ofskills and professional 
values.249 This process would be completed two years after graduation from law 
school and would result in full licensure.25o Alternatively, graduates could be 
required to pass a bifurcated bar exam, with the first part testing analytical 
thinking and traditional doctrinal subjects after the completion ofthe first year of 
law school and the second part taken after the third year, assessing a broader 
range of skills.251 An alternative method of ensuring that students develop 
competencies in lawyering tasks beyond those tested by the bar is mandatory 
testing outcomes, particularly when they are tied to funding. Some schools have been accused of 
increasing expulsion rates and discouraging attendance for students expected to underperform in 
order to report more favorable test results. See generally William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When 
"Adequate" Isn't: The Retreat from Equity in Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 
56 EMORY L.J. 545, 585 (2006); Madeline E. McNeeley, Title IX and Equal Educational Access 
for Pregnant andParenting Girls, 22 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 267 (2007); James E. Ryan, The Perverse 
Incentives ofthe No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 932 (2004). While these heavy­
handed but shortsighted and dishonest tactics may assist test results in the short term, they exact 
a considerable long-term price, particularly to those students deemed unworthy or incapable of 
redemption. 
247. See BESTPRACfICES, supra note 3, at 9 n.21. 
248. Id. at 9. 
249. Id. at 10. 
250. Id. 
251. Wegner, supra note 172, at 640-41. 
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clinical education.252 These proposals can be summarily rejected as impractical, 
costly, radical, and irrelevant, but the arguments seem primarily based on 
antiquated custom and logistical challenges that should not justify refusing to 
reconsider the current, deeply flawed system. In the end, the structural barriers 
erected by the current system reverberate backward to the admissions process, its 
reliance on the LSA T, 253 and its presumed value in predicting bar passage. These 
factors render legal education inaccessible to many potentially talented, ethical, 
empathic, and zealous students who are edged out only by the narrow focus of 
our licensing system, not based on their potential to contribute to the legal 
marketplace specifically (and justice, more expansively). 
F. Encourage CurricularlTeaching Innovation 
Professors should be encouraged to experiment with curricular innovation 
designed to meet any number of goals not typically addressed under the 
"signature pedagogy." Because most law professors model their teaching on the 
instructional methodologies they experienced in law school, they have little 
exposure to pedagogical advances. In replicating the same teaching methodology 
without critical reflection, legal educators fail to consider and incorporate 
important pedagogical breakthroughs, including but not limited to those identified 
by John Dewey and experientiallearning,254 Donald SchOn's insights about the 
reflective practitioner,255 and Howard Gardner's recognition of multiple 
intelligences.256 A group of forward-thinking educators is collaborating on a 
project designed to overcome some of the barriers to pedagogical reform. Legal 
Education Analysis and Reform Network (LEARN) is comprised of "ten law 
schools [that] have come together to work with the Carnegie Foundation to 
promote thoughtful innovation in law school curriculum, pedagogy and 
assessment. ,,257 Recognizing that doctrinal law professors do not spend much 
252. See Stephen Ellmann, The Clinical Year, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 877, 891 (2008-09) 
("The clinical year speaks to all elements of the legal education apprenticeship, but does so in a 
way that may seem surprisingly obvious-namely, by making the third year something quite close 
to explicit apprenticeship."). 
253. See About the LSAT, LSAC, http://www.lsac.orglJDILSAT/about-the-LSAT.asp (last 
visited June 10,2011). 
254. See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION (1916); JOHN DEWEY, How WE 
THINK (1910); JOHN DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT (1922); JOHN DEWEY, My 
PEDAGOGIC CREED (1897); JOHN DEWEY & EVELYN DEWEY, SCHOOLS OF TOMORROW (1915). 
255. See, e.g., DONALD A. SCHON, EDUCATING THE REFLECTNE PRACTITIONER (1987); 
DONALD A. SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: How PROFESSIONALS THINK IN ACTION 
(1983). 
256. See, e.g., HOWARD GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND: THE THEORY OF MULTIPLE 
INTELLIGENCES (1983); HOWARD GARDNER, MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES: THE THEORY IN PRACTICE 
(1993). 
257. LEGAL EDUC. ANALYSIS & REFORM NETWORK (LEARN), GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF 
PLANNED PROJECTS 10 (2009-10), available at http://www.1aw.stanford.eduldisplay/imagesl 
dynamic/events_medialLEARN_030509_lr.pdf. 
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time discussing, ruminating, or writing about pedagogy, LEARN aspires to create 
an accessible platform to advance pedagogical developments within the 
academy.258 Among LEARN's goals are promoting the teaching innovations that 
are often unacclaimed and disseminating information about these creative 
approaches to other law schools and professors.259 In so doing, LEARN hopes to 
discredit the notion that an innovative curriculum is less rigorous than its Socratic 
predecessor or inherently anti-intellectual; to share ideas so that schools are not 
compelled to reinvent the wheel when considering changes; and to engage in 
methodical reflection and mutual assessment about the efficacy of these new 
teaching tools.260 LEARN's approach is to encourage collaboration and create 
alliances among the great minds and talented teachers from across the curriculum 
to integrate the best of legal pedagogy and to bolster the legitimacy and 
momentum of reform by demonstrating all the ways it is currently happening.261 
The project initially started in small working groups but intends to expand its 
reach, ultimately creating an inclusive network of educators and law schools 
determined to identify the best way to train future lawyers, not cling uncritically 
to tradition.262 This effort typifies the attitudes espoused by many clinical 
educators, who eschew proprietary approaches to innovation and foster generous 
and collaborative endeavors whose shared objective is to bring everyone forward 
together.263 
Multiple avenues are available to develop creative curricula that help to 
engage the students' hearts and minds and to cultivate empathy, an essential 
ingredient for compassionate and effective problem solving and other important 
but intangible competencies. A few examples illuminate the range of creative 
possibilities. Herb Eastman asks students to draft a social justice complaint-one 
that refuses to delimit a complaint to the legally salient, emotionally detached and 
decontextualized facts, but rather is written passionately, integrating broad social 
justice themes and narrative.264 His unconventional approach forces students to 
situate their clients' legal issues in their social, political, historic, and economic 
context, and to craft narrative that speaks not just the sophisticated players in the 
legal system, but to the clients as well.265 Recognizing the numbing impact of 
Socratic dialogue and exhibiting concern about the its effect on students' 
commitment to public interest work, Nisha Agarwal and Jocelyn Simonson 
258. Id. at 16. 
259. Id. at 14. 
260. See id. at 22. 
261. See id. at 13. 
262. See id. at 20. 
263. Although unstated, a secondary benefit is decreasing the risk associated with innovation, 
as there is safety in numbers. 
264. See generally Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language 0/Civil 
Rights Litigators, 1 04 YALE LJ. 763, 769 (1995). 
265. Derek W. Black, Turning Stones o/Hope into Boulders o/Resistance: The First andLast 
Tasko/Social Justice Curriculum, Scholarship, and Practice, 86 N.C. L. REv. 673, 693-95 (2008); 
see also Eastman, supra note 264, at 788 (example ofa "thick pleading"). 
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describe a summer program at Harvard designed to immerse students in the 
theories underlying public interest work by coupling an internship experience 
with a seminar devoted to identifying and interrogating the work they do on-site 
at public interest organizations?66 
Laurie Moran and Susan Waysdorf describe the development of a new type 
of hybrid course that seamlessly integrates a doctrinal class with a compelling 
service learning component. 267 In this course, the students were exposed to the 
structural underpinnings of the geography of poverty in post-Katrina New 
Orleans and then traveled there to provide hands-on service grounded in a deep 
understanding of history and context.268 Other professors are humanizing 
teaching in large classroom settings,269 expounding on the methods and benefits 
of the problem method,270 heeding the importance of classroom architecture and 
atmospherics,271 and ameliorating the pressure of first year classes by organizing 
students into small law firms in which they can navigate the process ofanswering 
questions with reduced stress.272 
In order to encourage faculty experimentation, schools can reduce any 
perceived risks associated with deviating from the norm, so long as the efforts are 
reasonably calculated to achieve certain outcomes. For example, schools could 
minimize the importance of course evaluations in the initial phases of piloting 
new methodologies, develop evaluation instruments that are better designed to 
266. See generally Nisha Agarwal & Jocelyn Simonson, Thinking Like a Public Interest 
Lawyer: Theory, Practice, and Pedagogy, 34 N.Y.V. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 455 (2010). 
267. Laurie Moran & Susan Waysdorf, The Service-Learning Model in the Law School 
Curriculum: Expanding Opportunities for the Ethical-Social Apprenticeship (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://www.nyls.edu/user_files/l/3/41l5/1009ffHE_SERVICE_ 
LEARNING_MODEL_ IN_THE _ LAW_SCHOOL _ CURRICULUM090 II 0 I.pdf(last visited June 
10,2011). 
268. !d. at 2-3. Similarly, I have developed some independent studies that are partnerships 
with non-governmental organizations to combine student research with the needs of under­
resourced organizations. Students were very engaged in the legal issues and derived a sense of 
satisfaction about the real-life impact of their work. 
269. See generally Justine A. Dunlap, "I'd Just As Soon Flunk You As Look at You?" The 
Evolution to Humanizing in a Large Classroom, 4 7 WASHBURN LJ. 389 (2008) (describing various 
techniques to humanize large classroom teaching); Paula Lustbader, Walk the Talk: Creating 
Learning Communities to Promote a Pedagogy ofJustice, 4 SEATILE J. Soc. JUST. 613 (2006) 
(promoting a learning environment that encourages justice). 
270. See generally Keith H. Hirokawa, CriticalEnculturation: Using Problems to Teach Law, 
2 DREXEL L. REv. I (2009) (arguing that problem-based learning allows doctrinal professors to 
integrate critical pedagogies). 
271. Sturm & Guinier, supra note 40, at 531. The architecture of the traditional classroom 
focuses on the front ofthe room, which funnels authority to the professor facing the class, a design 
that affects the classroom dynamics. Id. In contrast, clinic seminars are often structured so that 
students are all seated at the sarne height in a circle, creating a more collaborative learning 
environment. 
272. See Schuwerk, supra note 231, at 790-95. 
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assess efficacy in teaching that integrates non-traditional goals, and otherwise 
encourage innovation. This would be especially important for faculty in the pre­
tenure years. Schools can send the clear message that diverging from standard 
practice and reflecting on the results, based on sound pedagogy, is welcome, 
encouraged, and even rewarded. Another option is to assign lighter course loads 
and committee work to professors who are teaching classes that incorporate more 
labor-intensive, skills-oriented methods, thereby offering an incentive. Creative 
approaches would only serve to enhance instruction in a broad range of skills. 
G. Provide Mentoring.73 
Faculty obligations to students should entail more than just shepherding them 
through the mastery of substantive and procedural law and techniques of 
argument. More expansively, professors can guide students' entry into the world 
of legal professionals, a concept characterized by Robert Schuwerk as 
"stewardship of the practice of law.,,274 The nature of the relationship between 
law students and faculty is inherently hierarchical, partly because of the real 
knowledge and experience gap that separates them, and partly due to the unequal 
dynamic that attends the student-professor dyad.275 Despite this intrinsic and 
unavoidable power imbalance, students benefit from personal connections with 
professors, and they often relish opportunities to interact in a less formal manner 
than the classroom typically allows.276 To be blunt, especially because tuition 
dollars pay faculty salaries, our obligation to nurture students should not end at 
the office door. Professors should be accessible for more than just a study 
question posed during office hours and limited to the substantive topic that arose 
in the classroom. Instead, faculty should immerse themselves in a vibrant 
learning community277 and seek out opportunities to engage in meaningful 
273 . Women mentors help students normalize their responses to law school stress and feelings 
ofalienation. See Batlan et a!., supra note 211, at 148 (arguing that women mentors would "allow[] 
women to shape a space in which to recognize that their feelings ofdistress are neither isolated nor 
unusual"). 
274. Schuwerk, supra note 231, at 754 (emphasis added). 
275. Id. at 758-61. 
276. Many schools have developed mentoring programs that partner with attorneys from the 
local bar, but these programs have to be thoughtfully administered and consist ofmore than just a 
hands-off approach to matching up students. Instead, programs should involve structure, 
guidelines, and monitoring to ensure the best experience for students and the ongoing participation 
ofthe local bar. See Neil Hamilton & Lisa Montpetit Brabbit, Fostering Professionalism Through 
Mentoring, 571. LEGAL Eouc. 102, 128 (2007) ("A well designed formal mentor program that 
successfully combines the talents and skills ofa mentor with a strong seminar component can foster 
... principles [ ofprofessionalism] for the newest generation as well as older ones."); see generally 
Melissa H. Weresh, I'll Start Walking Your Way, You Start Walking Mine: Sociological 
Perspectives on Professional Identity Development andInfluence ofGenerational Differences, 61 
S.C. L. REv. 337, 337 n.l (2009) (encouraging new and experienced lawyers to work together to 
"enhance professionalism in the legal community"). 
277. Faculty members will understandably have different sensibilities, comfort levels, and 
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interactions outside the classroom278 in ways that foster the modeling and 
transmission of professional values. The level of commitment and structure of 
interaction can vary from fairly low-demand advising programs to more sustained 
and structured interactions.279 Unfortunately, professors do not typically conceive 
of mentoring as within their job description.280 Some faculty members who 
entered the academy with complete comfort about the hierarchy or rigid 
boundaries may feel unsettled by exchanging more than superficial pleasantries 
with their students, or they may feel constrained by other considerations to limit 
the time they spend with students. However, establishing relationships also 
enables faculty to serve as a resource to identify and support struggling students. 
While that may arguably fall under the bailiwick of a dean of students, the 
comfort ofa compassionate and familiar professor can be extremely meaningful. 
Given the reported rates of distress, the legal academy should marshal any 
available resources to humanize legal education and attend to student well­
being.281 
Law schools should also broaden the notion of career counseling as well to 
include more than advice about job acquisition, resume reviews, and practice 
interviews. Students would be better served by learning about the benefits and 
disadvantages of various practice areas, including non-legal career options, and 
be encouraged to reflect about their career goals, temperaments, and options. 
Introspection allows students to make deliberate and informed choices about what 
aspects of practice they will find challenging and fulfilling, what they cannot 
tolerate, and areas in which they can compromise. Faculty can supplement their 
career services offices by serving as ad hoc advisors who are willing to engage 
students in discussions calculated to dig below the surface of stated career goals 
and be available to discuss issues ofvalues, professionalism, job satisfaction, and 
boundaries. However, schools could adopt formal advising programs that are designed and 
resourced to provide informal contact, such as brown bag lunches, to allow for free-flowing 
discourse. See, e.g., Ann Juergens, Practicing What We Teach: The Importance ofEmotion and 
Community Connection in Law Work and Law Teaching, 11 CLINICAL L. REv. 413 (2005). 
278. See William J. Rich, Balance in Legal Education: Pervasive Principles, 601. LEGAL 
Eouc. 122, 123 (2010) ("Engaged faculty also care about their students outside ofthe classroom, 
make themselves available for individual conferences, and respond to expressions of need or 
interest. "). 
279. For example, after Hurricane Katrina, an outpouring ofstudent interest coalesced into a 
large contingent dedicated to providing on the ground and immediate assistance, and the newly 
minted Student Hurricane Network planned and promptly executed service trips. After my school's 
first trip to post-Katrina Mississippi, I accompanied students on the next two trips, first to New 
Orleans, and then to Texas to work with Texas RioGrande Legal Aid. Working, staying, and 
recreating with students provided ample opportunities to interact. The nature and intensity oftrip 
served an equalizing function, fostered enduring social connections, and facilitated broad-ranging 
discussions about law, justice, and lawyering that are often lost under the structure and pressures 
oflaw school. 
280. See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 40, at 535. 
281. See supra Part II.A. 
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how to cultivate a balance between work and family. These conversations can be 
guided by the precepts of client-centered counseling, encouraging students to 
contemplate their goals expansively and consider all the ramifications of each 
choice based on their individual priorities, goals, and experiences. In the current 
economy, it is fair to question whether students have the lUxury of thinking in 
those terms, and it is virtually impossible for career services offices, under 
enormous pressure to elevate employment statistics, to counsel desperate students 
to make carefully calculated choices. However, the temporary unattainability of 
some goals should not thwart efforts to foster reflection, even if students must 
temper their short-term expectations and behavior in light ofthe present economic 
circumstances. 
Law schools can redouble their efforts to set up programming to facilitate 
interactions among faculty, practitioners, and students. The Inns of Court is an 
exemplary organization, providing both engaging programming and informal 
social interactions centered on themes related to lawyering and professionalism.282 
Collegiality can also be fostered with members of the local bar, who are often 
more than willing to mentor students. Less formal meetings would also be useful, 
such as brown bag lunches with no particular agenda, allowing issues to arise 
organically from unstructured conversations. With competing demands on 
faculty time, this intangible mandate is likely to fall by the wayside unless we 
explicitly value the ability to serve as an important force in the lives of students. 
H. ClinicslExternshipslExperiential Education 
Law schools should strive to expand offerings that immerse students in real 
life lawyering. The multidimensional and potentially trans formative value of 
clinics is undisputed. Clinical education serves multiple purposes by providing 
hands-on skills training, inculcating values, advancing justice, exposing students 
to problem solving, introducing ethics and professionalism as applied to real 
situations, and beginning the lengthy process ofacculturation to legal practice.283 
With the luxury ofsmaller classes comes the opportunity to engage with students 
about critical issues that are merely abstract principles in the absence ofauthentic 
(rather than simulated) clients and the myriad pressures that accompany real 
282. General In/ormation, AM. INNS OF COURT, http://www.innsofcourt.orgiContentlDefault. 
aspx?Id=2 (last visited June 25, 2011). Local chapters of the Inns of Court set up engaging 
programs intended to provide connections between lawyers and the judiciary, with interactive 
programming to address emerging issues. Id. 
283. Rebecca Sandefur & Jeffrey Selbin, The Clinic Effect, 16 CLlNlCALL. REv. 57, 58 (2009) 
(discussing RONIT DINOVITZERET AL., NALP FOUND. FOR LAW CAREER RESEARCH & EDUC. &AM. 
BAR FOUND., AFTER THE JD: FIRST RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS 81 (2004) 
[hereinafter After the JD]). After the JD is a careful analysis ofthe impact ofparticipating in clinics 
during law school. Recent law graduates consistently rated their clinic experience highly in terms 
of preparation of practice. Id. at 81 fig. 1 1.1. To the surprise of many, participation in the clinic 
did not appear to inculcate an enduring commitment to public interest work, although the study did 
find that those predisposed to public interest work seemed to have had that inclination ossified by 
participation in a clinic. 
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practice. Clinical faculty strive to instill habits ofself-reflection so that even after 
the experience, law students are motivated to remain vigilant and committed to 
ongoing professional growth. Clinical experiences are so instrumental in 
preparing students for the practice of law that some commentators argue 
persuasively that clinics should be universally required.284 
Clinics offer experiences that cannot be manufactured in a classroom and can 
be profoundly meaningful for students. Clinics are uniquely positioned to 
facilitate "trans formative experiential opportunities for exploring the meaning of 
justice and developing a personal sense ofjustice, through exposure to the impact 
of the legal system on subordinated persons and groups and through the 
deconstruction of power and privilege in the law.,,285 Exposure to real life 
situations and genuine clients also exposes students to the "disorienting 
moment,,286 that has been widely touted as integral to the development of 
sensitivity and an internal moral compass, as well as passion for the law and for 
justice.287 
284. See Karen Tokarz et aI., Toward Universal Clinical Education: Why the Time Is Ripe 
for Requiring Clinical Courses for All Law Graduates 1 (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.nyls.eduluser_files/l /3/4/ 15/ 1 009IMandatory''1020Clinical%20Legal%20Education 
%20draft%20Sept%2021 %2020 lO-l.pdf (last visited June 10, 20 II). 
285. Jon C. Dubin, Clinical Design/or Social Justice Imperatives, 51 SMU L. REv. 1461, 
1477 (1998) (internal citations omitted). 
286. See Fran Quigley, Seizing the Disorienting Moment: Adult Learning Theory and the 
Teaching ofSocial Justice in Law School Clinics, 2 CLINICALL. REv. 37,38-39 (1995) (arguing 
that lessons ofsocial justice are a necessary partonegal education generally, and clinical education 
in particular). 
287. E.g., Deborah Maranville, Infusing Passion and Context into the Traditional Law 
Curriculum Through Experiential Learning, 51 J. LEGAL Eouc. 51 (2001); see generally Ass'N OF 
AM. LAW SCH., PURSUING EQUAL JUSTICE: LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROVISION OF LEGAL SERVICES 
4 (2002), availableat http://www .aals.orglequaljusticelfinaIJeport.pdf[hereinafter EQUALJUSTICE 
PROJECT]; David Bamhizer, The Justice Mission ofAmerican Law Schools, 40 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 
285 (1992); Barry et aI., supra note 7; John O. Calmore, "Chasing the Wind": Pursuing Social 
Justice, Overcoming Legal Mis-Education. andEngaging in Professional Re-Socialization, 37 loY. 
L.A. L. REv. 1167 (2004); Lauren Carasik, Justice in the Balance: An Evaluation ofOne Clinic's 
Ability to Harmonize Teaching Practical Skills. Ethics and Professionalism with a Social Justice 
Mission, 16 S. CAL. REv. L. & SOC. JUST. 23, 78 (2006); Dubin, supra note 285; Freamon, supra 
note 9, at 167; Hess, supra note 64, at 79 (lamenting the "psychological distress, dissatisfaction, 
and substance abuse" some attribute to the casebook method and opining that the impact of this 
teaching methodology could be ameliorated by experiences that confront students with issues of 
morality and social justice); Henry Rose, Law Schools Should Be About Justice Too, 40 CLEv. ST. 
L. REv. 443 (1992); Wizner, supra note 12; Stephen Wizner & Jane Aiken, Teaching and Doing: 
The Role ofLaw School Clinics in Enhancing Access to Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 997, 1011 
(2004). Although a recent study found mixed results as to whether participation in clinics inspired 
students' interest in social justice, it did conclude that participation in clinics likely nurtured and 
solidified those inclinations for students already predisposed to work in this area. See Sandefur & 
Selbin, supra note 283, at 99. There has been much hand-wringing about the erosion of public 
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Among the benefits offered clinics is instruction on professionalism288 and 
exposure to moral issues, as "practice-oriented courses can provide important 
motivation for engaging with the moral dimensions of professional life-a 
motivation that is rarely accorded status or emphasis in the present curriculum. ,,289 
Clinical experiences further provide space for professors to inculcate values 
regarding the public service ethos of the profession.290 Additional opportunities 
for experiential learning are available through extemships291 and other practice­
oriented projects that can be integrated into the existing curriculum. In any of 
these opportunities, escaping the sterile classroom environment can be 
enormously gratifying, inspiring, and edifying.292 Although these opportunities 
are resource-intensive to structure with appropriate pedagogical goals and 
oversight, there are creative ways to offer them. Unfortunately, even if the 
institutional resistance to a reoriented emphasis on skills training is surmounted, 
the ensuing discussion is often derailed by the perceived financial cost of low 
faculty-to-student ratios and labor intensive pedagogy, thrusting this debate 
squarely into the constant battle over the allocation of scarce resources. 
However, as David Chavkin demonstrates through his analysis of the relative 
costs ofclinical training at his institution, some ofthis conventional wisdom may 
be illusory.293 
Admittedly, advocates of expanded opportunities for experiential learning 
face a haunting conundrum. It is hard to reconcile demands for more labor­
intensive, and therefore costly, experiential learning with a commitment to 
contain spiraling tuition costs. One solution discussed previously, the increased 
interest commitment among students as they progress through their legal education, so this finding 
should not be minimized. See Robert Granfield, Institutionalizing Public Service in Law School: 
Results on the Impact ofMandatory Pro Bono Programs, 54 BUFF. L. REv. l355, 1412 (2007); 
Deborah L. Rhode, Pro Bono in Principal [sic} and in Practice, 26 HAMLINE J. Pus. L. & POL'y 
315, 320-23 (2005). 
288. See Melissa L. Breger et aI., Teaching Professionalism in Context: InSights from 
Students, Clients, Adversaries, andJudges, 55 S.C. L. REv. 303, 308-09 (2003) ("[C]linicallegal 
education, with its convergence oftheory and real-world practice, provides an ideal opportunity for 
teaching professionalism and ethics to students in meaningful ways. "). 
289. CARNEGIE REpORT, supra note 2, at 88. 
290. Robert R. Kuehn, A Normative Analysis ofthe Rights and Duties ofLaw Professors to 
Speak Out, 55 S.C. L. REv. 253, 293 (2003) ("[T]he issue is not whether law schools should seek 
to instill the legal profession'S public service norms, but rather, how this should best be done."). 
291. This Article does not wade into the debate as to whether clinics or externships are more 
valuable, but it is worth noting concern expressed by some that because externships are infinitely 
cheaper to run, educators must be wary of the risk that most experiential instruction will be 
outsourced as a cost-saving measure rather than a reasoned pedagogical decision. 
292. This is not meant to suggest that the learning imparted in classrooms is without value, 
but simply that it cannot prepare students to practice alone without complementary training that 
situates students in the real world. 
293. David F. Chavkin, Experiential Learning: A Critical Element ofLegal Education in 
China (and Elsewhere), 22 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L.J. 3, l3-14 (2009). 
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use ofadjuncts, provides a partial response to the cost issue but implicates serious 
concerns related to the historically fraught status of clinical faculty. Shifting 
teaching to those with either a circumscribed or nonexistent role in faculty 
governance hearkens back to a time when clinical faculty were completely 
marginalized in the academy. Outsourcing supervision is risky and likely 
sacrifices some quality of interaction when an attorney is balancing supervision 
with the competing demands of his or her own practice. Moreover, those 
attorneys do not have the luxury of contemplating the nuances of pedagogy. 
Organized faculty mentoring is essential in any program that expands the use of 
adjuncts. On balance, the risks of the increased use of adjuncts to facilitate 
increased experientialleaming opportunities must be carefully considered. This 
analysis should extend beyond the quality of the classroom experience to issues 
related to the structure of the academy. 
1. Professionalism. Ethics. and Morals 
The Carnegie Report defines the third apprenticeship as one of "identity and 
purpose,,,294 an introduction to canons of ethical and social behavior through 
which students can begin to explore and develop their professional integrity, 
mission, and character.295 This is partly achieved through explicit discussion, and 
partly through the '''hidden' curriculum," which is comprised ofthe myriad subtle 
and unspoken ways that values are transmitted between and among faculty and 
students. 296 The ABA has recently exhorted lawyers to strive for higher ideals,297 
principles that should be unequivocally telegraphed to students during the first 
298year. In furtherance of these goals, the ABA is currently contemplating 
mandatory instruction in professionalism.299 One commentator has suggested that 
if instruction and guidance about professionalism is incorporated into standards, 
there must be output measures to ensure that law schools take this relatively 
intangible commitment seriously.30o To safeguard against a hollow and illusory 
294. CARNEGIE REpORT, supra note 2, at 28. 
295. Id. 
296. Id. at 29. 
297. See AM. BAR ASS'N, " .... IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBUC SERVICE:" A BLUEPRINT FOR THE 
REKlNDUNG OF LAWYER PROFESSIONAUSM 16-19 (1986) [hereinafter ABA BLUEPRINT], available 
at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/professionalismlStanley_Commission _ Report.pdf; AM. BARAss'N, 
TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONAUSM 13-25 (1996). 
298. See generally Patrick E. Longan, Teaching Professionalism, 60 MERCER L. REv. 659 
(2009) (describing Mercer's efforts to provide explicit instruction in professional ideals, starting 
with a credit-bearing class in the first year, and recognizing the importance of introducing these 
values at the outset of education). 
299. Timmer & Berry, supra note 121, at 1 (noting that the American Bar Association's 
Accreditation Standards Review Committee is considering inserting the word "ethical" into its 
description ofparticipation in the legal profession). 
300. See id. at 20 ("Because law schools have a significant opportunity for impacting the 
professional identity oflawyers, the schools must be accredited in a way that their commitment to 
professional identity development is encouraged, required, and measurable."). 
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commitment to these ideals, schools need to develop thoughtful, integrated, and 
pervasive instructional plans. Mandatory instruction does not require schools to 
thrust values down the students' throats, but rather recognizes that institutional 
and personal reluctance to tread into areas characterized as values does a 
disservice to students and the profession.301 The attitude that certain "soft" topics 
should be deliberately sidestepped has deep historical roots, as "Llewellyn and 
his followers so thoroughly purged most discussion of genuine ethics from the 
initial curriculum that law students and lawyers are now taught a process and not 
a purpose for the law.,,302 However, leaving it to students to absorb professional 
ideals in a vacuum is fraught with peril. If schools fail to raise issues of the 
professional role, they run the risk that in the absence of guidance and modeling, 
some students will consciously or unconsciously imprint on the first lawyers with 
whom they interact and assume that such conduct represents acceptable 
professional behavior. These issues are too important to leave to chance. A 
much better practice is to raise issues ofprofessional identity proactively so that 
within the expansive range of behavior that is not explicitly proscribed/03 
students can think through their own values and priorities and develop a 
philosophy oflawyering that is consistent with those ideals.304 Even ifthey parse 
cases and statutes based on neutral principles oflegal analysis, "[l]aw professors 
cannot be value-neutral on matters ofvalue. ,,305 As members ofa self-regulating 
profession that is central to reinforcing our nation's democratic ideals, law 
professors have an obligation to inculcate some universal minimum standards, the 
absence of which can impede both procedural and substantive justice. 
301. The supposition that we can be completely neutral with respect to values is faulty. It is 
better to acknowledge our assumptions and perspectives and point out various alternatives to our 
views than to falsely suggest that one can be truly be a blank slate, disassociated from all the 
aspects of one's identity, ideals, and lifetime of experiences. 
302. Steve Sheppard, Teach Justice, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 599, 599-600 (2008). 
303. See Nathan M. Crystal, Developing a Philosophy ofLawyering, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 75, 75 (2000) ("Almost all significant ethical decisions that lawyers face in 
the practice oflaw involve discretion. For some of these decisions, no rules or standards guide 
lawyers."). 
304. Timmer & Berry, supra note 121, at 15 ("[T]hen there are the rest-the future lawyers 
wandering through law school becoming soulless automatons as they master the case method and 
learn to be passionate about the perspective of the party who hired them, losing themselves in the 
process. These are the students whose souls might be released and liberated to carry their values 
along with them into practice. Rather than leave their souls behind, they can learn when, where, 
and how to incorporate their personal beliefs, morals, and ethics into the practice of law, thereby 
ensuring a career that they can live with and be proud of."). 
305. RHODE, supra note 180, at 203; see also Stephen Wizner, Is Learning to "Think Like a 
Lawyer" Enough?, 17 YALEL. & POL'yREv. 583, 583, 591 (I998)(suggesting that "law schools 
[are] educating students for technical proficiency, but failing to inculcate in them a proper sense 
oftheir social and public responsibilities as members ofthe legal profession" and contending that 
"[l]aw schools, and particularly law teachers, have a 'moral responsibility' to democratize our legal 
culture."). 
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Law schools typically do not address the ethical, moral, and professional 
choices students will necessarily face. To inoculate students against the surprise 
and confusion when these issues arise, and to enhance the process of thoughtful 
and principled resolution of these issues, students should be introduced to the 
vexing ethical and moral questions they will confront in practice early and often, 
throughout the curriculum. Frequent exposure to these formative issues will 
sensitize students and help prepare them in advance of encountering these 
scenarios in practice, when they are presumably under more pressure and 
potentially more myopic as a result. 306 Reflection will not necessarily minimize 
or eliminate exposure to difficult issues, but students will be better prepared to 
formulate a system for resolving them, or they will select an area or type of 
practice where they can exercise some greater control about the issues that are 
likely to arise.307 Because morality is deemed personal, discussion of morality is 
typically relegated to the periphery of education, if it happens at all. This is a 
mistake, as "[i]t is incumbent on the national law school faculty to give law 
students tools to argue about moral duty, to recognize a compelling moral 
argument, and to prepare students to engage in the moral practice of law. ,,308 
Avoiding these topics sends a tacit and undesirable message: "[w]hen faculty 
routinely ignore--or even explicitly rule out-of-bounds-the ethical-social issues 
embedded in the cases under discussion, whether they mean to or not, they are 
teaching students that ethical-social issues are not important to the way one ought 
to think about legal practice.,,309 Some articles that deconstruct the elusive 
concept of professionalism exalt lawyering as a learned profession and note that 
all but the most sophisticated clients cannot truly assess the services they retain. 
The nature of our self-regulating profession and our monopoly of legal 
representation elevates the collective obligation to seek and advance justice. 
As part ofthe critique of law, legal institutions, and lawyering that comprise 
a well-rounded legal education, students should be exposed to the underlying 
philosophy of our system. This understanding should extend beyond an ability 
to parrot back the nature of our esteemed adversarial system and its obligation to 
adhere to the tenets of zealous representation for individual clients.31o Students 
306. See Beth D. Cohen, Helping Students Develop a More Humanistic Philosophy of 
Lawyering, 12 J. LEGAL WRITING lNST. 141, 152-58 (2006). 
307. Even iflawyers expect to assume heroic postures in all cases and for all clients, they will 
invariably be confronted with difficult clients and ethical conundrums, and they will at some point 
inevitably and unavoidably grapple with issues ofpatemalism and other dilemmas. 
308. Sheppard, supra note 302, at 601. 
309. CARNEGIE REpORT, supra note 2, at 140. 
310. For some students, the process of disengaging their moral compass and following the 
dictates ofclient prerogative can be deeply disconcerting. Much has been written of the personal 
cost of the "hired gun" approach, in which the lawyer is merely executing a function in an 
adversarial system, irrespective of her moral reaction to the objectives of representation in a 
particular case. See, e.g., Paul R. Tremblay, Practiced Moral Activism, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 9, 
13 (1995) (explaining moral activism, which "in its broadest sense demands accountability from 
lawyers for their actions, and tends not to permit the mere fact of occupational role expectations 
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should be encouraged to explore the obvious and hidden costs and benefits ofthis 
system that requires subversion of the greater good to the interests of individual 
clients, both for those who interact with our legal institutions and for lawyers 
individually, who will invariably be forced to advocate for positions they would 
not personally choose. Exposing students to the spectrum of alternative 
constructs that exist in other legal systems empowers them to engage in a 
comparative critique of the axioms upon which each system is based and to 
understand the implicit values and tradeoffs. Being prepared for these 
contingencies, acknowledging the potential toll our system exacts, and 
understanding why these compromises are foundational in our system may 
minimize the impact for those who don the mantle ofzealous advocacy with some 
ambivalence. 
Professors can insert opportunities to discuss ethics, morals, and professional 
ideals by making an effort to recontextualize the cases under discussion, 
indentifying personal and humanizing details about the clients, and examining the 
broader social, political, historical, and economic context that the conflict 
inhabits.3I1 Attention to the issues deemed essential to the formation of a 
responsible, integrated, and professional identity cannot wait until the second or 
third year of study, when students may have effectively, but not necessarily 
auspiciously, internalized the disconnection between their morals and their 
mastery of dispassionate and analytical reasoning.312 Additionally, these issues 
should be taught pervasively, not just in a course focused on ethics that is 
relegated to the margins ofthe curriculum. The tacit message is that the mastery 
of technical ethical guidelines is sufficient instruction. An effort to integrate 
these topics into other courses would situate them within the overarching 
framework that requires some lawyers to subvert their personal morality to their 
lawyering persona, sometimes at considerable cost to their sense of integrity and 
well-being. Providing pervasive instruction permits an exploration beyond our 
rule-bound, proscriptive approach to ethics as a rich opportunity to nurture their 
sense of personal ethics and morality. Expansive discussions can be 
supplemented by concrete teaching tools, such as movie clips, role plays, small 
group discussions, reflective essays, guest speakers, and other exercises designed 
to justify lawyer conduct"). Some ethicists suggest that we adopt a more flexible model in which 
lawyers are permitted, but not required, to include political considerations ofthe choices faced in 
the process ofrepresenting clients. See generally THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., 
LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (1994); Beverly Balos, The Bounds of 
Professionalism: Challenging Our Students; Challenging Ourselves, 4 CUNICAL L. REv. 129 
(1997). This permits the lawyer some flexibility to allow her personal moral and professional 
spheres to coexist. Encouraging students to explore various reactions to the role they will play in 
our adversarial model should be done frequently. 
311. In the first year, "students are told repeatedly to focus on the procedural and formal 
aspects oflegal reasoning, its 'hard' edge, with the 'soft' sides of law, especially moral concerns 
or compassion for clients and concerns for substantive justice either tacitly or explicitly pushed to 
sidelines." CARNEGIE REpORT, supra note 2, at 141. 
312. See id. at 142. 
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to engender real dialogue. An approach that carefully circumvents or studiously 
ignores discussion of the intersection of ethics, morals, and professionalism does 
nothing to inculcate a heightened sense ofresponsibility in all areas. 313 Ethics and 
professionalism should be considered a broad, idealistic, and aspirational 
construct that extends beyond regulatory dictates.314 
J. Public Interest Work 315IAccess to Justice 316/Pro Bon0317 
Our vaunted democratic ideals are premised on the notion of equal access to 
justice. The concept of "equality before the law is at the core of the social 
contract just as peacefully resolving disputes between citizens, including between 
citizens of different economic and social classes is ... the 'chief reason,' but 
313. Id. at 149; see also Jeremy Cooper & Louise G. Trubek, Social Values from Law School 
to Practice: An Introductory Essay, in EDUCATING FOR JUSTICE: SOCIAL VALUES AND LEGAL 
EDUCATION,supra note 9, at 1, 14 ("A law school ... can too easily destroy the potential desire of 
law students to commit themselves passionately and wholeheartedly to social justice, by its 
obsession with the acontextual, the dispassionate, and the analytical."). 
314. It is critical to emphasize professionalism and ethics beyond examination ofthe rules, as 
they are largely proscriptive and fail to articulate lofty standards. See Daniel S. Kleinberger, 
Wanted: An Ethos ofPersonal Responsibility-Why Codes ofEthics and Schools ofLaw Don't 
Makefor Ethical Lawyers, 21 CONN. L. REv. 365, 370 (1989) ("[T]he rules are seen primarily as 
a set ofmalum prohibitum commands to be parsed, analyzed, interpreted, and distinguished-just 
like any set of regulations applicable to any other trade or business."). 
315. See Russell Engler, From the Margins to the Core: Integrating Public Service Legal 
Work into the Mainstream ofLegal Education, 40 NEW ENG. L. REv. 479,485 (2006) ("Numerous 
studies reveal the extent to which the values of law students are shaped by their law school 
experiences and those experiences typically push students away from, rather than toward, public 
interest work."); see also Jane H. Aiken, Provocateurs for Justice, 7 CLINICAL L. REv. 287, 288 
(2001) ("A provocateur for justice actively imbues ... students with a lifelong learning about 
justice, prompts them to name injustice, to recognize the role they may play in the perpetuation of 
injustice and to work toward a legal solution to that injustice."). 
316. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT 
UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 1, 28 (2009), http://www.1sc. 
gov/pdfs/documenting_thejustice_gap_in_america_2009.pdf [hereinafter DOCUMENTING THE 
JUSTICE GAP] (noting that under 20% oflow-income persons get the legal assistance they need and 
that "to fund these needs, the federal share must grow to be five times greater than it is now, or $1.6 
billion"); Engler, supra note 315, at 484 ("Legal needs studies have consistently shown that 
anywhere from seventy to ninety percent oflegal needs ofthe poor go unaddressed in America."); 
Robert Rubinson, A Theory of Access to Justice, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 89, 104 (2005) 
("Everyone-lawyers, judges, academics, the public-knows that the 'rich' get more justice than 
everyone else."). 
317. Comment 1 to Rule 6.1 of the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct states that "[e]very lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional work 
load, has a responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay, and personal involvement 
in the problems of the disadvantaged can be one of the most rewarding experiences in the life of 
a lawyer." MODEL R. PROF'L CONDUCT 6.1 cmt. 1 (2004). 
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obviously not the only purpose, for government itself.,,318 Despite its 
foundational underpinnings, "[i]t is astonishing that the principle of equal 
justice-a principle enshrined in virtually every articulation and embodiment of 
civic virtue and pride in our democracy, from courthouse facades, to the Pledge 
of Allegiance, to the iconography of 'blind justice' -remains so obviously and 
utterly hollow and illusory.,,319 A panoply of fundamental rights are rendered 
inconsequential ifpeople lack the resources and access to vindicate them. Yet in 
a system that lauds its adherence to the rule oflaw, the inattention to equal access 
to justice is shameful. The statistics are undeniably stark-for every 6415 people 
who are eligible for free legal services, there is one attorney, while the 
corresponding ratio for attorneys providing private legal services is 429 to one.320 
The federal funding of legal services through the Legal Services Corporation, 
which originated in 1981, has been appreciably diminished in real dollars.321 
Securing increased funding for the poor is a tough sell when economic suffering 
is omnipresent, but woefully unequal access to the justice system predated our 
current economic crisis and will endure long past its recovery. Even in better 
times, the United States has still lagged far beyond other developed and 
democratic societies. Studies demonstrate a lamentable comparison between 
expenditures for access to justice in the United States and other countries, 
pointing out that one would expect that in a purely adversarial system, financial 
investment would be proportionally higher than in systems that are premised on 
an inquisitorial style, where judges are active participants in the fact-finding 
mission.322 The two largest sources offunding for legal services providers are the 
Legal Services Corporation323 and money generated through the Interest on 
Lawyers Trust Accounts program (lOLTA).324 Decreases in IOLTA coffers, due 
in part to a lack of the economic activity that generates the funds325 and 
318. Earl Johnson, Jr., Equality Before the Law and the Social Contract: When Will the 
United States Finally Guarantee Its People the Equality Before the Law the Social Contract 
Demands?, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 157, 215 (20 I 0)(citation omitted); see also Stephen C. Yeazell, 
Socializing Law. Privatizing Law. Monopolizing Law. AcceSSing Law, 39 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 691, 
691 (2006) ("A society based on the rule of law fails in one of its central premises if substantial 
parts ofthe popUlation lack access to law enforcement institutions."). 
319. Rubinson,supranote316,at 156. 
320. DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP, supra note 316, at 19. 
321. Johnson, supra note 318, at 210-11. 
322. See id. at 200; see also Sande L. Buhai, Access to Justice for Unrepresented Litigants: 
A Comparative Perspective, 42 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 979,979 (2009) (suggesting that certain aspects 
of civil law systems, in which judges play an inquisitorial role, may be suitably adopted by our 
system to advance access to justice). 
323. Helaine M. Barnett, Justice for All: Are We Fulfilling the Pledge?, 41 IDAHO L. REv. 
403,409-10(2005). 
324. What Is IOLTA?, IOLT A.ORG, http://www.iolta.org/grantsl (last visited June II, 20II). 
325. See Luz E. Herrera, Rethinking Private Attorney Involvement Through a "Low Bono" 
Lens, 43 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1,29 (2009) ("Moreover, funds earned through the Interest on Lawyers 
Trust Accounts (IOLTA) program have reached dismal lows with the lowering of interest rates."); 
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compounded by dramatic state budget cuts, have further eroded the ability of 
legal services offices to provide representation to those in need.326 
The current statistics evince an unprecedented crisis, and law schools, as the 
point ofentry into the legal profession, have an obligation to inculcate in students 
a sense of responsibility to respond.327 This commitment must be more than just 
hollow admonitions or aspirational exhortations to undertake this work as a 
worthy charity; it must be a fundamental component oftheirprofessional identity. 
By raising the importance of these ideals to the very foundation of our system, 
professors can work to dislodge complacency. Justice for all should not be a 
contested, controversial, or illusory concept.328 Since lawyers have constructed 
a state-sanctioned system that confers a complete monopoly in the provision of 
legal services, law schools must instill the ethos that this privilege is accompanied 
by the solemn obligation to ensure that equal justice is a reality. This extends 
beyond mere access to the courtroom door to the obligation to work toward 
eliminating the barriers to structural equality.329 Raising these issues in class 
Erik Eckholm, Interest Rate Drop Has Dire Results/or Legal Aid, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 19,2009, at 
AI2 ("[A]s the federal funds rate declined along with the number of real estate transactions, the 
payout has fallen precipitously."). 
326. Kathleen A. McKee, The Impact a/the Current Economy on Access to Justice, 62 ME. 
L. REv. 613, 627 (201 0) ("In light ofthe reduction in IOL TA funding, some legal aid programs face 
program budget cuts ofup to 50 percent. Projected shortfalls in 2008 IOL TA revenue ranged from 
a low of $2.3 million in Illinois to a high of $15 million in New Jersey and Massachusetts. In 
practical terms, the president of Legal Services of New Jersey estimated that 'for every million 
dollars New Jersey loses in money for legal services, it must lay off20 staffers and serve 900 fewer 
clients.'" (internal citations omitted)); Neeta Pal, The Economy andCivil Legal Services, BRENNAN 
CTR. FOR JUSTICE, Apr. 22, 20 11, http://www.brennancenter.org/contentiresource/the_economy_ 
and _ civiUegal_services1/ ("IOL T A revenue has plummeted due to declining interest rates."). 
327. The current state ofaffairs surfaces discussions about whether pro bono work should be 
mandatory for lawyers, who enjoy an absolute, state-sanctioned monopoly on the provision oflegal 
services and arguably should be subjected to a heightened duty to advance access to justice. While 
relevant and important, that debate is beyond the scope of this Article. 
328. Rhode, supra note 55, at 1021 ("[M]ost legal academics have done little to educate 
themselves, the profession, or the public about access to justice and the strategies necessary to 
increase it. ... [W]e are not shouting from rooftops about unmet needs; we are not, for the most 
part, even murmuring in classrooms or muttering in law reviews. "). See DEBORAH L. RHODE, 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE 191-93 (2004), for a discussion about the responsibility ofJegal educators to 
instill professional values. "Legal education plays an important role in socializing the next 
generation of lawyers, judges, and public policymakers. As gatekeepers to the profession, law 
schools have a unique opportunity and obligation to make access to justice a more central social 
priority." Id. at 193; see also Barnhizer, supra note 287, at 337; Calmore, supra note 287, at 1169. 
329. See EQUAL JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 287, at 3 ("The Project eschewed the term 
'access to justice' in its planning literature in the belief that access to the legal system, though 
critical to many when meaningful, did not capture the full range of legal inequality that affects 
people and communities ...."). 
800 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:735 
should augment student awareness,330 and it may serve to sustain a passion for 
justice that initially draws some idealistic students to the practice of law but 
becomes attenuated under the pressure and rigors of school and legal practice.33i 
Schools can inculcate a commitment to equal access to justice and 
professional obligation by nurturing these ideals in law school. 332 One way to do 
so is by investing in a vibrant pro bono culture within the schooe33 under the 
guiding principle that "free legal work for clients who cannot afford legal services 
is a vivid enactment of the law's professional identity.,,334 Law schools should 
demonstrate a tangible commitment to pro bono work not merely by empty 
encouragement, but by providing opportunities, an institutional framework, and 
administrative attention that communicates implicit values.335 A powerful 
message from law schools and concrete actions that support those ideals can 
create a culture of service and pro bono work that endures after graduation. 336 
330. Dwight Aarons, A Nuts andBolts Approach to Teachingfor Social Change: A Blueprint 
and a Plan ofAction, 76 TENN. L. REv. 405, 407 (2009) ("Raising social justice issues in the law 
school classroom should raise the social consciousness of all students."). 
331. [d. (noting that justice-related themes "may encourage students who came to law school 
intent on serving the public interest not only to retain their idealism and values, but to consider how 
they might put that idealism and those values into action"). 
332. See Tigran W. Eldred & Thomas Schoenherr, The Lawyer's Duty ofPublic Service: 
More Than Charity?, 96 W. VA. L. REv. 367, 400 (1994) (asserting that "'law schools ... 
constitute the greatest opportunity' to instill an ethic ofpublic service in young lawyers" (citation 
omitted)); Kuehn, supra note 290, at 293 ("[T]he issue is not whether law schools should seek to 
instill the legal profession'S public service norms, but rather, how this should best be done."); 
EQUAL JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 287, at 3 ("[L]aw schools have a vital role to play in 
explicating the nature of the problems and generating approaches for their resolution."). 
333. E.g., Leslie Boyle, Meeting the Demands of the Indigent Population: The Choice 
Between Mandatory and Voluntary Pro Bono Requirements, 20 GEO. 1. LEGALETHICS 415,415-16 
(2007); Steven B. Scudder, Justice Will Prevail (with a Little Help from Her Friends): Pro Bono 
in Utah, 2006 UTAH L. REv. 1081, 1082 (analyzing the pro bono culture in Utah, "explor[ing] 
strategies for changing the culture ofpro bono nationally," and asserting that America's law schools 
can playa vital role in establishing and expanding pro bono services). 
334. CARNEGIE REpORT, supra note 2, at 138. 
335. See Engler, supra note 315, at 493 (addressing the importance ofinstilling a commitment 
to provide legal services to the poor and advocating for more coherence in law school programs 
aimed at equal justice). 
336. E.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE: PUBLIC SERVICE 
AND THE PROFESSIONS (2005); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Cultures ofCommitment: Pro Bono for 
Lawyers and Law Students, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 2415, 2431 (1999) (suggesting that thoughtful 
strategies employed by law schools to involve law students in pro bono projects while in the 
developmental stage oftheir professional identity can significantly affect their commitment to pro 
bono activities); Larry R. Spain, The Unfinished Agenda for Law Schools in Nurturing a 
Commitment to Pro Bono Legal Services by Law Students, 72 UMKC L. REv. 477,492 (2003) 
(asserting that "[a]ccess to justice and a commitment to pro bono service should become an 
institutional priority at every law school," and to that end, every law school should develop an 
801 2011] RENAISSANCE OR RETRENCHMENT 
One study demonstrated that a school's success in inculcating an ethos of pro 
bono work depends in large part on "how supportive the school's overall culture 
is of such experience and how well integrated it is into the students' developing 
understanding of what it is to be a lawyer.,,337 Admittedly, resistance to these 
ideals may emanate from those who see a license to practice law as a ticket to 
wealth and status. Other options include collaborative partnerships between law 
schools, private firms, and non-profit organizations338 and other alliances that 
serve the dual goals of conveying an institutional commitment to pro bono work 
and providing much-needed services to the community.339 These initiatives can 
also enhance opportunities for mentoring, networking, and practical lawyering. 
Pro bono efforts and experiential learning opportunities can be supplemented 
by incorporating justice work into existing courses. For example, in a class that 
includes a research and writing component, professors can encourage students to 
select topics that serve the dual goals of inspiring and engaging them individually 
while providing much needed labor for under-resourced agencies, instead of 
having students focus on topics that represent purely academic inquiries.340 
Structures already exist for non-profits to identify areas ofresearch that would be 
useful to them. Students could also be assigned other projects with practical 
utility. 341 Debates as to whether participation in pro bono efforts should be 
mandatory in law school are beyond the scope of this Article, but it is worth 
heeding the caution that obligatory programs may ultimately emphasize the 
acquisition of skills over justice-related goals.342 
agenda for the provision ofpro bono services). 
337. CARNEGIE REpORT, supra note 2, at 139. 
338. See generally Laurie Barron et ai., Don't Do It Alone: A Community-Based, 
Collaborative Approach to Pro Bono, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL Ennes 323 (2010) (affirming the need for 
pro bono services and suggesting a tripartite model-involving faculty and students, law firms, and 
community organizations-that responds to the need for legal services for low income clients and 
communities). 
339. E.g., Dale Margolin et ai., Empowerment, Innovation, and Service: Law School 
Programs Provide Access to Justice and Instill a Commitment to Serve, 48 F AM. CT. REv. 672, 672 
(2010) (describing five pro bono programs "where law students, underthe supervision of[faculty] 
... or community professionals, provide assistance or legal representation to underserved ... 
populations"). 
340. For example, the American Constitution Society compiles a list ofpublic interest research 
topics. About ResearchLink, AM. CONST. Soe'y L. & POL'y, http://researchlink.acslaw.orgl (last 
visited June 11,20 11) ("ACS ResearchLink collects legal research topics submitted by practitioners 
for law students to explore in faculty-supervised writing projects for academic credit."). Additional 
outreach could generate an expanded list of topics. 
341. For example, at Western New England College, Judge Dina Fein teaches a course entitled 
"Access to Justice." Students in that course select projects intended to assist local organizations 
and can include developing pro se training manuals, websites, policy suggestions, and other work 
with practical applications. 
342. But see Granfield, supra note 287, at 1404-05 ("[I]n mandatory [pro bono] programs, the 
emphasis on skills training may usurp the question of professional commitment to serving 
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The legitimacy of the entire system is undermined when so few of the 
nation's poor and middle class cannot proceed past the courthouse steps,343 a 
reality that communicates an intolerable indifference to those at the bottom ofthe 
socioeconomic ladder.344 The harsh economic realities ofpractice can throw cold 
water on idealism and a commitment to advance access to justice, and the 
economic downturn makes advocacy for increased funding for legal services a 
seemingly futile goal. To raise awareness of this reality, lawyers and law 
professors must disabuse the public of the notion that our system, as currently 
structured, comes even remotely close to satisfying our venerated ideal of equal 
access to the law, to justice, and to lawyers. 
K. Challenge the Primacy o/U.S. News345 
The U.S. News and World Report ranking system exerts a hegemonic and 
ultimately destructive influence in law school culture, indirectly dictating 
institutional responses at every level of administration, from admission to bar 
underrepresented populations .... One potential drawback ofmandatory pro bono programs and 
their tendency to focus on skill-based benefits might be that they unintentionally dilute the meaning 
and purpose of pro bono."). 
343. A push for a "Civil Gideon" has been recently reinvigorated. See, e.g., Russell Engler, 
And Justice for All-Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, 
Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1987, 1988 (1999) (advocating pro se court reform); 
Russell Engler, Shaping a Context-Based Civil Gideonfrom the Dynamics ofSocial Change, 15 
TEMP. POL. &CN. RTS. L. REv. 697, 697 (2006) (advocating for a Civil Gideon). Even if such a 
system were implemented, we still must safeguard against failures within the system-ineffective 
assistance ofcounsel, an unlevel playing field, overworked attorneys, bias, and other impediments 
to equal access to justice. 
344. But see Rhode, supra note 55, at 1016 (noting that many people labor under a 
misperception about the availability to legal counsel to the poor: "Four-fifths ofAmericans believe, 
incorrectly, that the poor are entitled to counsel in civil cases; only a third think that low-income 
individuals would have difficulty finding legal assistance, a perception wildly out of touch with 
reality."). 
345. See Alfred L. Brophy, The Emerging Importance ofLaw Review Rankingsfor Law School 
Rankings, 2003-2007, 78 U. COLO. L. REv. 35, 37 (2007) ("There is increasing evidence that law 
schools have bent their practices of admission, expenditures, hiring, and even their modes of 
reporting to the ABA in response to the U.S. News rankings."); Francine Cullari, Law School 
Rankings Fail to Account for All Factors, 81 MICH. B.J. 52, 52 (2002) (pointing out that 
"applicants, administration, trustees to a certain extent, faculty, and employers pay attention to the 
[U.s. News] rankings."); MICHAEL SAUDER & WENDY ESPELAND, LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, 
FEAR OF FALLING: THE EFFECTS OF U.S. NEWS & WORLD REpORTR.ANiGNGS ON U.S. LAW SCHOOLS 
1 (2007), available at http://www.lsac.org/LSACResources/Research/GRJGR-07-02.asp ("One 
general effect of the ... [U.s. News] rankings on law schools is that it has created pressure on law 
school administrators to redistribute resources in ways that maximize their scores on the criteria 
used by ... [U.S. News] to create the rankings, even if they are skeptical that this is a productive 
use of these resources."). 
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passage to employment statistics.346 The literature analyzing the impact of U.S. 
News is predominantly negative. Scathing criticism for the damage caused by the 
U.s. News ranking system is multifaceted. Commentators argue, among other 
things, that the system decreases incentives for innovation/47 measures the wrong 
things,348 has a deleterious impact on admissions decisions349 and diversity/50 is 
unreliable,351 contributes to the escalation of law school costs,352 is unrelated to 
346. See Amir Efrati, Hard Case: Job Market Wanes/or US. Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 
2007, at Al ("Students entering law school have little way ofknowing how tight ajob market they 
might face. The only employment data that many prospective students see comes from school­
promoted surveys that provide a far-from-complete portrait ofgraduate experiences. "). Reporting 
is not always constructive. See Michael Sauder & Wendy Nelson Espeland, Strength in Numbers? 
The Advantages 0/Multiple Rankings, 81 IND. L.J. 205, 211 (2006) ("Pressure to boost placement 
statistics has encouraged schools to broaden their definition of employment to include non-legal 
jobs and to invest heavily in tracking students who do not respond to their employment surveys."); 
see also Kyle P. McEntee & Patrick J. Lynch, A Way Forward: Improving Transparency in 
Employment Reporting at American Law Schools (Apr. 8, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.comJabstract=1528862 (describing efforts to launch a website aimed at 
providing unvarnished employment statistics about law school graduates). 
347. See Rachel F. Moran, O/Rankings and Regulation: Are the U.S. News & World Report 
Rankings Really a Subversive Force in Legal Education?, 81 IND. L.J. 383, 383 (2006) (noting that 
"norms of uniformity and standardization have dominated the world of legal education, 
substantially limiting law schools' ability to compete against one another" and that accordingly, 
law schools are reluctant to innovate lest they risk their accreditation, reputation, and future). 
348. See, e.g., Brian Leiter, How to Rank Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 47,52 (2006) ("We should 
produce more rankings that unleash academic talent and ambition, not rankings that reward decanal 
connivance at manipulating ranking schemes cooked up by journalists."). 
349. See Michael Sauder & Ryon Lancaster, Do Rankings Matter? The Effects ofU.S. News 
& World Report Rankings on the Admission Process o/Law Schools, 40 LAW & Soc'yREv. 105, 
105 (2006) (finding that the Us. News & World Report rankings "have significant [negative] 
effects on both the decisions of prospective students and the decisions schools make in the 
admissions process"). 
350. Wendy Espeland & Michael Sauder, Rankings andDiversity, 18 S. CAL. REv. L. & Soc. 
JUST. 587, 589 (2009) (highlighting "concerns about the impact of rankings on diversity, and 
rais[ing] questions about how to think about professional diversity"); Laura Rothstein, The LSAT, 
U.S. News & World Report, and Minority Admissions: Special Challenges and Special 
Opportunities/or Law School Deans, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 257, 258 (2006) (arguing that the Us. 
News "purported measure of quality" ignores the importance of diversity). 
351. See generally Theodore P. Seto, Understanding the U.S. News Law School Rankings, 60 
SMU L. REv. 493 (2007) (demonstrating the unreliability of US. News rankings oflaw schools 
through a comprehensive analysis). 
352. Emily A. Spieler, Making Legal Education More Practical, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 22, 2010, 
available at http://www.law.comJjsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202443868634&slreturn= 
l&hbxlogin=l ("A recent U.S. Government Accountability Office report indicates that rising 
tuition levels are, at least in part, a reflection of law schools' response to the 'rankings game. "') 
(citing U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNTABIUTY OFFICE, GAO-l 0-20, HIGHER EDUCAnON: ISSUES RELATED 
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the quality of education provided by the institution,353 and is not individualized 
for the needs ofeach student and offerings ofa particular school. 354 Perhaps most 
damning, the dominance of the ranking system creates immense pressure, and 
"schools frequently manipulate the rankings by reporting false data.,,355 
The ABA's Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar's report 
on the u.s. News and World Report rankings examined the impact ofthe ranking 
system and outlined three primary concerns.356 Citing a U.S. Government 
Accountability Office report, the ABA's report concluded that because the 
ranking system considers per pupil expenditure, schools that endeavored to keep 
costs down would face the perverse result of faring worse in the ranking than 
those who made no effort to contain costS.357 As a result, the ranking system 
TO LAW SCHOOL COST AND ACCESS (2009». 
353. See M.H. Sam Jacobson, The Curse ofTradition in the Law School Classroom: What 
Casebook Professors Can Learn from Those Professors Who Teach Legal Writing, 61 MERCER L. 
REv. 899,903 (2010) ("The U.S. News & WorldReport rankings are the tail that wags the dog. The 
rankings are based on statistical measures that have little to do with the quality of the education, 
yet they are widely used by prospective students and faculty, as well as prospective and existing 
donors and employers, for that very purpose"). 
354. See Joanna Grossman, U.S. News & World Report's 2005 Law School Rankings: Why 
They May Not Be Trustworthy, and How the Alternative Ranking Systems Compare, FINDLAW 
(Apr. 6, 2004), http://writ.news.findlaw.comlgrossmanJ20040406.html (asserting that legal 
education has fallen hostage to the U.S. News rankings and students would be better served by 
"more SUbjective assessment of the fit between a student's needs and a school's offerings"). 
355. Thies, supra note 51, at 617. Instead of obfuscating the real figures, schools should 
provide useful and transparent infonnation on short-term and long-term job prospects. Thies 
recommends that the ABA "require law schools to provide more infonnation to prospective 
students about the career prospects of their graduates." Id. at 599. Also, there should be methods 
to safeguard against suspicious statistics or at least illuminate the methodology. For example, 
schools have been using post-graduate programs to elevate employment statistics. In response, 
schools argue that if everyone else is employing sketchy reporting methodologies, they will be 
disadvantaged by more candid reporting. This phenomenon reinforces the need for more 
transparency in the process. Students would also benefit from some sort ofpre-counseling to see 
iflaw school is the right fit for them. Some students may end up at law school by default, because 
they were not interested in business or medicine, and they may not feel a genuine calling to the 
profession. Giving students full infonnation would help them make informed decisions. Also, a 
recent study concluded that grades, rather than the elite status of the school, are a better predictor 
ofsalary. See Ashby Jones, New Study: Forgetthe Rankings, Just Bring Home Straight A 's, WALL 
ST. J. L. BLOG (July 30,2010,2:24 PM EST), http://blogs.wsj.comllaw/2010/07/30/new-study­
forget-the-rankings-just-bring-home-straight-as/. 
356. MARTHA DAUGHTREY ET AL., AM. BAR ASS'N, REpORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMlTIEE ON 
THE u.s. NEWS AND WORLDREpORTRANKINGs3-4 (2010) [hereinafter ABA REPORT], available at 
http://amlawdaily.typepad.comlfiles/f.usnewsfinal-report.pdf. 
357. !d. at 3 (citing U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 352). On an anecdotal 
note, one school worried that if it charged less in tuition than its competitors, students would 
perceive that the school offered a less valuable commodity, putting it at a competitive disadvantage. 
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encourages tuition increases.358 Second, the report concluded that the rankings 
system incentivizes admissions offices to gear fmancial aid toward students with 
high LSA Ts and GPAs rather than students with greater financial need, requiring 
the neediest students to borrow more money.359 Finally, the report concluded that 
the u.s. News rankings have an adverse impact on the goal ofincreasing diversity 
in law school, as "the overriding importance of the u.s. News metric has tended 
to drive other measures ofquality and mission to be down-played, and that racial 
diversity has been one of the casualties. ,,360 The report discussed various efforts 
to minimize the deleterious effect of the ranking system-including attempts to 
convince U.S. News to modify its system, proposals to educate the public about 
the system's shortcomings and thereby decrease its power, and initiatives to 
coalesce resistance from law schools in cooperating with U.S. News .361 With little 
results accruing from these efforts, the report concluded that the system is 
unlikely to undergo significant transformation, yet it did not want to discourage 
a continued campaign advocating for a system designed to honor the differences 
in law school missions and discourage the disincentives to innovation or 
resistance to the hegemony of considered factors. 362 
Not everyone is critical of the rankings system. Some analysts, while 
conceding the system's shortcomings, argue that the tool has some utility for 
students363 and that the rankings match students with employers.364 Further, there 
may be some benefits, such as requiring schools to report pro bono efforts. 
Various proposals suggest alternatives designed to redress the pitfalls of the U.S. 
News methodology/65 such as a proposal for a two-tiered ranking system366 and 
358. "[nhe move to a more hands-on, resource-intensive approach to legal education and 
competition among schools for higher rankings appear to be the main factors driving the cost oflaw 
school." U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 352, at 2. 
359. As Paula Lustbader points out, reliance on the LSAT perpetuates distributive injustice, 
since students with fewer economic resources are less likely to take a LSAT preparation course, 
with a corresponding decrease in chances for admission and merit based financial aid. Lustbader, 
supra note 269, at 617. 
360. ABA REpORT, supra note 335, at 3-4. 
361. Id. at 4. 
362. Id. 
363. See. e.g., Russell Korobkin, In Praise of Law School Rankings: Solutions to 
Coordination and Collective Action Problems, 77 TEx. L. REv. 403, 407-08 (1998). Professor 
Korobkin notes that students read and value rankings because they know that attending a highly­
ranked school signals their quality to desirable employers, who also study the rankings in order to 
interpret these indicators. Id. at 407-09. This coordination function is served whether or not the 
rankings accurately measure the quality oflaw schools, however defined. Id. at 410. 
364. Id. at 409-10. 
365. See, e.g., Jon M. Garon, Take Back the Night: Why an Association ofRegional Law 
Schools Will Return Core Values to Legal Education and Provide an Alternative to Tiered 
Rankings, 38 U. ToL. L. REv. 517 (2007) (suggesting regional alliances aimed at combating the 
dominance of U.S. News); Andrew P. Morriss & William D. Henderson, Measuring Outcomes: 
Post-Graduation Measures ofSuccess in the U.s. News & World Report Law School Rankings, 83 
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the use of SSRN as a more accurate indicator of scholarly impact, but none are 
likely to pose any real challenge to its dominance any time soon.367 
To limit the primacy of and damage inflicted by the ranking system, some 
commentators have exhorted law schools to engage in collective and concerted 
action to refuse to participate, recourse that does not seem to have gained much 
traction. Other options include the development of an alternative ranking 
mechanism that gives students transparent and useful information about law 
schools that is relevant to their professional goals, at least as much as they are 
able to identify before they start school.368 Such a system might actually promote 
innovation and differentiation among law schools that currently believe they have 
no choice but to strive to emulate the model ofthe elite law schools against which 
they will be measured.369 Alternatively, survey instruments need to be modified, 
perhaps through independent verification, to prevent schools from manipulating 
data.370 In addition to the foregoing advantages of systemic reform, the rejection 
IND. L.J. 791 (2008) (arguing that law schools or governing organizations should compile 
meaningful information for prospective students); Patrick T. O'Day & George D. Kuh, Assessing 
What Matters in Law School: The Law School Survey ofStudent Engagement, 81 IND. LJ. 401 
(2006) (arguing that indicia ofstudent engagement are a better measure ofthe value ofa law school 
program than U.S. News); Richard A. Posner, Law School Rankings, 81 IND. L.J. 13 (2006) 
(comparing U.S. News ranking with alternative methodologies); Cass R. Sunstein, Ranking Law 
Schools: A Market Test?, 81 IND. L.J. 25 (2006) (arguing for a market test relying on students' 
choices); David A. Thomas, The Law School Rankings Are Harmful Deceptions: A Response to 
Those Who Praise the Rankings andSuggestionsfor a Better Approach to Evaluating Law Schools, 
40 Hous. L. REv. 419 (2003) (examining the flaws ofthe ranking systems). 
366. See generally Bernard S. Black & Paul L. Caron, Ranking Law Schools: Using SSRN to 
Measure Scholarly Performance, 81 IND. L.J. 83, 95 (2006) (identifying the disadvantages ofUs. 
News and exploring advantages and disadvantages ofthe Social Science Research Network (SSRN) 
measures and proposing using them to supplement existing measures oflaw schools' performance); 
Laurel Terry, Taking Kronman and Glendon One Step Further: In Celebration of "Professional 
Schools," 100 DICK. L. REv. 647, 667-75 (1996) (arguing that legal institutions should be ranked 
on two different models-research institutions and teaching institutions). 
367. But see Sam Kamin, How the Blogs Saved Law School: Why a Diversity ofVoices Will 
Undermine the U.S. News & World Report Rankings, 81 IND. LJ. 375, 381 (2006) (noting that 
information is increasingly available to prospective students through the Internet). 
368. This will presumably be a fluid dynamic once they are immersed in school. 
369. However, the elite law schools can sometimes take risks that the lower schools 
cannot-for example, not providing class rank, with little risk that employers will decline to 
interview students who have not been pre-sorted by grades (although there are still ways to 
distinguish oneself with the standard indicators oflaw school achievement, such as participation 
in law reviews and stellar faculty recommendations). 
370. 	 Andrew Morriss and William Henderson propose the following: 
Law schools, acting through their accrediting agency, the ABA, could authorize NALP 
to compile and publish school-level salary and employment information. Providing 
information on the distribution ofsalaries ofrecent graduates would, for example, allow 
students a realistic method ofcomparing their expected debt levels to their ability to pay 
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of U.S. News as a driving force likely would have a positive impact on diversity 
in law schools.371 
L. Revisit the Elevation o/Scholarship and Broaden Its FocuslRewartp72 
Theoretically, law school academics are expected to excel in three 
areas-teaching, scholarship, and service. In reality, scholarly productivity is the 
coin of the realm, and within the "publish or perish culture," at least until tenure, 
teaching is a distant second at many institutions.373 "[M]any American law 
schools continue to privilege theory over practice in teaching, scholarship, and 
institutional mission."374 While many scholars aver that engaging in scholarly 
inquiry and writing inures to the benefit of students, studies are more equivocal 
about a clear and demonstrable link between scholarship and the quality of 
teaching.375 Legal scholars relish the time to contemplate legal issues and argue 
offstudent loans after graduation. Salaries have the potential to exert a large anchoring 
effect on law student expectations; furthennore, average salaries can be substantially 
affected by a small fraction of students obtaining lucrative large firm employment. 
Therefore, a more useful and accurate summary ofinfonnation would provide a detailed 
breakdown of employment type by law schools. 
Morriss & Henderson, supra note 365, at 831 (internal citations omitted). 
371. See Espeland & Sauder, supra note 350, at 589 (highlighting "the actual and potential 
consequences of the rankings for diversity at three levels of analysis: I) the individual decision­
making of law school applicants; 2) the organizational decision-making of law schools in the 
admissions practices that create classes and distribute students across schools and programs; 3) and 
the heterogeneity of law schools as kinds oforganizations with distinctive missions and niches in 
the field of legal education" (emphases added»; Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The Destruction of the 
Holistic Approach to Admissions: The Pernicious Effects ofRankings, 81 IND. LJ. 309 (2006) 
(looking at the impact ofrankings on achieving a diverse student body). For a discussion of the 
overreliance on LSAT scores and its impact on diversity, see supra Part III.E. 
372. One recent analysis estimated that the cost ofproducing a law review article by a tenured 
professor at a highly ranked school is in the range of$100,000 and noted that 43% oflaw review 
articles are never cited by other academics, judges, or practicing lawyers. Karen Sloan, Legal 
Scholarship Carries a High Price Tag, NAT'LL.J. , Apr. 20,2011, available at http://www.law.coml 
j sp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.j sp?id= 1202490888822&Legal_ scholarship_carries _a_high -price_tag&s 
Iretum= I &hbxlogin= I. 
373. Rogelio Lasso, From the Paper Chase to the Digital Chase: Technology and the 
Challenge ofTeaching 21st Century Law Students, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1,56 n.281 (2002) 
(noting that "u.s. News & World Report'[s] rankings ... do not consider quality ofteaching as a 
factor worth evaluation"); Schuwerk, supra note 231, at 763 ("Once they are hired, law professors 
are rewarded primarily for scholarship."). 
374. Anthony V. Alfieri, Against Practice, 107 MICH. L. REv. 1073, 1073 (2009). 
375. See David L. Gregory, The Assault on Scholarship, 32 WM. & MARy L. REv. 993,999 
(1991) ("Ifprofessors do not engage in scholarship, they cannot fully foster critical analytical skills 
in their students because their own skills will atrophy. Squandering these intellectual professional 
resources is inexcusable."); Korobkin, supra note 363, at 423-24; James Lindgren & Allison 
Nagelberg, Are Scholars Better Teachers?, 73 Cill.-KENT L. REv. 823,827-29 (1998); Deborah 
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that their distance from the actual practice of law empowers them to engage in 
more objective critiques than would be possible while fully immersed in the 
enterprise of practicing law. In contrast, critics argue that academics ensconced 
in the ivory tower, wholly isolated from the vagaries of legal practice on the 
ground, have created a body of esoteric legal scholarship that is of little utility to 
the bench, the bar, and the students taught by these scholars. 
Statistics support the claim that scholarship produced in the legal academy 
is cited with decreasing frequently by the judiciary, lending credence to the 
assertion that many scholars are essentially writing to the increasingly narrow and 
exclusive audience of other law school academics.376 Moreover, the student­
driven process of selecting law review articles and its attendant impact on a 
professor's career trajectory has been widely criticized.377 One answer is to 
expand the defmition ofcountable scholarship and de-privilege the identification 
of recondite topics as infinitely preferable to practical scholarship that is selected 
for its relevance to the world of practicing lawyers instead of the rarified ranks 
of academics. 
Many suggestions aimed at addressing the inadequacy of legal education as 
currently conceptualized require intangible efforts and attention, unlike the 
quantifiable production of scholarly articles and presentation of these ideas to 
other academics. This is compounded by the lack of incentives for faculty to 
engage with students or adapt their pedagogy. Because efforts unrelated to 
scholarly output often go unnoticed and unrewarded, both financially and in terms 
of recognition, it sends a tacit message that these contributions to the life of the 
law school are devalued.378 A reconstructed system that rewards both productive 
scholars and engaged and innovative teachers could redirect some energy into 
enhancing law school pedagogy over lengthening a list of scholarly OUtpUt.379 
Tenure standards could be revised to incorporate the recognition of dedication 
and service to the law school. Another option is to lobby the omnipotent Us. 
News to include in its indicia the quality and quantity of faculty contributions to 
the life of the law school, even though they may be more difficult to objectively 
Jones Merritt, Research and Teaching on Law Faculties: An Empirical Exploration, 73 Cm.-KENT 
L. REv. 765, 807 (1998); Fred R. Shapiro, They Published, Not Perished, but Were They Good 
Teachers?, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 835,840 (1998). 
376. See generally David Hricik & Victoria S. Salzmann, Why There Should Be Fewer Articles 
Like This One: Law Professors Should Write More for Legal Decision-Makers and Less for 
Themselves, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 761 (2005). 
377. Jason P. Nance & Dylan 1. Steinberg, The LawReview Article Selection Process: Results 
from a National Study, 71 ALB. L. REv. 565,584 (2008)(noting "that editors use author credentials 
extensively to detennine which articles to publish"). 
378. See Newton, supra note 41, at 136. 
379. This will be a hard sell for institutions when a large portion of the U.S. News reporting 
system is reputational and presumably based in large part on perceived scholarlyquality. However, 
as discussed throughout the Article, the entire system must be reformed, given the interconnection 
between the component parts. 
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380assess.
M Equalize Status ofClinical, LRW, and Tenure Track Faculty 
The demand for expanded instruction in practical skills will be vindicated 
when all faculty members share equal status, salary, and voting rights in hiring, 
promotion, and tenure, as well as full participation in all curricular and 
institutional decisions.381 Some schools have equalized and integrated their 
faculties, but in many schools, the balkanization of faculty continues to engender 
a destructive dynamic within the academy, and deep divisions persist among 
doctrinal, clinical, and LRW faculty. It is easy to retreat behind old narratives 
and perceived entrenched interests, wary and resentful of each other. The 
continued relegation of "skills faculty" to the margins of power within the 
academy stunts the conversation about educational reform since full participation 
in law school governance is critical.382 This stratified structure sends an 
unmistakable message to students about what is valuable in the curriculum. 
Moreover, it is hard to measure the true cost of relegating clinical and writing 
faculty to a lower status, but demoralization certainly takes a toll. Eliminating the 
current hierarchy could instead transcend the divisions and redirect attention to 
the big picture that should be driving the conversation about law school 
reform-how to prepare our students to be competent, ethical, and satisfied 
lawyers. With a fully inclusive representation of legal educators at the table, 
faculty could work toward finding common ground. A collaborative reform 
effort wrought from multiple and occasionally tense and fragmented 
conversations might engender conditions in which the stakeholders truly listen, 
eschew defensiveness, contemplate, and perceive critiques about how educators 
function individually or institutionally not as personal attacks, but instead 
advanced in the spirit of truly open-minded dialogue in pursuit of meaningful 
reform. Skills and doctrinal faculty all bring important perspectives to this 
380. The temptation to fudge subjective data could threaten to render reporting completely 
unreliable, given the likelihood that law schools may feel they have no choice but to gin more 
objective data ifthey perceive that their competitors are engaging in similar dissembling. However, 
instruments such as student evaluations of faculty engagement may be possible. Some 
commentators have suggested that law schools should not strive to teach everything to all students, 
but instead to provide general training and then tailor curricula to particular focuses by creating 
niche law schools. 
381. See Deborah Maranville et a!., Re-vision Quest: A Law School Guide to Designing 
Experiential Courses Involving Real Lawyering 50 (NYLS Clinical Research Inst., Working Paper 
No. 10111-6), available at http://papers.ssm.com/so\3/papers.cfm?abstracUd=1626568 ("At the 
same time, decisions made at the local level on status,job security, and voting rights in tum affect 
who will be in a position to participate in the national discussions on both personnel issues and 
curriculum."). 
382. It strikes me as ironic that doctrinal faculty do not question their ability to evaluate 
clinical teaching and scholarship despite the rich world ofclinical pedagogy and a distinct body of 
clinical scholarship, yet in many institutions, clinical faculty cannot vote on hiring and retention 
of doctrinal faculty, an inequality that further skews and reinforces the power imbalance. 
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enterprise, but as currently structured, some voices are more equal than others. 
Stiff resistance to equalization is due in part to ingrained assumptions about 
the relative value of the different work, and it is attributable in part to the relative 
expense of clinical education.383 The intrinsic hierarchy of values can only be 
dismantled when faculty are forced to honestly examine deep-rooted assumptions, 
and it will be perhaps encouraged by a review of legal education. One response 
to the cost is reflected in the current threats to the hard-fought victory giving 
clinical faculty security of position,384 which should serve as the miner's canary 
for doctrinal faculty. Schools should strenuously resist, mindful that the 
proposals may be genuinely motivated by an interest in ameliorating the financial 
burden that law students face, but the impact is far-reaching. If security of 
position provisions are repealed, whether with the demise of tenure for all 
professors or clinical faculty alone, the pressure will be to add experiential 
learning opportunities on the cheap, at the expense ofthe current educators in the 
trenches with the students.385 Greater flexibility may be desirable, but concerns 
persist about consistent pedagogy and the long-term demoralization of clinical 
faculty who reside in those institutions. 
Opposition to placing a premium on skills training includes: objections to the 
perceived costs; parrying from tenured faculty who are wedded to their research 
agendas; faculty resistance to learning new teaching methodologies when they 
have long ago mastered the old ones; disinterest in the labor-intensive demands 
of skills teaching; a lack of support for, or even overt hostility to, focusing on 
skills because they are derided as too pedestrian; the difficulty of developing 
assessment instruments designed to measure competencies that are not tested by 
standard examinations; pressure from U.S. News to attend to concrete inputs that 
are more readily and objectively measured; and the drive to increase institutional 
visibility and prestige through scholarly productivity.386 Schools have enjoyed 
some increased funding for skills training, but this increase is typically 
accompanied by a parallel increase for research as well, which fails to address the 
underlying disparities or offset concerns about disproportionate resource 
allocation.387 
N. Respond to the Changing Nature ofPractice 
Law schools are educating lawyers who will hone their skills in a world that 
may bear little resemblance to the one in which many faculty cut their teeth as 
practitioners, if they practiced at all. That our system of education has hardly 
383. But see Chavkin, supra note 293, at 13-14 (arguing that clinical education is not as 
expensive as is widely believed, particularly when compared to the relative cost ofsmall seminars). 
384. AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 109, at 32 ("A law school shall afford to full-time clinical 
faculty members a form of security of position reasonably similar to tenure. "). 
385. This discussion of security ofposition provisions is not intended to argue against tools 
for ensuring ongoing post-tenure productivity, but to raise concern about academic freedom and 
parity among faculty. 
386. See Thies, supra note 51, at 612. 
387. Id. at 612-13. 
811 2011] RENAISSANCE OR RETRENCHMENT 
evolved to mirror the changes in practice over the past century is telling. It is 
incumbent on schools to carefully consider how legal education ought to be 
modified to reflect the needs of our students and a more contemporary legal 
marketplace. 
Ofparticular relevance to the changing face oflaw school is the "death ofbig 
law.,,388 Law schools were historically driven in part to produce associates whose 
labor enriches law firms. Under the "big law" model, law firm partners generate 
significant profits by leveraging the labor ofassociates,389 driving up costs for the 
consumers of high-price legal services. Because the tasks assigned to associates 
typically did not require sophisticated legal skills, law schools did not experience 
pressure to graduate students with a wide range oflawyering skills/90 and "[l]aw 
schools shaped their curricula to respond to the needs of the corporate practice of 
large law firms. ,,391 Changing times and the economic downturn have produced 
sophisticated and thrifty clients who are no longer willing to subsidize the legal 
training of associates392 and who impose pressure for new associates to generate 
money in a way that adds value for the clients, not the firm partners.393 As a 
result, some analysts contend that employers will prefer law school graduates 
who possess a range of practical skills.394 The reconstructed model in big law 
may trickle down to other employers, who will follow suit in demanding practical 
skills, given the high price of training lawyers in-house. This trend may exert 
additional pressure on law schools to focus on the provision of skills training. 
Another area that must be considered is generational learning preferences.395 
Millennials, the generational group from which the vast majority of current law 
students are drawn, have grown up in a world saturated with almost unimaginable 
and ever-advancing technological innovation. As a result, their style of learning 
and engagement has developed differently than those who came of age in a 
different era.396 Legal educators must resist the temptation to duck their heads in 
388. LarryE. Ribstein, The Death a/Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REv. 749, 813-14 ("Law schools 
will have to find education models that are more cost-effective and that address employer demands 
in the new market for law graduates."). 
389. Thies, supra note 51, at 600. 
390. Id. at 602. 
391. MACCRATE REpORT, supra note I, at 87. 
392. Burk & McGowan, supra note 126, at 78 ("As increasing numbers ofsophisticated clients 
refuse to pay high rates for inexperienced lawyers, the debate about new lawyers' practical 
preparation and who should be providing it has gotten louder and more pointed, though no 
clearer."). 
393. See Lat, supra note 125 ("Clients are balking at paying for junior associates, which raises 
a question: If clients will no longer pay for the training of junior associates, who will?"); see 
generally Thies, supra note 51 (outlining the reasons the traditional structure of law firms is not 
economically sustainable). 
394. See Thies, supra note 51, at 600-02. 
395. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 100, at 282-83. 
396. See Susan K. McClellan, Externships/or Millennial Generation LawStudents: Bridging 
the Generation Gap, 15 CLINICAL L. REv. 255, 255 (2009); see also Leslie Larkin Cooney, Giving 
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the sand when it is challenging to keep pace with technological advancements and 
force themselves to adapt to student learning styles and the modernization oflegal 
practice (e.g., electronic discovery, technology in the courtroom, depositions 
conducted remotely, and confidentiality issues associated with the use of this 
technology). 
In an increasingly globalized world, schools must adapt their curriculum, 
pedagogy, and worldview to incorporate this reality. Strategies include the 
increased integration of issues related to the internationalization of law practice, 
the importance of providing instruction on cultural competence,397 and the 
installation of awareness of the legal, economic, cultural, and political world 
beyond our borders. Even if schools do not expect the graduates of individual 
institutions to acquire jobs with obvious international connections, the influence 
of increased global interconnectedness will inevitably seep into almost all areas 
of practice.398 
As professionals, law professors must address the widespread dissatisfaction 
among the public about the hostile way law is practiced, including the 
incalculable costs to perceptions ofjustice and fair play engendered by the current 
system. The concept that all disputes are litigable and all injuries compensable 
fuels a caustic cycle and often serves to perpetuate harm rather than foster the 
peaceable and enduring resolution ofdisputes. Introducing students to alternative 
dispute resolution and other problem-solving competencies early and often is 
critical before students have fully internalized the message sent throughout the 
first year-that conflicts should be resolved in zero-sum game litigation posture. 
Faculty must counter the first year curriculum's 
overwhelming message . . . that real law and real lawyers maintain the 
status quo by resolving disputes between private parties. This message 
is built into the very fabric of the torts, contracts, property, and civil 
procedure courses, as they were designed by Langdell and his immediate 
successors, and as they continue to be taught at the present time.399 
The students' educational experiences should fully embrace and incorporate 
exposure to the expanding range of alternative perspectives on law practice,40o 
Millennials a Leg-Up: How to Avoid the "IfI Knew Then What I Know Now" Syndrome, 96 Ky. 
L.l. 505, 505 (2008) ("Millennial students are those born after 1981 and they are quite different 
from the Oen X students with whom legal educators are familiar."). 
397. See Arturo l. Carrillo, Bringing International Law Home: The Innovative Role ofHuman 
Rights Clinics in the Transnational Legal Process, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 527, 586 (2004) 
("[M]ore law schools are realizing that the clinical training oftransnational lawyers is an essential 
component of legal education in the age of globalization."). 
398. See, e.g., Lauren Carasik, "Think Glocal, Act Glocal": The Praxis ofSocial Justice 
Lawyering in the Global Era, 15 CLINICAL L. REv. 55 (2008). 
399. Edward Rubin, Cu"icular Stress, 60 l. LEGALEDUC. 110, III (2010). 
400. Bruce 1. Winick, Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Teaching Lawyering Skills: 
Meeting the Challenge ofthe New ABA Standards, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 429,433 (2005). 
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including multidisciplinary problem solving,401 holistic lawyering,402 collaborative 
lawyering,403 therapeutic jurisprudence,404 creative problem solving,405 preventive 
law,406 transformative mediation,407 and restorative justice.408 
401. See V. Pualani Enos & Lois H. Kanter, Who's Listening? Introducing Students to Client­
Centered, Client-Empowering, and Multidisciplinary Problem-Solving in a Clinical Setting, 9 
CLINICALL. REv. 83, 84 (2002) (arguing that "[c ]lients dealing with complex and multidimensional 
problems need service providers who approach problem-solving in a way that is client-centered, 
client-empowering, and incorporates multidisciplinary and community-based solutions and 
resources"). 
402. 	 Holistic lawyering is defined as 
"[ a]n orientation toward law practice that shuns the rancor and bloodletting oflitigation 
whenever possible; seeks to identify the roots of conflict without assigning blame; 
encourages clients to accept responsibility for their problems and to recognize their 
opponents' humanity; and sees in every conflict an opportunity for both client and 
lawyer to let go ofjudgment, anger, and bias and to grow as human beings." 
Ingrid N. Tollefson, Enlightened Advocacy: A Philosophical Shift with a Public Policy Impact, 25 
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'y 481, 504-05 (2004) (citation omitted). 
403. 	 Collaborative lawyering is explained as follows: 
The mission ofcollaborative law is "[t]o promote the non-adversarial practice oflaw. 
To promote collaborative law, which resolves legal conflicts with cooperative, rather 
than confrontational, techniques, and in which lawyers do not litigate-thereby 
encouraging parties to reach agreements in a creative and respectful manner. To 
educate the public and the legal community about the process and value ofcollaborative 
law." 
Cohen, supra note 306, at 156 n.73 (citation omitted). 
404. 	 Therapeutic jurisprudence 
"[c]oncentrates on the law's impact on emotional life and psychological wellbeing. It 
is a perspective that regards the law (rules of law, legal procedures, and roles of legal 
actors) itself as a social force that often produces therapeutic and anti-therapeutic 
consequences. It does not suggest that therapeutic concerns are more important than 
other consequences or factors, but it does suggest that the law's role as a therapeutic 
agent should be recognized and systematically studied." 
Id. (citation omitted). 
405. The Center for Creative Problem Solving, which is based at California Western School 
of Law, "develops curriculum, research, and projects to educate students and lawyers in methods 
for preventing problems where possible, and creatively solving those problems that do exist." 
Center for Creative Problem Solving, CAL. W. SCH. OF LAW, http://www.cwsl.edulmainl 
default.asp?nav=creativeyroblem_solving.asp&body=creativeyroblem_solving/home.asp (last 
visited June 11, 2011). 
406. "The National Center for Preventive Law (NCPL) is dedicated to preventing legal risks 
from becoming legal problems." National Center for Preventive Law, CAL. W. SCH. OF LAW., 
http://www.preventivelawyer.orglmainidefault.asp(lastvisitedJune 11,2011). The NCPL is also 
based at California Western School of Law and provides materials and information to those 
interested in the theories and practice ofpreventive law. Id. 
407. In the transformative view, conflict is more about interactions than violations or conflicts 
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o. Impediments 
1. Faculty Resistance.-Some faculty members react defensively to the 
admonition to make legal education more relevant. Discussing the importance 
of integrating practical skills or other creative curricular reforms to their teaching 
repertoire can leave professors feeling irrelevant and antiquated, fueling 
resistance to reorienting their teaching so far into their careers-that is, 
"[r]eluctance to support curricular reform may in fact reveal some discomfort 
with curricular modifications that may make certain faculty members feel a lack 
of confidence in their ability to take part in new, more modern visions of law 
teaching.'",o9 Moreover, faculty "may resist change because they prefer to 
replicate the environment in which they achieved success.''''IO Those arguing for 
an overhaul of the system should be mindful of the reasons for resistance and 
frame their arguments with an understanding of factors which may undergird the 
opposition. Overt criticisms of faculty who have not practiced law may be 
counterproductive in encouraging them to innovate their teaching to include 
methods more often used by those who teach the skills. Instead, disparate groups 
of faculty can stop trading recriminations, share the best teaching methodologies, 
demystify the various techniques and goals, and recognize that law students must 
merge doctrinal insights with practical knowledge and skills. Somehow, faculty 
need to foster a belief that the participants are all operating in good faith to 
advance legal education and engender dialogue that rejects old, ossified 
assumptions. Faculty members who are disengaged with the current crisis are not 
likely to be reading law review articles on pedagogy and legal education. Those 
concerned with reform need to reach out to their colleagues and create space for 
these conversations to take place in a non-accusatory, constructive, and collegial 
way, such as faculty colloquia. These suggestions may sound hopelessly naIve. 
Let me be clear, however, that I prefer a process of civil discourse, but I do not 
suggest that those agitating for reform temper the substance of our critique. 
Admittedly, these conversations will be threatening to some whose gravitational 
pull toward tradition is powerfu1.411 
2. Financial Issues.-Even if law school administrations and faculties 
embrace reforms, the thorny issue of fiscal pressure can dampen or extinguish 
even the best ofintentions. Competition for law students may increase in the near 
of interest. See Institute for the Study of Conflict Transformation, HOFSTRA LAW, http://law. 
hofstra.edulacademics/institutesandcenterslISCT/isctJesources.html (last visited June 11, 2011). 
408. As Beth Cohen notes, other approaches include restorative justice, "[a] systematic 
response to wrongdoing that emphasizes healing the wounds of victims, offenders, and 
communities caused or revealed by the criminal behavior." Cohen, supra note 306, at 156 n.73 
(citation omitted). 
409. Toni M. Fine, Reflections on u.s. Law Curricular Reform, 10 GERMAN LJ. 717, 729-30 
(2009). 
410. Sonsteng et aI., supra note 105, at 352. 
411. A less nefarious cousin to refractory individual faculty is institutional inertia, which will 
only change when the affected constituencies persevere in challenging the status quo. 
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future. Assuming that undergraduate college applications peaked in the 2009 
application cycle, four or six years down the road, law school applications will 
likely drop, perhaps precipitously. Compounding the demographic shifts are both 
the economic downturn and the publicity surrounding the questionable financial 
wisdom of attending law school. Some schools may be forced to shut their 
doors.412 Although this may be appealing to prospective law students, fewer 
attorneys may exacerbate the inadequacy of legal resources for the poor and 
middle class. Moreover, because escalating pressures to prepare students to 
practice law through a reoriented focus on skills are often dismissed on account 
of fiscal constraints, any real dialogue about the mission of legal education is 
eclipsed by the bottom line. 
Despite the barriers to forward progress, law school must evolve because 
legal practice has changed. In the face of opposition, some successful prior 
reform efforts have altered legal education in meaningful ways. For example, 
because of the vanishing trial, schools pay increased attention to alternative 
dispute resolution. The academy has absorbed other changes as well; critical 
pedagogies have contributed incalculably to our understanding ofdifference and 
the importance ofdeveloping cross-cultural competencies,413 and the introduction 
of clinics into the law school curriculum (and their progress, albeit uneven, from 
the margins of the school to more established place) has been widely hailed as a 
critical advance. Schools have witnessed the introduction of more 
interdisciplinary approaches, and classes on interviewing, counseling, and 
negotiation are more readily available, although they are by no means ubiquitous. 
Some initiatives have prevailed over the initial resistance, but there is a long way 
to go. Reform may feel like a Sisyphean task, but doing nothing represents an 
abdication of our duty as legal educators. 
412. One possibility is that in this environment, some law schools will simply not be able to 
survive. The closure ofsome law schools would yield both positive and negative results. Closure 
would limit the number of graduates vying for the same jobs, perhaps making it easier for those 
who make the cut to secure employment, perhaps with an attendant salary increase associated with 
fewer candidates for jobs. In all likelihood, however, those denied entrance would come from the 
groups already underrepresented in law school, the bar, and the bench. Another downside is that 
fewer lawyers would be available to the public in an era when the poor and middle class have few 
legal resources at their disposal. Top law schools would not be at risk, so it would likely be 
independent law schools unconnected to a university capable of absorbing some of the financial 
burden that face closure. The losers would likely include schools that serve a predominantly local 
market and provide community-oriented lawyers. A further potential downside is that the 
decreased competition for students fostered by fewer slots might lessen the pressure on law schools 
to mold the education to student demands for relevancy of their education. 
413. See Margaret E. Johnson, An Experiment in Integrating Critical Theory and Clinical 
Education, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'y& L. 161, 162 (2005); Kathryn M. Stanchi, Step Away 
from the Case Book: A Call/or Balance andIntegration in Law School Pedagogy, 43 HARv. C.R.­
C.L. L. REv. 611,612 (2008) (arguing that law school professors should "increase the number of 
courses that integrate doctrine, theory and skills so that students learn to use both doctrine and legal 
theory, including critical theory, in a practice context"). 
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P. The Gordian Knot 
The above suggestions are inextricably intertwined, sometimes obviously and 
at times more sUbtly. For example, the rising tuition and student debt cannot be 
remediated without considering the factors that make legal education so 
expensive and the emerging proposals to contain costs, a conversation that cannot 
take place outside the context of current efforts to implement potentially 
regressive regulatory reform, which in tum must be viewed in terms of their 
retrograde impact on the entire enterprise oflegal education and the exacerbation 
of already significant structural inequities.414 Access to justice cannot be 
advanced in isolation from institutional indifference to instilling a sense of 
professional commitment to public interest ideals. Further, it is related to efforts 
to increase diversity in law school and the attendant increase in lawyers 
committed to working in underrepresented communities that a diversified 
profession would bring-an effort that loops back again to crushing debt loads, 
which often foreclose the possibility of low-remuneration justice work. Student 
distress cannot be ameliorated without considering changes to our signature 
pedagogy, which must be evaluated for its efficacy in preparing students to 
practice law, especially when it is elevated over skills training and experiential 
learning, priorities that are representative of curricular and institutional policies 
that are influenced by the precarious status of skills faculty within the academy. 
The narrow and repetitive attention to sanitized, de-contextualized facts and 
analytical thinking is exacerbated by faculty reluctance to transmit ideals on 
issues of professionalism, ethics, and morals that are often obfuscated by the 
focus on value-neutral Socratic instruction. Grading methodologies both 
contribute to student distress and fail to provide meaningful and formative 
assessment, but they must be viewed in the context of bar preparation, itself a 
questionable goal given the test's inability to identify and measure the 
competencies necessary for lawyering. All of these factors are refracted through 
the prism of the U.S. News rankings, a singularly destructive tool when assessed 
in light of its impact on legal education. In essence, the seemingly disparate 
factors cannot be easily disaggregated, since they are entangled as part and parcel 
of the whole enterprise of legal education. Nothing short of a radical 
reorientation will remediate the complex set of factors that work synergistically 
to create the current crisis.415 
Perhaps the biggest impediment to meaningful reform is the potentially 
insurmountable challenge of motivating academics to act against their own 
414. See supra Part I.E. 
415. I reluctantly acknowledge that change may be incremental rather than radical, given the 
conservative nature ofour institutions. That reality should not deter us from articulating the ideal 
reforms, because if we concede and internalize the futility of real change, the vision we embrace 
will already be compromised. We should delay pragmatic considerations for later. If we adopt 
even some of these suggestions, they may help to generate institutional change. Even small 
changes can create a meaningful and measurable difference for individual law students and their 
future clients. 
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perceived self-interest in maintaining the status quo. It is not my intent to assert 
a blanket indictment of law professors and their underlying intentions-they 
reflect in large part the institutions to which they belong. While I repeatedly and 
emphatically question our motivations and conclusions, I believe that some ofthe 
individual and institutional tendencies toward self-preservation are not conscious 
and deliberate, but rather uncritical. That said, we must challenge the blind 
adherence to the dogma ofcurrent legal pedagogy without demonizing those who 
subscribe to its tenets. The prevailing confidence in the fundamental wisdom of 
our current system must be evaluated by something other than the vigor of the 
beliefs underlying it. Although there is a difference in intent between actively 
obstructing change and passively hindering reform with inertia, the end result is 
the same. If we stand by and do nothing, we are complicit in this deteriorating 
system. If we just cobble together piecemeal reforms that cohere only in their 
unwillingness to challenge the status quo, meaningful reform will be effectively 
obstructed. I am not alone in feeling increasingly agitated about this enterprise 
and my role in it, and I would welcome an open, engaged, expansive, and 
inclusive conversation in which we genuinely step outside our personal and 
institutional interests to figure out what is best for the students,416 the profession, 
and the society in which the law operates.417 
CONCLUSION 
Legal education is at a critical crossroads.418 Most commentators, even those 
who argue that the time is ripe to transform legal education, are not sanguine 
about the prospects of meaningful change. Given legal education's history of 
successfully thwarting reforms, observers are justifiably cynical about generating 
any groundswell of support for reorienting our institutions. Admittedly, the 
barriers are enormous and perhaps insurmountable, especially if legal educators 
continue to resist engaging in unflinching introspection about our mission and 
methods. While this Article proposes sweeping changes that are likely to be 
dismissed as quixotic, we must make an effort to engender these conversations 
not just on a national level among the most vociferous interested parties, but also 
at the level of institutional discourse, and even through individual conversations 
in the hallways. Law professors can be impassioned, resolute, and outspoken, but 
they often to fail to leaven their opinions with humility and introspection. We 
must question our own assumptions and open our minds to think charitably about 
the positions espoused by others instead ofsilencing or marginalizing dissenters. 
416. As one of the largest stakeholders in this enterprise, students should also be invited to 
participate in this dialogue. 
417. I concede discomfort with threads ofmy discussion. Some ideas, proposed with the best 
intentions of reform aimed at the students, could easily be hijacked and backfire. For others, I 
merely identify something that needs to be examined and changed, without suggesting a particular 
solution, in part because the considerations are complex and the answers opaque. 
418. For many schools, the current crisis will not represent an existential threat. For other 
schools, the risk is real, and those schools face a stark choice: they can either sit at the helm and 
navigate through necessary reforms, or they can focus on rearranging deck chairs. 
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We must articulate with brutal honesty the depth and breadth ofthe problems and 
acknowledge that our own self-interest colors our perceptions. We can resort to 
unproductive and antagonistic finger-pointing, demand incontrovertible empirical 
evidence and an appealing bottom line before we take reform seriously, and cling 
tenaciously to a tradition which serves us, but no longer serves our students. 
Alternatively, we can work diligently to overcome faculty resistance to venturing 
out beyond our comfort zones. 
For those determined to widen the lens through which we view reform, it 
would be a shame if we ceded our demands for meaningful reform at the outset 
and settled out of the box for less contested change instead of mobilizing 
attention and resistance to the current crisis. Only after we are able to shake the 
foundation of legal education should we seek common ground to rebuild legal 
education from its roots. Consensus is a messy, frustrating, and at times 
alienating process, but the underlying principle suggests that the process builds 
alliances among former adversaries, opens minds, and ultimately yields a more 
sustainable result with broader buy-in from the diverse constituencies. Law 
professors, known to be a combative bunch, will never unanimously subscribe to 
a revamped, uniform pedagogy, however elegantly articulated, but refusal to 
participate in good faith makes those resisting change unwitting accomplices in 
maintaining the much maligned status quo. In order to embark on this process, 
we must be willing to examine the entire enterprise. The inextricable 
interconnection among many ofthe malfunctioning components demands nothing 
less than a wholesale reevaluation of our current system. Integrity compels us to 
speak truth to power, even if it is not for the faint of heart. Perhaps this is the 
perfect storm to motivate long overdue, enduring change that inures to the benefit 
ofour students, the legal system, and the bedrock principle ofequal justice under 
law. 
